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ABSTRACT 
John Matson, Shellev's Idea of Nature: A Study of the Interrelationship of 
Subject and Object in the Hajor Poems, Ph.D thesis, University of Durham, 
1995. 
The thesis offers an interpretation of Shelley's poetry which focuses on his 
treatment of external nature. Its main argument is that a subject-object 
dialectic lies at the basis of his thought and style. Hanifesting itself as a 
tension and oscillation between dualist and monist tendencies, this dialectic 
underlies the opposing strains of thought associated with his sceptical 
idealism; it informs the relationship between various contraries with which he 
is recurrently concerned, such as reason and feeling, necessity and freedom, 
language and thought; and it accounts for some major characteristics of his 
style--for example, its self-reflexiveness, indeterminacy, and restless 
forvmrd momentum. Nature is found to play a complex dual function in this 
dialectical process: first, as the circumference to the circle of Hhich mind 
is the centre, it provides the material of thought and poetry; secondly, 
through its cyclic processes, ~t serves as an emblem of the mind's dynamic 
relationship with that material. In finding the characteristic thought-pattern 
of his poetry to be constituted of a creative-destructive interplay of 
contraries, the thesis contends that Shelley is a significant exponent of 
Romantic irony. Such a reading of his work mediates between an earlier 
tradition of interpreting him as a Platonising poet of nature and the more 
recent emphasis that has been given to his philosophical scepticism and 
political radicalism. Throughout, attention is given to the interacting 
influences of his direct experience of nature (as recorded mainly in his 
letters) and the representations of nature he encounters in his reading. The 
following poems, chosen for their importance in Shelley's canon and as clear 
illustrations of his treatment of nature, are discussed chronologically in 
successive chapters: Queen l-iab, Alaster, the 1816 odes, Prometheus Unbound, 
Adonais, and The Triumph of Life. 
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C h a p t e r 1 
Introduction: 'Ten Thousand Orbs Involving and Involved' 
In the Preface to her edition of Shelley's Posthumous Poems (1824) Hary 
Shelley describes her husband's way of life and preoccupations as follows: 
His life was spent in the contemplation of Nature, in arduous study, 
or in acts of kindness and affection. He was an elegant scholar and a 
profound metaphysician; without possessing much scientific knowledge, 
he was unrivalled in the justness and extent of his observations on 
natural objects; he knew every plant by its name, and was familiar 
with the history and the habits of every production of the earth; he 
could interpret without a fault each appearance in the sky; and the 
varied phenomena of heaven and earth filled him with deep emotion. He 
made his study and reading-room of the shadowed copse, the stream, the 
lake, and the waterfall •••• Such was his love for Nature that every 
page of his poetry is associated, in the minds of his friends, with 
the loveliest scenes of the countries which he inhabited. (Hutchinson, 
pp. xxv-xxvi) 
Although it is hardly a balanced view of Shelley's interests, much of what 
Mary Shelley says here about his love of nature is borne out in his writings--
his letters and journal entries as well as his poetry. Indeed, the language of 
her Preface is so reminiscent of the material she has been collecting and 
editing that her portrait appears to be drawn from it as much as from her 
memory. 
As if in anticipation of her exalted view of him as a lover of nature, 
Shelley writes in his essay 'On Life' (1819) that an 'intense delight' in the 
1 
external world 'is esteemed to be the distinguishing mark of a refined and 
extraordinary person' (R&P, p. 475). Horeover, he evidently regarded it as an 
important qualification of the poet. Although in his sonnet 'To Hordsworth 1 
(1816) he condemns the 'Poet of Nature' for his political tergiversation, he 
nevertheless aspired to be a nature poet after the Wordsworthian example. 
Describing his education as a poet in the Preface to The Revolt of Islam 
(1818), he writes, 'I have been familiar from boyhood with mountains and 
lakes, and the sea, and the solitude of forests', and he goes on to identify 
the two main components of his poetic training as a wide knowledge of 
literature and a varied experience of 'the beautiful and majestic scenery of 
the earth' (Hutchinson, pp. 34-5). Having seen some of the remnants of 
classical art in Italy, he writes to Peacock from Rome on 23-24 January 1819, 
that he now understood 'why the Greeks were such great Poets •••• They lived in 
a perpetual commerce with external nature and nourished themselves upon the 
spirit of its forms' (Jones, II, 74). As Mary Shelley suggests, his own poetry 
bears the frequent imprint of his direct observation of natural phenomena and 
scenery, and in Prometheus Unbound (1820) and its accompanying lyrics 
particularly he attempts to recapture something of the spirit of openness to 
nature that he finds in Greek art. 
Although for over a century after his death it was to a considerable extent 
as a poet of nature that Shelley was read and judged, this aspect of his 
poetry has since been almost completely overlooked, as John Freeman has 
1 
observed. The main cause of its neglect has been its association with an 
interpretation of his poetry which in recent decades has been generally 
discredited by a greatly increased awareness of his philosophical scepticism 
and political radicalism. Prior to this critical sea-change, Shelley was 
widely regarded as a mystical Platonist who internalised the outward forms of 
nature as symbols of a transcendent ideal--a conception which was never wholly 
2 
separable from the sentimental Victorian myth of the 'beautiful and 
2 
ineffectual angel'. His preoccupation with nature has never recovered from 
its contamination with these views. Consequently, while Wordsworth's idea of 
nature continues to be much discussed in terms of its ideological and 
philosophical implications, Shelley's is considered almost extraneous to his 
3 
major interests. 
In re-examining Shelley's attitude to the external world in this thesis, I 
shall argue that both the former concentration on this aspect of his work and 
the current neglect of it are equally misrepresentative of its importance to 
his other poetic and philosophical concerns. Moreover, I shall suggest that an 
understanding of Shelley's view of nature offers a means by which the 
visionary idealist and the revolutionary sceptic can be seen as less exclusive 
of each other than the swing in critical opinion has tended to suggest. Both 
conceptions of the poet have, after all, always had their adherents, and most 
critics have attempted to accommodate both; though they have nearly always 
done so by subordinating one to the other. Shelley's bifurcated vision is now 
commonly referred to as his sceptical idealism. No two critics, however, mean 
precisely the same thing by the term, and above all they differ about the 
relative importance of the opposing tendencies, and about the nature of the 
4 
relationship between them. 
In this chapter, within the context of a survey of relevant critical 
approaches to Shelley's work, I aim to show in broad terms how his concept of 
nature can explain the connection between quite contrary aspects of his 
thought. I begin by considering some of the characteristics of the nineteenth-
and earlier twentieth-century views of Shelley as a nature poet, and I return 
first of all to Mary Shelley's comments about him in her editions of his 
poetry. 
3 
i 
Mary Shelley's remarks about Shelley's poetry are in many ways typical of 
later Victorian views, and, as P.D. Fleck has suggested, were probably 
5 
influential in forming them. Motivated mainly by a concern for the reception 
of the poems, she plays down his dangerous opinions in the Prefaces to her 
1824 and 1839 editions, and her portrayal of him in the first of these as 
6 
primarily a lover of nature is one of the ways in which she does so. In the 
1839 Preface and Notes she writes of him with greater critical distance, and 
her tone of reverence is more obviously qualified by an implicit censure. This 
ambivalence extends to her judgement of the poems, which she divides into two 
types--on the one hand, those which are 'purely imaginative' and reveal his 
'clinging to the subtler inner spirit, rather than to the outward form', and 
on the other, those which 'sprang from the emotions of the heart', some of 
which derive from 'sentiments inspired by natural objects' (Hutchinson, p. 
xxii). This is certainly a questionable categorisation of the poems, but it 
points to an important contradiction both in Mary Shelley's response and 
ultimately in the poetry itself. She makes it clear that she prefers the poems 
which 'sprang from the emotions' to those which are 'purely imaginative', for 
the latter she finds too subtly metaphysical and remote from common human 
feeling. This fault, however, is turned to account in her mythologizing of the 
poet. His imagination is seen as a form of escape from harsh reality and 
painful human contact: 
[from] the sad vicissitudes of human life ••• he delivered up his soul to 
poetry, and felt happy when he sheltered himself from the influence of 
human sympathies, in the wildest regions of fancy •••• He loved to 
idealize reality; and this is a taste shared by few •••• In this, Shelley 
resembled Plato; both taking more delight in the abstract and the ideal 
than in the special and tangible. (Hutchinson, p. xxii) 
4 
This portrayal clearly conflicts with the lover of nature she describes in 
1824, who was 'unrivalled in the justness and extent of his observations on 
natural objects', and also with the poet who gives spontaneous expression to 
'the sentiments inspired by natural objects'. There is a further contrast 
between his avoidance of 'human sympathies' in his 'purely imaginative' poems 
and his description, in the other class, of 'emotions common to us all', such 
as love, grief and despondency. In Hary Shelley's account there are thus 
clearly divergent tendencies in Shelley's poetry between his idealization of, 
and hence·escape from, the external world, and his close observation and 
immediate response to it, and between his tendency to speculative thought and 
his expression of immediate feeling. 
The tenor and many of the details of Mary Shelley's view of the poet are 
regularly repeated in criticism throughout the Victorian period. Her 
distinction between Shelley's two kinds of apprehension of nature is 
particularly common. Parke Godwin, for example, writes in 1843: 
Shelley was by no means deficient in sensibility: he loved the external 
world; was ever living in the broad, open air, under the wide skies; and 
was keenly alive to the picturesque and harmonious in Nature. But his 
power of reflection predominated over the power of his senses. He was 
more at home in the microcosm of his own thoughts, than in the larger 
world of Nature. He was ever proceeding from the centre, that is, of his 
own mind, outward to the visible universe. He was ever transferring the 
operations of his mind to the operations of Nature. 7 
In the opinion of Margaret Fuller Osoli, Shelley surpasses all other poets of 
his day in two characteristics, his fertility of fancy, and his sympathy with 
8 
nature. For Robert Browning, 'his noblest and predominating characteristic' 
is 'his simultaneous perception of Power and Love in the absolute, and of 
5 
9 
Beauty and Good in the concrete'. W.B. Yeats too, though interpreting Shelley 
as a Platonist and symbolist, speaks of his consciousness of the externality 
of things, and emphasizes his view that mind 'cannot create, it can only 
10 
perceive'. 
There is however often a tendency among Victorian critics, particularly 
those who peddle the more extreme forms of the angelic myth, to lose sight of 
the importance to Shelley of an immediate apprehension of the external world, 
and at the same time to suggest an absence of intellectual substance in his 
imaginative flights. A contrast with Wordsworth's greater concreteness is 
often the occasion of their doing so. For example, Walter Bagehot writes, 
'Wordsworth describes the earth as we know it, with all its peculiarities •••• 
Shelley ••• rushes away among the stars; this earth is an assortment of imagery, 
he uses it to deck some unknown planet', while Francis Thompson, the doyen of 
Shelley's sentimental Victorian interpreters, considers that 'he deviates from 
the true Nature poet, the normal Wordsworth type of Nature poet: imagery was 
to him not a mere means of expression, not even a mere means of adornment; it 
11 
was a delight for its own sake'. Even where a tension is acknowledged 
between Shelley's powers of internal and external expression, an emphasis is 
usually given to the former. Thus Matthew Arnold, who sees in him 'a 
passionate straining after both', concludes that 'the right sphere for 
Shelley's genius was the sphere of music' because he lacked the 'intellectual 
12 
force' and 'sanity' to master the representational medium of words. A more 
common and indulgent explanation of Shelley's departure from the world of 
sense impressions and plain sense was sought in what was regarded as his 
childlike simplicity. Mary Shelley herself speaks of his 'luxury of 
imagination, which sought nothing beyond itself (as a child burdens itself 
with spring flowers, thinking of no use beyond the enjoyment of gathering 
them)' (Hutchinson, p. xxii), and ultimately she, like Browning and Yeats, 
6 
gives the main emphasis to his Platonising inwardness and transcendentalism. 
Although the New Critics are mainly hostile to Shelley their assumptions 
about him are essentially the same as those generally held in the nineteenth 
13 
century, as Timothy Webb has pointed out. Leavis 1s complaint about his 'weak 
grasp upon the actual' recalls /' William Hazlitt's description of his ~oetry as 
14 
a 'confused embodying of vague abstractions'; the comparison he draws with 
the concreteness of Wordsworth has been made many times before; and the lack 
of correspondence he detects between outward things and feelings, and between 
feelings and ideas, is reminiscent of Arnold's criticism. W.H. Auden and T.S. 
Eliot to some extent go along with Leavis, the former complaining that Shelley 
'never looked at or listened to anything', the latter that he deals in 
'abstract ideas' which are merely adolescent, and in sound rather than 
15 
sense. Eliot thus perpetuates the notions of Shelley's poor intellect, 
musicality and immaturity that have long been current. 
For at least the first half of the twentieth century Shelley continues to 
be read primarily as a Platonist or pantheist, and with regard to his 
representations of the external world the emphasis remains on his 
abstractness, and his tendency to assimilate natural forms to an inward 
16 
conception of unity. Richard Harter Fogle, comparing the imagery of Keats 
and Shelley in 1949, clearly articulates some of the best insights of his own 
and earlier periods into Shelley's attitude to nature when he writes: 
Shelley's poetic world is not a literal transcription of his perceptions 
of the natural world, but a conscious arrangement and composition of 
these perceptions •••• While Keats permits things to rest in their 
complexity, Shelley consciously imposes upon them the order of his 
intellect, reshaping them according to his restless and masterful 
will •••• He is sometimes concerned less with the world as it is than with 
the world as he would have it •••• [His] poetry strives continually to 
express by images an absolute truth or beauty beyond the scope of 
7 
imagery •••• [He] is abstract in that his poetry continually climbs 
towards abstraction on steps of concrete imagery •••• [He] is 
intellectually a Monist, emotionally and instinctively a Dualist. He is 
always attempting to reconcile these two poles of his nature, and never 
. . 17 qulte succeedlng. 
This helps us to identify certain features of Shelley's treatment of nature 
which are inferred if not explicitly defined in much of the criticism we have 
considered so far, and which can be summarized as follows. First, he has a 
tendency to transform outward impressions into an abstract and inward ideal, 
which supplants the concrete actuality on which it depends. Nature therefore 
has two functions in his poetry which tend to conflict: it is at once the 
subject and the material of poetry, or, in other words, it serves as both the 
object of perception and the source of poetic images. Related to this conflict 
is a tension between inner and outer worlds, and, correspondingly, between 
thought and feeling. There is also a sense that Shelley's poetry has a 
tendency to break away from referentiality, to enjoy what Mary Shelley calls 
the 'luxury of imagination', and Arnold the condition of music. I'·Ioreover, as 
Fogle says, he is both a monist and a dualist, always striving vainly towards 
a conception of ideal unity. These various forms of tension, which are all 
finally reducible to a relationship of attraction and repulsion between 
subject and object, are, I shall argue, an ioportant characteristic of 
Shelley's poetry throughout his career. However, the complex structure and 
process of thought to which they contribute are quite different in effect from 
any conception of Shelley's poetry that has so far been considered. 
8 
ii 
In considering the subject-object relationship in Shelley's poetry there are 
two paradigms from his own writing that I wish to make use of, both based on 
the idea of the circle. The first of these is his much-favoured metaphor of 
the centre and circumference of a circle, generally used to describe the 
18 
situation of the individual mind in the surrounding universe. It is thus 
JA employed in 10n Life', a short but complex essayAwhich gives his fullest 
statement in prose of his understanding of the relationship between mind and 
nature. Through an examination of this essay I will show that there is a 
philosophical basis to Shelley's poetic treatment of external nature as it has 
so far been defined. 
The essay's central argument, following Hume, but more immediately the 
'intellectual system' (R&P, p. 476), as Shelley calls it, of Sir William 
Drummond, is that there is only a nominal distinction between ideas and 
external objects, and that therefore life is to be conceived as a unity. 
However, the image of the circle of existence consisting of centre and 
circumference tends to resist the notion of complete unity, and suggests 
19 
rather what Wasserman calls a 'paradoxically monistic dualism'. The two 
axioms upon which Shelley's philosophy rests--on the one hand, 'nothing exists 
but as it is perceived', and on the other, mind 'cannot create, it can only 
perceive' (R&P, pp. 476, 478)--are the basis of this paradox. Assuming a 
distinction between perceiver and percept at the very moment of denying there 
is such a distinction, the two statements also contradict each other 
concerning which is prior. Thus the circle is also the figure of a circular 
logic by which mind and nature exist interdependently; which is perhaps the 
nearest that Shelley can come to conceiving that absolute unity to which the 
'intellectual system' leads him. 
There is, however, another weakness in his reasoning which renders even 
9 
this conception of a duality-within-unity an unstable one. The statement 
'nothing exists but as it is perceived' represents a further contradiction in 
being an objective assertion of complete subjectivity. In A Defence of Poetry 
Shelley rewords this doctrine as 'All things exist as they are perceived: at 
least in relation to the percipient' (R&P, p. 505). This version is not only, 
as Terence Allan Hoagwood points out, less dogmatic and therefore more truly 
sceptical, but it avoids the contradiction of the statement in 'On Life' by 
distinguishing the point of view of the 'percipient' from that of the 
statement's speaker, \vho, like Hume and Drummond, allovrs the possibility of an 
20 
unknowable world beyond perception. It thus makes no objective claim to 
unity. In his statement in 'On Life', on the other hand, Shelley, unwittingly 
it would seem, moves from a position of strict phenomenalism to one of 
objective idealism. This shift becomes all the plainer \vhen, having denied the 
separate reality of distinct individual minds and described 'The words, I, 
~' thev' as 'merely marks employed to denote the different modifications of 
the one mind' of existence, he then proceeds to say, 'Let it not be supposed 
that this doctrine conducts to the oonstrous presumption, that I, the person 
\vho now write and think, am that one mind 1 ( R&P, pp. 4 77-8) • But the 
phenomenalist position that he has until now been expounding leads to 
precisely this conclusion, and it is only when he introduces the self-
consciousness of 1 I, the person \lho nmv write and think 1 , and so objectifies 
the unity he has been proclaiming, that he is compelled to shift his ground. 
Shelley's attempt to overcome the epistemological dualism of mind and 
matter through a view of life as a unity thus gives rise to an ontological 
dualism of the self-conscious subject and a merely notional unity of mind and 
its objects. There are therefore two senses in which the essay speaks of life 
as a unity: first, it is an immediate, subjective experience, involving 'an 
unusually intense and vivid apprehension', and causing those affected to 'feel 
1 0 
as if their nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe, or as if the 
surrounding universe were absorbed into their being'; and second, it is an 
object of reflection, the result of a thread of reasoning, which leaves 'the 
relations of things ••• unchanged 1 (R&P, pp. 477-78). The 'great miracle' of 
life as a unity in the first sense, the essay suggests, even.if in some way it 
can be experienced by children and those subject to the state of 'reverie', 
cannot be fully comprehended intellectually; we can only come to 'that verge 
where words abandon us, and what wonder if we grow dizzy to look down on the 
dark abyss of--how little we know' (R&P, pp. 475-78). But as an object of 
thought it becomes the projection and ultimately the assertion of a unity 
which is unknowable and inexpressible as experience. In his discussion of 
Shelley's 'intellectual philosophy' Wasserman writes: 
Shelley wishes not only to formulate a liberating phenomenalistic 
interpretation of Existence but also to include in his conception of the 
'universe' the trans-phenomenal realm of absolute Being that embraces 
and stands behind Existence. 21 
Wasserman has been taken to task by a number of critics for this comment, and 
not without some justice, for he provides little argumentative basis for it, 
relying instead on his claim that Shelley 'wishes' to conceive of a 'realm of 
22 
absolute Being'. Nevertheless, it can be argued from 'On Life' that in the 
two modes in which unity is discussed--as 'that which is all', but also as 
something which lies beyond that 1all 1--Shelley does, perhaps inadvertently in 
this essay, give a place to the trans-phenomenal in his philosophy. Thus 
understood, 'On Life' provides a useful insight into Shelley's sceptical 
idealism. The two strains of his thought included in this term coincide and 
become indistinguishable in the phenomenalist unity which the assertion that 
1 1 
'nothing exists but as it is perceived' is intended to explain. But the 
contradictions in his argument also reveal that his scepticism and idealism 
diverge in response to the subject's irrepressible self-consciousness and its 
need to project an ideal and objective other as a means of self-definition. 
The essay thus points to an opposition between subjective and objective, 
monist and dualist views of the world. 
So far we have arrived at a view of Shelley's relation with the external 
world which is not essentially different from that which is typical of the 
criticism already considered. It is also congruent with accounts given by 
/ 
various critics writing in the 1950s and 1960s of the treatment of nature in 
Romantic poetry generally and \'l'ordsworth particularly. \'lilliam \-'limsatt refers 
to what Wordsworth calls 'the conferring, the abstracting, and the modifying 
powers of the Imagination' to explain the Romantic spiritualization of the 
23 
landscape, and the warping of vehicle by tenor. Geoffrey Hartman observes in 
Wordsworth's poetry a recurring process by which in successive stages the 
autonomous imagination transcends nature, the light of the senses is 
extinguished, the progress of poetry is temporarily halted, and finally the 
24 
poet returns to nature once more. This description of the mind-nature 
interchange in Wordsworth lies somewhere between the Coleridgean argument of 
M.H. Abrams that for the Romantics imagination and art have the power of 
synthesizing the natural and the human, and Paul de Han's view of the 
intentional nature of Romantic poetry and the irremediable split between 
25 
consciousness and the external world. 'On Life' also bridges these two 
points of view in that it overtly proclaims the unity of ideas and external 
objects but tacitly reveals such a notion to be unrealizable. 
A similar tension is repeatedly revealed in Shelley's poetry, as all those 
who have seen it as striving towards a Platonic oneness implicitly recognize. 
Yet this is still not an adequate account of the subject-object relationship 
1 2 
in his poetry. For, as I shall go on to show, the two contrary positions 
between which he is pUlled are not statically opposed as in an irresolvable 
antithesis, but are rather involved in a continuously reciprocating interplay. 
This oscillating process bears some resemblance to the cyclical stages that 
Hartman observes in Wordsworth's poetry, but is far more dynamic and 
pervasive, operating at all levels of Shelley's poetry. Above all, through 
giving priority to neither nature rior mind, it becomes for Shelley, not a 
1 chastening and corrective process as for Wordsworth, but a means to creative 
freedom. 
iii 
To explain this dynamic relationship of nature and mind it is necessary to go 
beyond the static metaphor of the centre and circumference, and I therefore 
refer to a second paradigm, that of the natural cycle. This appears in 
Shelley's poetry in a variety of forms--in the daily, monthly and yearly 
rotation of the heavenly bodies, in the hydrological and electrical cycles as 
Shelley understood them, and in various cycles of death and rebirth. These and 
the various phenomena associated with them are repeatedly used by Shelley to 
represent the way in which subject, object and their projected unity are 
caught in a continuous cycle whereby the relationships between them constantly 
shift and change. It is hardly too much to say that the tensions, ambiguities 
and tautologies of these evolving and revolving relationships are the major 
subject of Shelley's poetry. 
Although in its ramifications this cyclical process is infinitely complex, 
in its bare bones it is very simple, and is readily described. Its first 
stages, in fact, already have been. Through its interrelation with nature the 
mind conceives of what is initially a unity between them. This ideal unity 
inevitably eclipses and supplants nature as an externality. But the self-
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consciousness re-asserts itself to drive a wedge between mind and the unity it 
has conceived. External nature is then rediscovered but in an alienated state. 
The mind seeks reintegration with nature, but the original unity, now an 
abstraction, stands between them. Finally, through the sceptical dismantling 
of this abstraction, the possibility of a reunion between mind and nature 
arises, and the cycle can continue. 
This cycle is observable in a variety of forms in Shelley's writing. At its 
most basic level it is a process of thought by which perceptions constantly 
succeed one another. Shelley describes this process in a prose fragment 
entitled 'Difficulty of Analyzing the Human Hind': 
But thought can with difficulty visit the intricate and winding chambers 
which it inhabits. It is like a river whose rapid and perpetual stream 
flows outwards;--like one in dread who speeds through the recesses of 
some haunted pile, and dares not look behind. The caverns of the mind 
are obscure, and shadowy; or pervaded with a lustre, beautifully bright 
indeed, but shining not beyond their portals. If it were possible to be 
where we have been, vitally and indeed--if, at the moment of our 
presence there, we could define the results of our experience,--if the 
passage from sensation to reflection--from a state of passive perception 
to voluntary contemplation, were
2
6ot so dizzying and so tumultuous, this 
attempt would be less difficult. 
In this description of thought's headlong motion we can trace the same 
analysis of mind that underlies the exposition of the 'intellectual 
philosophy' in 'On Life'. In both instances Shelley relies on a dialectical 
triadic structure of subject, object and their objectified unity. \Vhat Shelley 
calls 'sensation' or 'passive perception' is always irretrievably past because 
'sensation' cannot be thought without immediately turning into 'reflection'. 
If it can be spoken of at all as a present experience, it involves the wholly 
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unconscious mergence of subject and object. But that putative present 
experience, so urgently desired, can only be consciously known through 
becoming an object of 'reflection' or 'voluntary contemplation' in the future. 
Hence, as he writes in 'On Life', 'man ••• exist[s] but in the future and the 
past, being, not what he is, but what he has been, and shall be' (R&P, p. 
476). The objectifying consciousness, by permanently banishing the knowledge 
of present sensation into the future (just as it allows past sensation only to 
be known in the present), provides the impetus to thought's forward motion. 
But when Shelley refers to this motion as the 'dizzying' and 'tumultuous' 
'passage from sensation to reflection' I think we must infer that he means not 
one single transition but a consecutive series of them, as sensation and 
reflection, subjectivity and objectivity, leapfrog each other in a rapid and 
continuing dialectical progression; but he may well speak of this 'passage' in 
the singular because the effect is of only one sensation--that which is always 
past, 'beautifully bright indeed, but shining not' beyond the portals of the 
mind's caverns. But because what is conceived as belonging to the past is 
sought in the future, past and future become oddly alike, as do flight and 
pursuit, while to go forward is always in a sense to go back, and vice versa. 
The desired convergence of sensation and reflection, which would allow us 
'to be where we have been, vitally and indeed' and 'at the moment of our 
presence there ••• [to] define the results of our experience', is thus conceived 
as the unattainable origin and end of thought. Without this notion of unity or 
power, however delusive and destructive it may turn out to be, there can be no 
process of interaction between thought and its objects. At the same time, it 
is revealed as the product of this process, and therefore its original 
centrality is also paradoxically denied. The process can in consequence appear 
to usurp the position of the power it creates and destroys. In the 'Ode to the 
ivest Hind', for example, the 'Spirit' of the wind, the 'Destroyer and 
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Preserver' (14), is evidently a process that has become a power: it is the 
actual motion of the wind and the process of death and destruction, but the 
poet also grants it the status of an 'unseen presence' (2), or moving pm·Jer. 
But in such cases the process-turned-power itself is absorbed into a yet 
larger process; and so the autumn west wind is only the manifestation of a 
stage in the cycle of the seasons, and will have to give way to winter and 
spring. Just as the projection of mind and nature as a unity creates another 
duality, so the stepping outside of one cycle necessarily involves stepping 
into a larger one, and so the process widens indefinitely. A recurring emblem 
of these cycles within cycles is the image of concentric circles or spheres, 
such as the 'Ten thousand orbs involving and involved', which spin with 'self-
destroying swiftness', in Panthea's vision of the Earth in Prometheus Unbound 
Act 4 (241, 249). Through the successive displacement of cycles the dialectic 
remains teleological, always throwing up a new power to replace the one it 
dethrones. 'Veil after veil may be undrawn, and the inmost naked beauty of the 
meaning never exposed', Shelley •~ites in A Defence of Poetrv (1821; R&P, p. 
500), but the unveiling is only pursued in the expectation that the 'naked 
beauty' lies within. The process is therefore not merely rotational but 
progressive as well; it does not stop with the triadic relationship of nature, 
mind and their synthesis or 'power', but becomes a dialectic between power and 
process, which is capable of endless self-renewal and self-expansion. 
The interaction of the circle and cycle paradigms, in the first of which 
nature functions as the object of mind, and in the second as a figure for its 
own revolving relationship with mind, is responsible for much of the 
complexity of Shelley's poetry, and for a number of its characteristic 
features of style. In particular, it gives rise to various forms of 
indeterminacy. Like subject and object, figure and reality also oscillate 
between attraction and repulsion, sometimes becoming indistinguishable and 
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even appearing to change places, as in the inversion of similes and the 
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interweaving of tenor and vehicle, which have been noted by William Keach. 
There is a similar alternation between allegory and symbol, and between 
external reference and self-reflexiveness, and the figural modes not only 
coexist but interact, confirming and undermining each other with an effect 
sometimes of almost vertiginous instability. Shelley's dialectic operates 
within the moral and political as well as the metaphysical spheres, and with 
the same tendency to indeterminacy, for just as unity and power have 
contradictory aspects, so any form of good subjectively experienced is 
potentially an evil once conceived objectively as an abstraction. Hence, as 
G~offrey Matthews has pointed out, recurrent concepts and symbols in Shelley's 
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poetry can express directly opposite qualities depending on their context. 
According to John Frere, Coleridge once remarked of Shelley that he was 'a 
man of great power as a poet, and could he only have had some notion of order, 
could you only have given him some plane whereon to stand, and look down upon 
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his own mind, he would have succeeded.' Indeed, Shelley's poetry constantly 
dismantles an~ such 'notion of order', or 'plane', even while it seeks to 
establish one. Alternating between subjective and objective viewpoints, he 
finds no firm ground of reference either inside or outside his writing, which 
consequently often slides between different levels of fiction and reality, and 
resists the closure of a final coherence. There is, in other words, a 
dialectic to be observed not only within the poems but in their relation to 
the world outside them, which includes the author, the reader, and the 
conditions of the time in which both live. The poetry's failure to achieve 
completeness or unity of meaning, to bring together world and text, always has 
the potential to be either a curse or a blessing. It can be the cause of deep 
pessimism, but on the other hand the dialectic itself, through its own 
destructive creativity, can, or can almost, be felt to constitute the goal 
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whose very notion it persistently demolishes; and the two responses are never 
far removed from each other. 
iv 
A number of recent critics have found in Shelley's poetry some kind of dynamic 
or dialectical process resembling the one I have described. Foremost among 
these is Jerrold Hogle, who identifies a preconscious 'radical transference' 
as the basic drive of his writings. Starting with the declaration in 'On Life' 
that an 'object of thought' is always a 'thought upon which any other thought 
is employed' (R&P, p. 478), he goes on to explain transference in a way that 
is similar to my own explanation of the fragment 'Difficulty of Analyzing the 
Human Mind' : 
Each basic thought is ••• a motion between at least two 'externalities'. 
It is a drive toward a counterpart rising ahead of it and a harking back 
to a different one receding in its wake. It seeks a future relationship 
that may carry forward a portion of a previous one now outside it and 
already dissolved •••• Every instant of mental life is a passing from 
moments only partially remembered to others that redefine their 
predecesssors from a later angle only to be redefined themselves at 
30 
other moments far ahead. 
Although I am indebted to Hogle's account of Shelleyan transference my own 
understanding of it is essentially different. At no point does Hogle question, 
or consider that Shelley questions, the latter's stated belief in the 
underlying unity of thoughts and things (or what Hogle refers to as 
'externalities'), even though the main force of transference is aimed at the 
dethroning of any such centre at one with itself. Rather, he argues that 
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transference 'generates 11 inside 11 and 11 outside 11 as functions of itself'. Yet 
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Shelley's scepticism cuts two ways on the question of subject-object 
relations: it casts doubt on the distinction between ideas and external 
objects, but it also questions the notion of their unity. In the cyclical 
process of his thought there is, as we have seen, a close connection between 
an empirical dualism of subject and object and a transcendental dualism, and 
both have an essential function in that process at the same time that they are 
repeatedly undermined by it. As William Ulmer writes, 'transference is 
meaningless except in relation to an otherness ••• [which is] as endemic to 
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Shelley as transference itself'. The flaw in Hogle's interpretation is 
underscored by one particular material inaccuracy. In arguing the all-
subsuming function of transference he claims it is written at the end of 'On 
Life' that '"motion produces mind" rather than the reverse', but what Shelley 
actually writes is: 'It is said that mind produces motion and it might as well 
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have been said that motion produces mind' (R&P, p. 478). In thus giving 
equal weight to Qoth propositions, Shelley makes almost explicit the 
dialectical nature of the mind's operations. 
Timothy Clark argues that Hogle's idea of transference is a version of 
romantic irony that lacks the justification of a transcendental conception of 
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the subject. The dialectical process of Shelley's poetry which I have been 
describing does, on the other hand, more fully exemplify the characteristics 
of romantic irony. Recent commentators on this literary mode have not, by and 
large, singled out Shelley as one of its practitioners, while those critics 
who have noted the presence of irony in his work have generally meant little 
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more by the term than that he remains sceptical of his own ideal imaginings. 
Yet Shelley's \ITiting, I suggest, fits some accounts of romantic irony well. 
Lilian Furst, for example, stresses the 'openness' of romantic irony and its 
affirmation of an infinite universe, in which flux, change and growth 
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were the norms, and where indeterminacy, chaos, ambivalence and 
relativism were evaluated as positive preliminaries to a progression 
towards the ideal •••• The polar tensions of contradiction and paradox 
were esteemed as productive stimulants to growth in a sequence that 
comprised negation as well as assertion. 36 
Anne Mellor explains Friedrich Schlegel's concept of ironic transcendentalism 
in poetry as a dialectical interdependency 'between enthusiastic creation and 
sceptical decreation ••• between the ideal an~ the real, between the chaos of 
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becoming and the orders of being'. Isobel Armstrong, referring to the 
philosophy of Hegel and his idea of being as 'the process of its own becoming' 
rather than to Schlegel, finds a similar dialectic to be a characteristic of 
·idealist nineteenth-century poetry: 
Being is mediation or transition; it is the continual and reciprocal 
construction and deconstruction of self and other. It is the perpetual 
movement between subject and object. It is neither static subject, nor 
static subject against static object, but the continual movement by 
which one recreates the other. Reality is not outside the self: it is 
th t f 1 t . h" 38 e ac o re a ~ons ~p. 
At its most characteristic and successful, Shelley's poetry is underpinned by 
a relationship of subject and object such as this, and aspires to affirm a 
principle of being through the continual process of becoming which this 
relationship represents. 
Several critics deny that Shelley is concerned with questions of ontology 
except in the negative sense of doubting the existence of all metaphysical 
powers. They do so broadly for two types of reason. On the one hand, those 
such as Kenneth Neill Cameron and P.M.S. Dawson, who lay stress on Shelley's 
engagement with current political issues, believe the main function of his 
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poetry is to offer 'beautiful idealisms of moral excellence' and to 'exalt and 
ennoble humanity' with poetic fictions rather than to make claims to 
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metaphysical truth. On the other hand, critics like John W. Wright and 
Ronald Tetreault, who emphasize his view that 'Language is arbitrarily 
produced by the Imagination and has relation to thoughts alone', consider that 
by means of the synthetic power of metaphor or the play of signifiers 
Shelley's poetry creates its own self-sustaining linguistic universe which 
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involves no transcendental presence. These two approaches, broadly 
classifiable as allegorical and symbolic, are not wholly dissimilar to rival 
conceptions of Shelley that have been current since his own time. Whereas 
Cameron and Dawson are the heirs of the early Owenites in reading him mainly 
politically, Wright and Tetreault, finding a tendency in his poetry towards 
aesthetic autonomy and abstract idealism, belong, despite their denials of his 
metaphysical intent, to the tradition which Mary Shelley helped to form in 
speaking of his 'love of abstract beauty' and 'luxury of imagination, which 
sought nothing beyond itself'. It is not difficult to find evidence in support 
of both points of view in Shelley's work, yet a comprehensive interpretation 
needs to embrace the two, and this a dialectical understanding of his poetry 
makes possible. Moreover, in accommodating both it also corrects them. In 
spite of their anti-metaphysical bias, both approaches assume a logocentric 
ontology, whether they admit it or not. Shelley, more fully sceptical than 
either class of critics quite realizes, deconstructs both allegorical and 
symbolic impulses in his work by pitting them against each other; and at the 
same time the interrelationship between becomes, in the way that Armstrong 
suggests, the basis of an ironic but nevertheless affirmative idealism. 
Hany critics have recognised in Shelley a conflict between what might be 
characterised in general terms as the eighteenth-century values of 
rationality, scepticism and a socially-based morality, and the more typically 
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Romantic preferences for feeling, idealism and a view of ethics which gives 
scope to the individual conscience. Several, particularly those who stress his 
Platonism, have often observed a development from one tendency to the other in 
41 
the course of his career, but most critics now tend to see them as held in 
constant tension throughout. The moral ambivalence that Floyd Stovall finds in 
Shelley between altruism and a search for personal fulfilment is echoed in 
Richard Cronin's observation of the poet's commitment to two kinds of 
~ 
morality, one social and normative, the other individual and empathic. Ross 
Grieg Woodman considers him torn between 'a desire to reform the world and a 
desire to transcend it', and Earl Wasserman similarly sees two rival 
aspirations in his work, one based on human and natural perfectibility, the 
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other on the idea of a perfect eternal afterlife. Indeed, most of those who 
follow C.E. Pulos in emphasizing Shelley's debt to sceptical philosophy, also 
admit an intuitive tendency to transcendentalism in his poetry, which in 
various ways they seek to reconcile with his prevailing rational anti-dualist 
~ 
doubt. Stuart Sperry seeks to redress the balance against these critics by 
stressing the 'emotional power and feeling' of Shelley's verse, and suggesting 
that the 'recent emphasis on Shelley as not only a philosopher but a 
philosopher of a specifically skeptical cast has obscured the fact that he is 
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one of the great visionary idealists of world literature'. The main 
objection to all these approaches, however, is that in seeing his scepticism 
and idealism, his thought and feeling, as merely antithetical qualifications 
of each other, they inevitably diminish both. 
Although a number of critics have observed a dialectical oscillation or 
interdependence between contraries in Shelley's poetry, they have generally 
done so by giving ultimate priority to his idealism. For example, Bloom sees a 
pattern whereby a moment of heightened relationship between the mind and its 
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universe is subsequently dissipated yet not invalidated by experience. 
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Influenced by Bloom, Daniel J. Hughes describes a cyclical action in the 
poetry by which an originating potentiality is repeatedly recuperated from the 
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actuality of form. Wasserman is conscious of an interdependence between 
faith in ultimate Being and a sense of the deceptiveness of the phenomenal 
world, but his final position is decidedly transcendentalist. Ulmer, too, 
believes that Shelley's idealism takes priority over his scepticism, arguing 
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that both are 'oriented to truth-as-presence'. Like Wasserman, he is aware 
of dialectical tensions between the two attitudes, but considers their 
mutually-sustaining relationship ultimately privileges idealism because the 
'contraries are linked in a dynamic symbiosis that takes place within the 
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closed circle of metaphorical form.' I would argue on the other hand that 
the interdependence is equal, and that Shelley quite deliberately breaks open 
the 'closed circle of metaphorical form' to submit his poetry to processes of 
change and renewal that include the world beyond its verbal boundaries. 
Indeed, if he places confidence in the transforming and redeeming power of 
poetry it is because he actually, not merely figuratively, admits the paradox 
that poetic failure is unavoidable as well. 
v 
The poems I have chosen to concentrate on in this study cover Shelley's career 
from beginning to end with a roughly even spread, are of recognized importance 
in his canon, and clearly illustrate his treatment of nature. They are 
considered in turn in the ensuing chapters, whose contents I briefly summarize 
as follows: 
Chapter 2: Queen Mab (1813) is revealing of formative influences, opinions 
and patterns of thought which Shelley adapts and elaborates in later work. In 
this chapter I am primarily concerned with tracing a tension between the overt 
monism and latent dualism which is apparent in the poem's concept of nature. 
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Chapter 3: In the poems of the Alastor volume (1816) a concern with the 
relationship of subject and object takes the place of the mind-matter 
speculations of Queen Mab, thus fndicating Shelley's shift from an eighteenth-
century materialism to a Romantic poetic idealism. In examining Alastor's 
portrayal of idealism's self-defeat, I focus on its themes of nature and 
solitude, particularly as they convey Shelley's response to the poetry of 
Wordsworth. 
Chapter 4: 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' and 'Mont Blanc' (1816) show a 
recovery of Shelley's confidence in the transformative powers of poetry. In 
these two odes he fully develops his sense of a dialectical relationship 
between nature and mind, an understanding of which is encapsulated, I suggest, 
in his concept of 'Power'. 
Chapter 5: The range and depth of the dialectical process are greatly 
extended in Prometheus Unbound, where, I argue, it becomes the basis of the 
poem's dramatisation of a moral and political revolution. I begin this chapter 
by looking at the poem's relationship with 'Mont Blanc' and The Revolt of 
Islam (1818), and then consider the ways in which Shelley's ideas about nature 
and politics entwine. Prometheus's moral reform is viewed in terms of a 
renunciation of desire for a former unity with the external world, an act 
which is transformed by Asia into a process of poetic and political self-
renewal. The final two acts are considered largely as they affect the 
coherence of the play by only partially conforming to its liberating 
dialectic. 
· Chapter 6: In the course of arriving at a view of death which overcomes 
grief and fear, Adonais (1821) proposes various conceptions of the 
relationship between nature and mind. These I relate to discussions on similar 
topics between Shelley and Southey in 1811-12, and to his reading of Keats, 
and argue that through the interaction of different notions of life and death, 
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the poem reaches an open, life-affirming conclusion, rather than a closed,, 
dualist one. r 
Chapter 7: This chapter on The Triumph of Life looks particularly at 
Shelley's rehandling of images of nature found in his various literary 
sources. I challenge Paul de Man's view that the poem represents a repudiation 
of poetry, arguing that in its oscillation between memory and forgetfulness, 
and between the viewpoints of 'actor' and 'spectator', it is saved from an 
absolute pessimism. 
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C h a p t e r 2 
Queen Mab: 'The Moral and Material Universe' 
When a pirated edition of Queen l~b appeared in 1821 Shelley wrote a letter to 
The Examiner and the Morning Chronicle dissociating himself from the 
1 
publication. The poem itself he admits was written in a 'sufficiently 
intemperate spirit';' further, he has no doubt 'that it is perfectly worthless 
in point of literary composition; and that in all that concerns moral and 
political speculation, as well as in the subtler discriminations of 
metaphysical and religious doctrine, it is still more crude and immature.' As 
if in excuse, he mentions that he was only eighteen when he wrote it, though 
in fact he was well over twenty by the time it was complete in February 1813. 
For Mary Shelley, who quotes the whole letter in her Note to Queen I~b, 
Shelley's self-criticism helps to justify her own disparagement of his 
2 
youthful revolutionary ardours. However, the letter is thoroughly 
disingenuous, for while Shelley disavowed the poem in public, he privately 
relished its popular success and notoriety, as other letters he wrote at this 
time reveal. 'You may imagine how much I am amused,' he wrote to John 
Gisborne, 'For the sake of a dignified appearance however, & really because I 
wish to protest against all the bad poetry in it, I have given orders to say 
3 
that it is all done against my desire.' This also makes clear that Shelley's 
main embarrassment was the literary quality of the work: 'villainous trash' is 
4 
how he describes it to Charles Ollier. Thus while seeming to distance himself 
from the poem's 'intemperate', 'crude' and 'immature' political and religious 
sentiments, Shelley actually uses his public letter to head off hostile 
criticism of its literary and philosophical failings. 
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Although Queen Mab has not been without its admirers, particularly among 
those who have valued it for its vigorous political polemic, few critics would 
5 
deny that these failings are real. In this chapter I shall argue, however, 
that the very inconsistencies and confusions of its ideas are of interest in 
revealing the early formation of a structure.of thought that remains with him 
for the rest of his career. These various incoherences, it will be found, 
centre very largely around the poem's concept of nature. Moreover, in defining 
some of its emergent patterns of thought, I shall suggest that, despite 
certain obvious literary weaknesses, the poem is worthier of our attention 
than Shelley suggests, and contains subtleties we normally associate with his 
later poetry. 
i 
Given that it is subtitled A Philosophical Poem, Queen Mab does indeed show a 
remarkable disregard for logical consistency. Commentators have remarked a 
number of its contradictions: for example, Barrell finds in the poem 'a 
strange mixture of humanitarianism and science, of intellectualism and 
emotionalism, of D1Holbach and Rousseau'; Woodman sees a conflict between what 
he calls Godwin's immaterialism, Halbach's materialism, and Thomas Taylor's 
and John Frank Newton's Orphism; and Grabe, Curran and Hogle note Shelley's 
6 
difficulties with the concept of necessity. The full title, however, not only 
claims for the poem a certain basis in reasoning, but points to an important 
source of its incoherence. David Duff draws attention to the contemporary 
Jacobin associations of the term 'Philosophy' and also to the connections with 
7 
romance suggested by the name Queen Mab. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
poem achieves the synthesis of its radical philosophy and conservative poetic 
form that he supposes, for the combination of a Southeyan supernatural 
machinery, by which the fairy queen transports the spirit of Ianthe in a magic 
34 
car to her etherial palace, and ~ab's materialist and revolutionary polemic 
8 
remains an insuperable anomaly. A further cause of the poem's doctrinal 
incoherence is the huge range and diversity of material upon which it draws. 
It is as if Shelley intended the work to be a compendium of his knowledge and 
opinions concerning all important branches of learning, including metaphysics, 
political theory and the natural sciences, and at the same time to reflect his 
wide reading in ancient and modern literature. The Notes, addressing subjects 
as various as astronomy, prostitution, the concept of necessity, and 
vegetarianism, and including long undigested gobbets of numerous authors in 
their original Greek, Latin and French, are perhaps the clearest indication of 
Shelley's failure to assimilate his materials. They also emphasize a conflict 
within the work between prosaic fact and reason on the one hand and the 
fictions of poetry on the other. 
A work which is comparable with Queen Mab in terms of its youthful 
ambition, declamatory style, and confusion of philosophical, religious and 
political subject matter is Coleridge's Religious Musings (written in 1794). 
This poem, moreover, reveals a philosophical tension which, I shall argue, 
also lies at the heart of Queen Mab. Distinguishing true religion from 
superstition, Coleridge writes: 
'Tis the sublime of man, 
Our noontide majesty, to know ourselves 
Parts and proportions of one wondrous whole! 
This fraternises man, this constitutes 
Our charities and bearings. But 'tis God 
Diffused through all, that doth make all one whole; 
This the worst superstition, him except 
Aught to desire, Supreme Reality! (126-33) 
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Here Coleridge expresses simultaneously a pantheistic sense of unity and a 
belief in a supernatural God who, though diffused through the world, is also 
distinct from it. Thomas McFarland finds this conflict to be one of 
Coleridge's major preoccupations, and in his discussion of the Biographia 
Literaria (1817), he argues that behind the work's heterogeneous and often 
contradictory material a reticulative principle is to be discerned in 
Coleridge's search for a rapprochement between Spinozist pantheism and Kantian 
9 
idealism. Obviously the youthful Shelley does not compare in depth and range 
of thought with the Coleridge of the Biographia, but it can be shown that in 
Queen l~b he too is torn between monist and dualist philosophical systems, and 
that the contradictions we find in the poem are largely attributable to this 
conflict. The two poets admittedly view the issue from almost opposite 
positions, yet there is a degree of convergence, for while Coleridge, 
essentially a transcendentalist, shows himself drawn in the Biographia towards 
Spinozism, Shelley's monist materialism is constantly disrupted by a tendency 
to dualism. They are also responding to very different philosophical 
influences. When he wrote Queen Mab, Shelley's knowledge of Spinoza was 
probably limited (although he quotes him in his Notes), and of Kant even less, 
but as a result of his reading of British empirical and French rationalist 
philosophy, and of eighteenth century poetry, the question of the relationship 
10 
of mind and nature was as important to him as it was to Coleridge. 
Shelley's declared philosophy in Queen Mab is monistic, whether he is 
following the rigorous materialism of Holbach, or adopting a loose form of 
pantheism derived from sources as various as Pope, Erasmus Darwin and 
11 
Wordsworth. His Note to the assertion 'There is no God! 1 (VII, 13) repeats 
the arguments of The Necessitv of Atheism (1811), but he now emphasizes that 
these apply to a creative God only and do not affect the 'hypothesis of a 
pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe'; thus he is justified in adding 
36 
quotations not only from Bacon and Holbach expressing atheist views, but from 
Pliny and Spinoza expressing pantheist ones (N&E, pp. 381-91). 'Nature' in the 
poem is sometimes identified with the impersonal and amoral necessity of 
Holbach's Svst~me de la nature, and sometimes approximates to '"the Soul of 
the Universe the intelligent & necessarilv beneficent actuating principle"', 
which is how he defines the object of his belief in a letter of 3 January 1811 
12 
to Hogg. There is clearly an inconsistency here, to which we will return, 
and yet in their rejection of dualism the atheist and the pantheist are at 
one. Shelley's awareness of the proximity of the two positions is revealed in 
his account of a conversation he held with Southey (who claims to have taught 
13 
him the term pantheist) in the winter of 1811-12: 'he says I ought not to 
call myself an Atheist, since in reality I believe that the Universe is God.--
I tell him that I believe that God is another signification for the 
14 
Universe. 1 
Throughout Queen Hab Shelley makes use of various commonly held eighteenth-
century ideas that identify, or at least establish a close correspondence 
between, the physical and moral spheres. He often expresses the animistic 
belief that, as he puts it in A Refutation of Deism (1814), 'Hatter, such as 
15 
we behold it, is not inert. It is infinitely active and subtile.' Thus Hab 
says, 'The moveless pillar of a mountain's weight/ Is active, living spirit. 
16 
Every grain/ Is sentient both in unity and part' (IV, 142-4), and, 
I tell thee that those viewless beings, 
Hhose mansion is the smallest particle 
Of the impassive atmosphere, 
Think, feel and live like man ••• (II, 231-34) 
As l1.H. Abrams has pointed out, the idea of an animate universe readily 
37 
17 
combines with the Stoic and Platonist notion of a world soul. Hence Mab 
addresses the 'Spirit of Nature' as the 'Soul of that smallest being,/ The 
dwelling of whose life/ Is one faint April sun-gleam' (III, 226-32). 
A corollary of the idea that the human and physical worlds share a common 
life is the belief that moral changes within human society are accompanied by 
corresponding changes in the environment. Thus Shelley espouses the theory, 
which he probably derived from John Frank Newton, that the oscillation of the 
earth's poles will gradually diminish, thus bringing in an everlasting spring 
18 
which would accompany a similar revolution in human society. 'There is no 
great extravagance', he says in his Note on the subject, 'in presuming that 
the progress of the perpendicularity of the poles may be as rapid as the 
progress of intellect; or that there should be a perfect identity between the 
moral and physical improvement of the human species' (M&E, p. 374). 
Another idea linking the moral and the physical, to which Shelley refers, 
is the catastrophic theory that the earth itself has experienced upheavals of 
its surface corresponding to similar upheavals in human society. Thus 
'Earthquakes and wars' (VI, 100) are associated, and in a striking 
anticipation of Prometheus Unbound we are told, 'Earth heard the name [of 
God]; earth trembled, as the smoke/ Of his revenge ascended up to heaven,/ 
Blotting the constellations' (VI, 111-13), where once again, bloodshed and 
volcanic eruption are equated. The theory of catastrophism was available to 
Shelley in various versions, of which there are two main types, differing in 
their emphasis. The more strictly scientific view, based on the investigations 
of geologists such as James Hutton and Georges Cuvier, was that periods of 
19 
intense volcanic activity followed each other in natural cycles. According 
to the other form of the theory, which had a moral or theological basis, and 
was strongly influenced by Thomas Burnet's The Sacred Theorv of the Earth 
(1691), the cataclysmic disruption of the earth was the result of human 
38 
corruption. Although they differed in their views about the ultimate cause of 
change, the two types of theory were not, however, completely separate. 
Cuvier, for example, makes a comparison between volcanic and political 
eruptions: 'Nature also has had her intestine wars, and ••• the surface of the 
20 
globe has been broken up by revolutions and catastrophes'; and Burnet's 
Sacred Theory regards itself also as a scientific theory. Both aspects of 
catastrophism are fully present in the second canto of Queen Hab, which offers 
a vision of the past, and accounts for the destruction of empires. The 
naturalistic explanation he derives mainly from Halbach, who speculates that 
periodically the human race and human civilization have been all but 
21 
annihilated by natural revolutions. For his moral (though anti-theological) 
view Shelley is indebted to Volney, who holds that 'Terrible catastrophes 
remind the human species, that the laws of nature, and the precepts of wisdom 
22 
and truth, cannot be trampled on in vain'. Thus the destruction of the 
'Metropolis of the western continent' (II, 188) is seen on the one hand as 
part of an inevitable cycle of rise and fall that affects all of nature (II, 
211-224), and on the other as the result of 'wealth, that curse of man', and 
his abandonment of 'Virtue and wisdom, truth and liberty' (II, 204; 206). 
Shelley combines the same two attitudes towards 'Monarchs and conquerors', 
whom he calls 'The earthquakes of the human race' (II, 121-3): they are both 
part of the inevitable natural order and manifestations of a corruption 
transgressing that order. 
·The interrelation of moral and physical health is a recurrent theme of the 
Notes of the poem. \'lriting of equality (Hate to V, 93-94) he says: 'Labour is 
required for physical, and leisure for moral improvement •••• A state which 
should combine the advantages of both, would be subjected to the evils of 
neither. He that is deficient in firm health, or vigorous intellect, is but 
23 
half a man'. Elsewhere we learn that prostitution causes 'body and mind 
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alike [to] crumble into a hideous wreck of humanity', and 'idiotcy and 
24 
disease' to be passed on to succeeding generations. The whole of the long 
Note on v~getarianism depends on the idea that health of body and mind are 
25 
inseparable: thus 'Crime is madness. Madness is disease.' Even the practice 
26 
of religion can cause a mania requiring the care of a physician. 
ii 
But while Queen Hab 1s stated philosophy is that God and the world, and mind 
and matter, are one, the poem also reveals this unity as constantly liable to 
fissure. As we have seen, its atheistic materialism may be consonant with the 
pantheist rejection of a creative deity, but hardly with such concepts as the 
'Spirit of Nature' and 'Soul of the Universe'. In Spinoza's strict use of the 
terms God and Nature, as found in the passage Shelley quotes in his Notes, 
1
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there is perhaps no conflict between pantheism and materialism. But loosely 
defined pantheistic ideas such as pervaded much eighteenth-century thinking on 
the question of mind arid matter, God and the world, often convey a sense of 
immanence rather than a consistent monism. The contradictions that we find in 
Shelley's work are therefore by no means exclusively his own. For example, 
Newton's dualist and mechanistic view of the universe nonetheless includes a 
unified theory of mind and matter, treating both as forms of energy, and thus, 
28 
as Grabo points out, representing a form of pantheism. Reflecting a similar 
world view, Pope's 'All are but parts of one stupendous whole,/ Hhose body, 
Nature is, and God the soul' occurs within the context of a conventionally 
theistic description of the universe; and it is as a young theist himself that 
Shelley quotes the first of these lines, in a letter of January 1811, with the 
29 
approving comment that it is 'something more than Poetry'. It is certainly 
something less than full pantheism, as indeed are numerous other scientific 
and poetic descriptions of the animation of matter that appeared in the 
40 
30 
eighteenth century. The advocate of such theories who had most influence on 
Shelley was Erasmus Darwin. His The Temple of Nature (1803), 'a work whose 
assertion of the unity of human and natural spheres left a lasting stamp on 
Shelley's conceptions', as Curran remarks, was an important model for Queen 
31 
Hab in particular. It nevertheless exemplifies the dualist philosophy of 
nature which he outlines at the beginning of Zoonomia (1794-6): 'The whole of 
Nature may be supposed to consist of two essences or substances, one of which 
32 
may be termed spirit, and the other matter.' The temple of Nature in Queen 
Mab embodies this same distinction, in being the material form in which the 
'Spirit of Nature' resides (I, 264-77). 
According to Wasserman, the 'paradoxically dualistic monism' of Shelley's 
so-called 'intellectual philosophy', as outlined in 'On Life', is what 
'essentially distinguishes [it] ••• from both materialism and the popular 
33 
dualism of mind and matter'. However, Shelley's account of his philosophical 
development in 'On Life' gives a somewhat misleading impression that he passed 
through well-defined stages, idealism superseding materialism as materialism 
had dualism, when in fact none of these positions was systematically argued, 
or held to the absolute exclusion of either of the others. In fact Shelley is 
never wholly a dualist or a monist, but is always subject to a tension between 
the two. In Queen Hab, for example, we find elements of mind-matter dualism, 
and also of idealism, mixed in with Holbachian materialism. Indeed, Shelley's 
commitment to the unity of mind and matter is constantly under assault from 
certain poetic and philosophical demands that his materialism cannot satisfy. 
These are revealed in a number of the poem's areas of concern, which we will 
consider in turn. They include the question of necessity and free will; the 
tendency of poetry to deify through personification; the desire for life after 
death; and the conflict between reason and feeling. 
In one of his Notes Shelley expounds the Humean doctrine of necessity. In 
41 
supposing an ineluctable chain of cause and effect operating equally through 
the material universe and the human mind, this theory is consistent with the 
Holbachian view of necessity that is found in Canto VI of the poem. Shelley's 
34 
Note also draws on Godwin, who is himself dependent on Hume. In Political 
Justice (1793), however, Godwin also introduces the teleological notion of 
society's inevitable progress towards truth--an idea which, as Mark Philp 
shows, he takes over from Priestley and Hartley, though translating their 
35 
theological terms into the language of truth and reason. Shelley does 
something very similar by combining a Holbachian impersonal necessity with the 
'Spirit of Nature' which has intelligence and will, and which in due course 
will usher in an 'age of endless peace' (III, 325). Both Godwin and Shelley, 
in other words, conflate a causative and a purposive view of necessity. In 
arguing that the purpose works through the causal chain, whose links include 
the human mind, Godwin is able to dispense with the dualism of his theological 
sources. Yet he does not envisage a complete identity between purpose and 
cause. In the last paragraph of Political Justice he suggests that although 
the progress towards truth is inevitable, it can be accelerated by the human 
36 
intellect. Shelley makes the same point in his An Address, to the Irish 
People (1812): 'these great changes ••• will certainly happen •••• But ••• it all 
depends upon yourselves how soon or how late' (Murray, p. 25). Thus for both 
Shelley and Godwin there is an interrelation but not a perfect conformity 
between ends and means. Failing satisfactorily to integrate a teleological 
with a mechanistic idea of necessity, they are left with elements of dualism 
and free will which conflict with their arguments from Hume. In Queen Mab, 
which lacks 'subtler discriminations' in such matters, Shelley scarcely 
recognizes that there is a problem, and in so far as he does he evades it. In 
a passage foreshadowing Asia's interrogation of Demogorgon, Queen V~b raises 
the question of the origin of evil (IV, 89-103), but since she can blame 
42 
neither a benevolent Nature nor human free will, the responsibility falls on 
'Kings, priests, and statesmen' (IV, 104). In a later Holbachian passage, 
however, she refers to the Spirit of Nature as the 'eternal spring/ ••• of 
happiness and woe' (VI, 190-1). Through such inconsistencies the question of 
free will and its relationship with necessity is avoided, but it will 
resurface in Shelley's later poetry, notably in Prometheus Unbound. 
A similar inconsistency in the conception of Nature in Queen Hab is to be 
found in the varying degree to which it is the subject of personification. On 
the one hand, as the impersonal force of necessity, it is 'Unlike the God of 
human error 1 , and requires 1 no prayers or praises 1 (VI'· 199-200), and on the 
other, it is deified as the 'Spirit of Nature', for whom the universe is its 
'fitting temple' (I, 268). This contradiction is_responsible for some of the 
poem's more absurd effects. For example, a passage beginning 'Spirit of 
Nature! all-sufficing Power,/ Necessity! thou mother of the world!' goes on to 
congratulate Nature for treating all humankind with impartiality, which she is 
able to do 'Because thou hast not human sense,/ Because thou art not human 
mind' (VI, 197-219). However, the contradiction is not originally Shelley's, 
for even the arch-materialist Holbach treats nature with an almost religious 
veneration. Though he begins his Svsteme de la nature by insisting that the 
term Nature is not a personification, he ends it with a hymn to Nature; and, 
as Cameron points out, Shelley's line 'Necessity! thou mother of the world!' 
37 
is taken from a footnote in Holbach's work. \Vhat makes their inconsistency 
the more flagrant is that both writers offer an account of the historical 
development of religious belief, the origin of which they attribute to the 
38 
human tendency to deify the phenomena of nature. Shelley even quotes parts 
of Holbach 1 s account in his Notes, beginning with the words: 'La premiere 
theologie de 1 1homme lui fit d 1abord craindre et adorer les elemens meme, des 
objets materiels et grossiers' (M&E, p. 386). Shelley's description of the 
43 
growth of religion (VI, 72-102) is similar to Holbach's, though it also draws 
39 
on Volney, who includes a lengthy chapter on this subject in The Ruins. All 
three writers define certain important stages: the deification of the 
elements; the attribution of powers to a world soul; and the fabrication of a 
first cause called God. Thus described, the development of religion, in its 
first two stages if not in its third, shows a curious similarity to the slide 
from materialism through pantheism to dualism that we have seen Shelley 
himself to demonstrate in Queen Mab. The parallel, however, far from being 
acknowledged in the poem, is actually suppressed. Not only does Shelley's 
passage betray no sign of conscious self-reference, but there is one important 
factor in the development of religion, mentioned by Holbach and Volney, that 
Shelley--for an understandable reason--omits: namely, the role of metaphor and 
poetry. Volney explains how, at an early stage of civilization, natural 
phenomena were given metaphorical animal and human names, which in time came 
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to be believed in as realities. Holbach claims that the first metaphysicians 
and theologians were natural philosophers and poets, who 'believed that they 
had made an important discovery in subtily distinguishing nature from herself' 
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by imagining a mover of nature called God. Poets also, he suggests, had a 
social function in propagating religious ideas: 
Poetry, by its images, by its fictions, by its numbers, by its harmony 
and rhyme, struck the mind of the people, and engraved on their memory 
those ideas which they were willing to give them; and at its voice the 
entire of nature was animated, it was personified as well as all its 
parts; earth, air, water, fire, took intelligence, thought, life; the 
elements were deified; the sky, that immense space which surrounds us, 
42 became the first of gods'. 
Although Shelley omits such ideas from Queen Mab, he was fully alive to the 
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affinities of poetry and personification with religion, as a letter of 11th 
June 1811 to Elizabeth Hitchener reveals: 
Imagination delights in personification; were it not for this embodying 
quality of eccentric fancy we sh9uld be to this day without a 
God •••• this personification, beautiful in Poetry, inadmissible in 
reasoning in the true style of Hindoostanish devotion, you have adopted. 
(Jones, I, 101) 
In Queen Hab Shelley suppresses this knowledge, but it is the last poem in 
which he does so, for one of the remarkable features of all his later poetry 
is its self-referential quality, and its consciousness that the 'embodying 
? 
quality' of the poetic imagination has an inevitable tendency to throw up new 
gods, even while it deposes old ones. Since nature provides the materials of 
thought and poetry, it is nature that is thus deified--turned by the poet into 
'Forms more real than living man,/ Nurslings of immortality' (Prometheus 
Unbound, i, 748-9). The delusiveness of such figments remains a theme for 
Shelley throughout his career, and receives its final illustration in the 
feminine 'shape all light' of The Triumph of Life (352). As the personified 
embodiment of the natural elements, she demonstrates poetry's unavoidable 
effect of 1subtily distinguishing nature from herself' by granting a reality 
to its own metaphors. In Queen Hab Shelley closes his eyes to the personifying 
and deifying effect of poetry by asserting an artificial monism, but all the 
later poems we shall be considering in different ways acknowledge this problem 
and attempt to deal with it. 
A further subject which reveals the flaws in Shelley's assertions of monism 
is that of postmortality. One of the principal causes of Shelley's later 
dissatisfaction with the philosophy of materialism, as he explains in 'On 
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Life' (R&P, p. 476), is that it allows no possibility of an afterlife. 
Although he is always sceptical of postmortal survival, there remains 'a 
spirit within him at enmity with nothingness and dissolution' (R&P, p. 476), 
as his letters of 1811 and 1812 reveal. 'I have considered it in every 
possible light & reason tells me that death is the boundary of the life of 
man, 1 he writes on 16 October 1811, 'Yet I feel, I believe the direct 
contrary' (Jones, _I, 150). This tension between his reason and his feelings 
concerning an afterlife is a major cause of Shelley's vacillation between 
monism and dualism. Even before he reads Holbach in 1812, he recognizes the 
incompatibility of materialism with the hope of a future life. In a letter of 
3 January 1811 he tells Hogg, 'I may not be able to adduce proofs, but I think 
that ••• some vast intellect apimates Infinity--If we disbelieve this, the 
strongest argument in support of the existence of a future state instantly 
becomes annihilated.' But he recognizes a difficulty with this belief: 'can we 
suppose', he goes on, 'that ••• [eternal life] ivill arise spontaneously as a 
necessary appendage to our nature, or that our nature itself could be without 
a cause, a First Cause, a God' (Jones, I, 35). Thus while his hope in a future 
life requires a belief in God, his scepticism resists it. In trying to satisfy 
both inclinations he postulates the existence of a non-transcendent and non-
creative God--a 'pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe', as he calls it 
in Queen Hab (H&E, p. 381). But it remains unclear 1-1hether such a deity is 
identical with or different from the universe. ifri ting to Hi tchener on 11 June 
1811, he attempts to define his position exactly, but his very emphases and 
repetitions betray his uncertainty: 'I acknowledge a God, but merely as a 
synonime for the existing power of existence •••• it is therefore the essence of 
the universe, the universe is the essence of it--it is another word for the 
essence of the universe' (Jones, I, 101). Shelley's ambiguous understanding of 
the nature of God is reflected in his view of life after death. In another 
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letter to Hitchener, in which he contemplates the possibility that both body 
and soul.are annihilated on death, he writes: 
Yet one of the properties of animal soul is consciousness of identity--
if this is destroyed, in consequenc (eJ the soul vThose essence this is, 
must perish; but as I conceive, & as is certainly capable of 
demonstration that nothing can be annihilated, but that everything 
appertaining to nature, consisting of constituent parts infinitely 
divisible, is in continufali change, then do I suppose, & I think I have 
a right to draw this inference, that neither will soul perish; that in a 
future existence it will lose all consciousness of having formerly lived 
else\.,rhere, will begin life anevl, possibly under a shape of \'lhich vie have 
no idea •••• I flatter myself that I have kept clear of supposition--
(Jones, I, 110) 
Here Shelley links the perpetuity of natural life in its continual cycle of 
change with the immortality of the individual soul, thus reasoning by analogy 
with nature to reach a supernaturalist conclusion, but again his lack of 
conviction is evident. In Queen Hab he addresses the issue in the context of 
the approaching age of perfection which he describes in the last two cantos. 
At first he suggests that when this new day dawns people will stand 'Immortal 
upon earth' (VIII, 211), though in the Notes he emphasizes that the 
immortality he has in mind is purely subjective, the result of being able to 
intensify the succession of ideas in the mind to such an extent that each 
moment appears of infinite duration (M&E, pp. 404-6). Such an idea anticipates 
his later espousal of Drummond's idealism, the only philosophy, he claims in 
'On Life', consistent uith contemplations of eternity (R&P, p. 476). In the 
ninth canto he admits that death is inevitable, but here it is 'the voyage of 
a darksome hour' (IX, 174), 
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That leads to azure isles and beaming skies 
And happy regions of eternal hope. 
Therefore, 0 Spirit! fearlessly bear on: 
Though storms may break the primrose on its stalk, 
Though frosts may blight the freshness of its bloom, 
Yet spring's awakening breath will woo the earth. (IX, 162-67) 
Again by analogy with natural processes, the poem postulates a life beyond the 
grave, and hence implicitly a dualism which is at odds with its stated 
philosophy. 
The tension between reason and feeling, which the question of an afterlife 
reflects, is another area in which the unity of mind and nature is seen to 
come under strain. This tension does not go wholly unacknm..rledged, for the 
poem affirms that in a renovated world 'Reason and passion [will] cease to 
combat there' (VIII, 231). But it is as a Godwinian rationalist that he makes 
such a claim. Just as Godwin argues that the passions should not be eradicated 
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but rather purified in accordance with reason, so the reconciliation of 
reason and passion envisaged by Shelley in Queen Hab is one in which reason 
retains precedence. He describes their relationship in the golden age of the 
future as follows: 
Reason was free; and wild though passion went 
Through tangled glens and 1..rood-embosomed meads, 
Gathering a garland of the strangest flowers, 
Yet like the bee returning to her queen, 
She bound the sweetest on her sister's brow ••• (IX, 50-4) 
Thus the obedient passions are subject to the queen-bee of reason. However, in 
various ways the metaphor subverts this ordered monarchy of the hive. Though 
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1Reason was free•, passion, ranging at will, appears to be freer. Passion also 
has a more immediate contact with wild nature, which reason only knows at 
second hand, and as the gatherer of garlands it has the primary poetic 
function. Nature here therefore is associated with an imaginative freedom 
which lies outside and has the potential to disrupt the rational social order. 
Yet generally in the poem Nature in its personified form is associated with 
reason, and the law of one is the law of the other. This opposition of feeling 
and thought, of nature as it is directly apprehended and Nature as an 
abstraction, is symptomatic of a crucial tension in all Shelley's later poetry 
between subjective and objective ways of thinking--a tension which translates 
itself into figural terms as a competition between symbolic and allegorical 
modes. 
In Shelley's letters of 1811 and 1812 the division of his loyalty between 
reason and feeling is a recurrent topic, and his claim to be the 'undivided 
votary' of reason is often inadvertently belied by his remarks in an even 
« 
clearer way than it is in Queen Mab. For example, to Hitchener on 11 June 
1811 he writes that he would 'with greater pleasure admit than doubt' the 
existence of a deity 1 on the score of feeling' (Jones, I, 100). Rationally, 
however, he cannot explain the origin of such feeling, for, he says, arguing 
from Locke, 'since all ideas are derived from the senses this feeling must 
have originated from some sensual excitation, consequently the posessor of it 
may be aware of the time, of the circumstances attending its commencement• 
(Jones, I, 100). Yet knowledge of the sensual origin of religious feeling is 
what constantly eludes and fascinates him. It is for this reason that he is 
interested in the emotional effect on him of natural scenery. For example, in 
July 1811 he writes to Hitchener from Cwm Elan as follows: 
This country of Wales is excessively grand; rocks piled on each other 
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to tremendous heights, rivers formed into cataracts by their 
projections, & valleys clothed with woods, present an appearance of 
enchantment - but ~ do they enchant, why is it more affecting than a 
plain, it cannot be innate, is it acquired?--Thus does knowledge lose 
all the pleasure which invol un tarily ari ses, by attempting to 
arrest th e fleeting Phantom as it passes - vain al most like the 
chemists aether it evaporates under our observation; it flies from all 
but the slaves of passion & sickly sensibility ••• (Jones, I, 119-20) 
On 26th July he writes again in similar terms: 
Nature is here marked with the most impressive character of loveliness 
and grandeur, once I was tremulously alive to tones and scenes - The 
habi~ of analysing feelings I fear does not agree with this. It is 
spontaneous, & when it becomes subjugated to consideration ceases to 
exist. But you do right to indulge feeling ':lhere it does not militate 
with reason, I wish I could too-- (Jones, I, 127) 
Shelley's disparagement of feeling in these letters does not disguise his real 
regret for the passing of the 1 fleeting Phantom' and of the time vThen he Has 
'tremulously alive to tones and scenes'. In both passages he describes the 
evanescence of spontaneous feeling at the moment it becomes an object of 
thought. This inevitable process is what, in the fragment 'Difficulty of 
Analyzing the Human Hind', he calls the 'passage from sensation to 
reflection 1 , 11hich makes it impossible 1 to be where we have been, vi tally and 
indeed' (I&P, VII, 64). The fleeting phantoms, vanishing apparitions and 
forgotten dreams of an immediate, unselfconscious apprehension of the external 
world flit through Shelley's poetry from Alaster to The Triumph of Life, and 
their elusiveness is a constant reminder of the unbridgeable division between 
feeling and thought. Queen Hab, however, in asserting the primacy of reason, 
and urging the conformity of passion to rational truth, minimizes the depth of 
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this division, and discounts the power of feeling to unsettle any objective 
formulation of unity. 
iii 
All the suppressed contradictions that are detectable beneath the defiant 
self-certainty and optimism of Queen Hab reappear in more conscious and 
complex form in Shelley's later work. Indeed they become the basis of a series 
of dynamic tensions that are fundamental to both the content and style of his 
poetry. But we find not only some of the components of these tensions in Queen 
Mab but also an emerging sense of their dialectical interrelationship. And 
just as the contradictions we have noted all revolve round the very 
eighteenth-century concern with the relationship of nind and matter, so it is 
some typically eighteenth-century ideas about the operations of physical 
nature that provide Shelley with the terms that describe the character of that 
dialectic as it later evolves in his poetry. 
There are two such ideas in particular that are of significance in this 
context, and they are both almost commonplaces in the philosophical and 
scientific \·II'i tings that Shelley draws on in Queen Hab. The first is defined 
in A Refutation of Deism (1814), where Shelley writes, 'The laws of attraction 
and repulsion, desire and aversion, suffice to account for every phenomenon of 
the moral and physical world' (Hurray, p. 115). He expresses the same idea in 
Queen 11ab thus: 
the minutest atom comprehends 
A world of loves and hatreds; these beget 
Evil and good: hence truth and falsehood spring; 
Hence will and thought and action, all the germs 
Of pain and pleasure, sympathy or hate, 
That variegate the eternal universe. (IV, 145-150) 
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Here and in the Refutation Shelley extends the Newtonian idea of the tensions 
sustaining matter into the moral sphere, as Halbach and Volney have done 
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before him, and the laws of attraction and repulsion thus become another 
example of the correspondence of mind and matter. In the later poems, however, 
as we shall see, these laws can be seen as governing the relationship between 
mind and the external world. They therefore correspond to the image of the 
centre and circumference which describes the 'paradoxically dualistic monism' 
of Shelley's 'intellectual philosophy'. In view of the fissiparous nature of 
the mind-matter unity in Queen Mab, it is tempting to interpret the laws of 
attraction and repulsion in the same way here, even though to do so is to 
introduce into the poem an element of self-reference and self-doubt that is 
not generally apparent. Indeed, read in this light, the passage quoted above 
gains considerably in interest and significance. In its obvious sense it 
merely accounts for all motive forces as forms of desire or aversion. But if 
the 'world of loves and hatreds' that each atom comprehends is understood as a 
unity riven by the kinds of tensions we have been discussing, the~ it is from 
this single source that good and evil, truth and falsehood promiscuously 
spring; and 'will and thought and action' are driven, not by simple responses 
to 'pain or pleasure', but by a dialectic of interactive forces. The passage 
thus becomes a description of the polarities and processes we find constantly 
at work in Shelley's poetry. 
The second idea taken from natural science that describes the dialectic of 
Shelley's poetry is simply stated in his Proposals for an Association of 
Philanthropists (1812), \vhere he writes: 'Do we not see that the laws of 
nature perpetually act by disorganization and reproduction, each alternately 
becoming cause and effect I --to which he adds, 'The [analogies] that we can 
draw from physical to moral topics are of all others the most striking' 
(Hurray, p. 53). The particular analogy he has in mind here links the natural 
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cycles of death and rebirth with the cycles of tyranny and freedom in 
politics. This is partly the import of the following passage from Queen i~b: 
Thus do the generations of the earth 
Go to the grave, and issue from the womb, 
Surviving still the imperishable change 
That renovates the world; even as the leaves 
Which the keen frost-wind of the waning year 
Has scattered on the forest soil, and heaped 
For many seasons there, though long they choke, 
Loading with loathsome rottenness the land, 
All germs of promise, yet when the tall trees 
From which they fell, shorn of their lovely shapes, 
Lie level with the earth to moulder there, 
They fertilize the land they long deformed, 
Till from the breathing lawn a forest springs 
Of youth, integrity, and loveliness, 
Like that which gave it life, to spring and die. 
Thus suicidal selfishness, that blights 
The fairest feelings of the opening heart, 
Is destined to decay, whilst from the soil 
Shall spring all virtue, all delight, all love, 
And judgment cease to wage unnatural war 
With passion's unsubduable array. (V, 1-21) 
The passage shows clearly how good and evil, as part of one process, are 
'alternately ••• cause and effect', and consequently not always easy to 
distinguish, just as the trees which deform the land with dead leaves also 
fertilize it and give birth to a new forest. It also illustrates the Lucretian 
idea of the permanence of matter through change, which, as we have seen, 
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offers the sceptic a monistic alternative to life after death. But in 
representing the inseparability of good and evil, life and death in a 
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perpetual round of change, the seasonal cycle can image no lasting conjunction 
of earth and heaven, or time and eternity, and spring's awakening is therefore 
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a doubtful basis for hope of renovation in the human sphere. An implicit 
acknowledgement that this is so is found in Shelley's recourse to the idea of 
a perpetual spring in Queen Hab (IX, 1-22, and Note to VI, 45-6), The Revolt 
of Islam (IX, xxvi, 3699) and Prometheus Unbound (III, iii, 84-107); and in 
Adonais (154-180) the failure of nature's seasonal rebirth to include the 
survival of the mind after death is a cause of lament. The 'fanalogiesJ that 
we can draw from physical to moral topics' would therefore seem to be 
applicable only if they are something less than metaphorical--that is, if 
nature and mind are considered not merely as similar in their difference but 
as identical in kind. As soon as a split between them is adcitted, as it 
always is, if only implicitly, the analogies cease to work. However, the 
usefulness of the metaphor from nature lies not merely in its function as a 
parallel to the processes of mind, but also in what it reveals about the 
relationship between mind and nature. In other words, nature serves as both 
the image and the object of mind--a dual role which is the source of much 
self-reflexive and self-cancelling complexity in Shelley's poetry. 
In the passage quoted above we see a movement towards this kind of 
complexity, which shows itself primarily in a wavering between literal 
statement and metaphor. Initially Shelley seems to say that the generations 
survive through a circulation of matter in literally the same manner as trees, 
though there may also be a suggestion of transmigration that involves more 
than merely physical permanence. The last six lines, on the other hand, 
comparing the regeneration of trees to that of human values, are clearly 
metaphorical. They consequently take a first step towards a dualism of mind 
and matter which immediately undermines the basis of the comparison. This is 
also an implication of the content of the metaphor, whose import is that the 
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purified feelings, associated here with natural regeneration, will cease to be 
involved in 'unnatural war' with judgement. The natural cycle as applied to 
the mind thus includes a division between the mind's rational judgement and 
natural passions. 
vfuat the metaphor of natural cycles therefore describes is a relationship 
between the human mind and the external world which constantly oscillates 
between difference and identity, attraction and repulsion. And metaphor 
itself, as the record of that relation, is marked by the same oscillation. 
Just as 'the laws of nature perpetually act by disorganization and 
reproduction', so, as Shelley later explains in A Defence of Poetrv, living 
metaphors in time become lifeless abstractions, and require poets 'to create 
afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized' (R&P, p. 482). 
Indeed, as we shall find in succeeding chapters, much of Shelley's poetic 
practice and theory depends on such cycles of creation and destruction in the 
relationship of mind with its objects. 
In its somewhat crude juxtaposition of conflicting philosophies and its 
agglomeration of ill-assorted influences Queen Mab does rather blindly and 
almost in spite of itself point in the direction in which Shelley's poetic 
career is destined to go. There is however a great distance to travel between 
this poem and Alaster. In its ideas and broad outlook, Queen Hab is still very 
much an eighteenth-century poem. Its expression of a materialist or pantheist 
monism, in particular, belongs to an eighteenth-century rationalism and 
religious scepticism. Coleridge's attraction to Spinoza is of a quite 
different order and reflects a poetic and characteristically Romantic desire 
for the subjective experience of unity. In contrast, the Shelley of 1812 is 
suspicious of poetry, feelings and the self, as his early letters amply 
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testify even while demonstrating his fascination with all three, and his 
ebullient advocacy of a monist philosophy in Queen }~b can be seen as a not 
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wholly successful attempt to resist the dualist tendencies with which they are 
associated. But in the ensuing three years this holding operation becomes 
unsustainable, as the demands of poetry, feelings and the self increasingly 
press their claims. The result is that his speculations about the connection 
between mind and matter, the moral and the physical, are replaced by a self-
conscious relationship of subject and object. The focus of his attention then 
shifts away from such subjects as the laws of nature and a universal soul 
towards the operations of his own mind. 
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C h a p t e r 3 
Alastor: A 'Treacherous Likeness' 
In Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude, written three years after Queen Mab, 
Shelley turns from the circumference to the centre of knowledge, from 
objective rationalism to subjective idealism, and in doing so he finds his 
characteristic voice as a poet. The very comprehensiveness of the earlier 
poem's vision proves its primary limitation. To borrow the language of 
Shelley's critique of rationalism in the Defence, Queen ~~b contains 'more 
moral, political, and historical wisdom than ••• [it knows] how to reduce into 
practise', and lacks the imaginative inwardness of what he calls 'the poetry 
of life' (R&P, p. 502). It is a basic assumption of Alaster, on the other 
hand, that 'Poetry is not like reasoning' (R&P, p. 503), but issues obscurely 
from the poet's subjective consciousness. The contrast between Ianthe's dream 
in Queen Mab, with all the world and its history laid out before her, and the 
Poet's fleeting vision in Alastor of an idealized 'Being whom he loves' (M&E, 
p. 462), could hardly illustrate more clearly the radical shift in Shelley's 
perspective. 
Alaster's theme of solitude, to which its subtitle draws attention, is 
directly connected with this change. The two essays 'On Love' (1818) and 'On 
Life', which relate closely to the poem, reveal Shelley's idealism to be 
deeply solipsistic in implication. In defining love as the thirst for 1a soul 
within our soul' (R&P, p. 474), and life as a unity in which there is no real 
distinction between thoughts and things--definitions which the Poet could be 
intended to illustrate--they both give an overriding emphasis to the subject 
self. The essays, however, give little indication of the darker side of 
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idealism and solitude which is evident in Alastor. The gloomy introspection to 
which the poem gives expression is, as Mary Shelley explains in her Note to 
the poem, in part a reflection of the difficult circumstances in which it was 
written. She specifically refers to her husband's ill-health, poverty and, 
somewhat euphemistically, his 'loss of friends' (Hutchinson, p. 30). His 
estrangement from his first wife, his family and the society which he had 
wished to take an active part in reforming certainly contributed to his 
feeling of isolation, and to this was added a sense of political isolation by 
1 
the triumph of reactionary Europe in 1815. However, Shelley's pessimism at 
this time is not attributable solely to external causes, for as Alaster shows, 
its own subjective idealism which in one sense is a response to a 'cold 
fireside and alienated home' (76) is in another a cause of alienation and 
hence inherently inclined to self-defeat. 
A major corollary of Shelley's departure from the rationalism of Queen Mab 
is a new regard for nature and landscape which is no longer hampered by a 
distrust for feelings. Again, the essays 'On Love' and 'On Life' provide a 
rationale for this aspect of his idealism: nature offers 'a secret 
correspondence with our heart' (R&P, p. 474) in the absence of human sympathy, 
external objects are indistinguishable from ideas, and a delight in nature, 
far from being the preserve of 'slaves of passion and sickly sensibility', as 
he wrote to Hitchener in July 1811, is now 'the distinguishing mark of a 
refined and extraordinary person'. Alastor is Shelley's first major poetic 
expression of this sense of community with the external world, though again it 
reveals limitations and dangers in the attitudes expressed in the essays. 
Personal experience contributes to his growing appreciation of natural 
scenery. Between 1811 and 1815 he travelled extensively in Britain and abroad, 
and the different landscapes he encountered leave their impression on the 
2 
natural descriptions of Alastor. The Holbachian abstract and impersonal 
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concept of nature, adhered to with difficulty even in Queen l4ab, is now 
clearly inadequate and gives way to the responsive, relational nature that 
Shelley finds in, above all, the poems of Wordsworth. 
Indeed, Wordsworth is the primary influence on the new direction of 
Shelley's poetry. One of the earliest records of Shelley's interest in 
Wordsworth is his transcription in a letter of 2 January 1812 (Jones, I, 217) 
of a few stanzas of Wordsworth's 'A Poet's Epitaph' (1800). This poem, quoted 
from memory (to judge by the mistakes), and quoted again briefly in a letter 
to Godwin of 5 July 1812 (Jones, I, 312), evidently impressed Shelley 
considerably, and was influential upon his recurring depiction of the frail 
poet figure. The last stanza he quotes, describing such a poet, is as follows: 
The outward shews of sky and earth, 
Of hill and valley, he has viewed; 
And impulses of deeper birth 
Have come to him in solitude. (45-8) 
Here are briefly drawn together the themes of Alastor that we have identified: 
poetic idealism, solitude and the love of nature. Shelley's poem, however, is 
primarily a response to The Excursion (1814), which (at least, in Shelley's 
perception) radically revises Wordsworth's former attitude to these themes. 
Shelley's adoption of a similar attitude occurs therefore at a moment when he 
senses that Wordsworth, his great exemplar, has abandoned it, along with his 
3 
earlier revolutionary sympathies. This betrayal becomes the focus of 
Shelley's feelings of profound ambivalence concerning the idealist project on 
which he is embarked, and a bitter reminder of its inevitable failure. For 
this reason, as G. Kim Blank writes, the poem 'moves back and forth between 
discovering and questioning Wordsworth's influence, between taking him on and 
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4 
shaking him off'. This relationship of attraction and repulsion has a 
pervasive symbolic presence in the poem, where the process in which a subject 
seeks an alluring but deceptive self-reflection in its object everywhere 
repeats itself. This self-reflectiveness in fact is inherently deceptive, for 
in predicating both a difference and identity between subject and object it 
ensures every reflected image has two aspects, one inviting identification and 
unity, the other objectification and separation. In Alaster, the most 
relentlessly self-reflective of Shelley's poems, there is a constant swing 
5 
between these points of view, each one unsettling the other. As a 'Poet of 
Nature', Wordsworth is an emblem of both poetry and nature, and shares with 
them a distorting quality of reflectiveness that can only return a 
'treacherous likeness' (474). 
In this chapter I propose to account in such terms for the idealist dilemma 
which Shelley confronts in Alaster. One manifestation of this dilemma is a 
certain ambiguity in the term idealism itself, and my use of it here therefore 
needs to be clarified. In both its general and philosophical sense the term 
can occupy various points on a scale between two extremes of meaning, at one 
of which the ideal and the real cease to be distinguishable, while at the 
other they are poles apart. In speaking of the idealism of Shelley and the 
early \·lordsworth I mean their hope in the earthly possibility of a 
convergence--however remote or dimly apprehended--between the real and the 
ideal, whether in poetry, politics or philosophy. Shelley's dilemma, 
therefore, is that while he cannot excuse Wordsworth for his abandonment of 
that hope, he finds himself in Alaster driven very close to abandoning it too. 
The moral aspect of this problem is addressed mainly in the Preface, and since 
the interpretation of its highly ambiguous two paragraphs has been a prime 
source of division among critics of the poem, I shall begin my discussion 
·here; Following that, the poetic and philosophical issues raised by the Poet's 
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quest will be considered, especially as they relate to the poem's treatment of 
external nature. Finally, I shall look at the poem as itself a quest--as a 
poem, that is, in pursuit of itself--an aspect of the work that particularly 
involves the function of the narrator. 
i 
An important example of the poem's swing between subjective and objective 
viewpoints is to be found in the discrepancy between the sympathetic rendering 
of the Poet and his quest in the poem and the censure of his 'self-centred 
seclusion' in the Preface. This apparently back-tracking authorial criticism 
has elicited a wide variety of responses from critics of Alastor. Several, 
following Mary Shelley's hint that the poem is rather 'didactic than 
narrative' (Hutchinson, p. 31), have argued that there is no significant 
conflict--that the poem does illustrate the lesson of the Preface. E.K. 
Gibson, for example, considers that it holds up for criticism the Poet's 
6 
neglect of human sympathy in his pursuit of an illusory ideal; and for 
Marilyn Butler it represents an attack on the kind of contemplative withdrawal 
7 
from politics recommended by Wordsworth in The Excursion. The conflict has 
been downplayed in a quite different way by Clark, who, believing the moralism 
of the second paragraph of the Preface to have been commonly misunderstood, 
stresses the praise of the Poet in the first in arguing that he embodies 
8 
progressive cultural forces. Dawson, considering Shelley's attitude to 
solitude generally, offers two alternative accounts of it that roughly 
parallel the responses of Butler and Clark to Alastor: 'When a man seeks 
retreat it either implies a repudiation of public hope, or signifies a 
temporary retirement which will allow him to renew the struggle later or to 
9 
contribute to it by spreading the influence of good.' Solitude is to be 
) blamed as a withdrawal from the political struggle or commended as being 
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necessary to it. Either way, Alastor is rescued as a politically radical poem, 
even though, aside from the Preface, its concerns are almost entirely private 
and introspective. 
Other critics grant more significance to the discrepancy between the poem 
and the Preface, explaining it in terms of a conflict of attitudes they find 
in the poem. Thus Stovall writes of a tension between egotism and altruism; 
Baker considers the Poet torn between communion with nature and human love; 
and Wasserman sees the poem as a debate between an earth-bound Wordsworthian 
10 
nature-loving narrator and a transcendentalist Poet. Each of these 
interpretations has a certain validity, but a fault they all have in common is 
a failure to recognize the close connection between the conflicting attitudes 
they describe. This connection is most easily traced in the poem's central 
theme of solitude. As Dawson's remark indicates, solitude has opposing 
aspects, one that is allied to love and hope, the other to their absence. 
Alastor demonstrates that these are indeed aspects of a single mental 
disposition. Cronin goes some way towards explaining the nature of the link 
between them. The Poet uses his imagination, he says, 'not in the manner which 
Shelley offers in the Defence as a description of the moral sense, the 
"identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, 
action, or person, not our own", but to pursue the embodiment of "his own 
11 
imaginations"'· What, how~ver, is not acknowledged by either Cronin or the 
Defence but is made evident in Alastor is that, as Ulmer writes, the 
12 
'imagination inherently resists socialization'. In other words, ideal love 
is by its very nature solipsistic, even alienating. 
This paradox is a familiar one in Romantic literature and occurs in most of 
the important influences on the poem. Wordsworth and Coleridge are both aware 
of the dangerous autonomy of idealism, and of the conflicting claims of 
13 
natural solitude and human society. This conflict is also a persistent theme 
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of the writings of Rousseau, whose Reveries of a Solitary Walker (1782) is in 
14 
this respect of particular importance to Alaster. The heroes of Goethe's The 
Sorrows of Werter (1774), Chateaubriand's Rene (1802), Godwin's Fleetwood 
(1805) and Owenson 1s The Missionary (1811) all seek love in a loveless world, 
15 
and indulge their ideal longings alone with nature. In various ways they 
demonstrate the contrary aspects of solitude, which can serve as either a 
retreat from or a challenge to the existing social order, and be either 
elevating and noble or destructive and selfish. The Poet in Alastor follows in 
this tradition: the isolation in which he leaves his 'alienated home' with 'an 
imagination inflamed and purified', as the Preface puts it, is the same 'self-
centred seclusion' for which he is condemned. 
Autobiographical and biographical readings of Alaster have tended to be 
simplistic, but are not to be wholly discounted, for the poem does, I think, 
reveal an awareness in Shelley of a certain congruence between his own recent 
history and the careers of some of his models, particularly in its portrayal 
16 
of the erosion of hopeful idealism. Indeed, over the period covered by Queen 
Mab and Alaster his passage from the isolation of defiance to the isolation of 
defeat offers a foreshortened parallel to the earlier progress over a much 
longer time of his three great literary mentors, Rousseau, Godwin and 
Wordsworth. That it does so no doubt owes something to the fact that it is 
during this period that he falls under their influence. Rousseau's increasing 
sense of persecution in middle life and retirement from political controversy 
to the Island of Saint-Pierre; Godwin's slow retreat from the defiance of the 
first edition of Political Justice, and from reliance on reason alone as the 
instrument of human improvement, and his growing isolation; and Wordsworth's 
17 
'loss of confidence in social man' after the unfolding events in France in 
the 1790s, and his withdrawal from the mainstream of life to the Lake District 
in 1799--all have their parallel in the admittedly still youthful Shelley of 
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181 5. 
Of the three predecessors, it is to Hordsworth and his political change of 
heart that Alastor particularly refers. However much Shelley may have felt 
betrayed by The Excursion, its publication in 1814 was well timed to coincide 
with and confirm his own awareness of the alienating and regressive aspects of 
idealism. 'To Wordsworth', one senses, is in part an elegy for a former self. 
His description in this sonnet of Hordsworth's earlier poems as 'Songs 
consecrate to truth and liberty' (12) suggests, however, a somewhat 
exaggerated sense of the radicalism of the Lvrical Ballads and the 1807 volume 
of poems, and consequently an exaggerated sense also of the apostasy 
represented by The Excursion. Shelley's feelings of betrayal were grounded in 
a real alteration in Wordsworth, but they also had the convenience of allowing 
I 
him to identify with the younger poet while disguising from himself his 
similarity to the older one, and thereby, in Harold Bloom's terms, relieving 
18 
his anxiety of influence. 
This ambivalence towards Wordsworth is particularly evident in the Preface, 
and the manner in vrhich it relates to the poem. The first paragraph expresses 
sympathy and admiration for the Poet, and describes his quest as follows: 
He drinks deep of the fountains of knowledge, and is still insatiate. 
The magnificence and beauty of the external world sinks profoundly into 
the frame of his conceptions, and affords to their modifications a 
variety not to be exhausted •••• But the period arrives when these objects 
cease to suffice. His mind is at length suddenly a1vakened and thirsts 
for intercourse with an intelligence similar to itself. He images to 
himself a Being whom he loves. Conversant with speculations of the 
sublimest and most perfect natures, the vision in vrhich he embodies his 
own imaginations unites all of wonderful, or vrise, or beautiful, which 
the poet, the philosopher, or the lover could depicture •••• He seeks in 
vain for a prototype of his conception. Blasted by his disappointment, 
he descends to an untimely grave. (H&E, pp. 462-3) 
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In certain ways this is a misleading summary of what happens in the poem. In 
suggesting that knowledge and the external world 'cease to suffice' when the 
Poet 'suddenly' conceives a desire for communion with an epipsyche, the 
Preface disregards the important role of nature in fostering the desire and 
providing the medium through which it is pursued. Moreover, it misrepresents 
the narrative by reducing to two short sentences the greater part of the poem 
describing the Poet's quest after his dream of the 'veiled maid'. 
In fact the Poet's search for 'a prototype of his conception' is not quite 
as vain as the Preface suggests. Exactly what Shelley means by a 'prototype' 
19 
might be in doubt, but on two occasions after his dream he has glimpses of 
what would appear to be manifestations of the original 'veiled maid'. Beside 
the 'silent well' (484) he sees 'Two starry eyes' (490), which are reminiscent 
of her 'beamy bending eyes' (179), and are in turn recalled, as Wasserman has 
20 
suggested, by the 'two lessening points of light' (654) formed by the horns 
of the moon as it sinks below the horizon at the moment of the Poet's death. 
These three encounters with self-reflections mark the endings of three 
distinct stages in his quest, which occupy successive sections of the 
narrative (67~191, 192-492, 493-671). While each is in various ways a 
repetition of the last, they also show a gradation of decreasing emotional 
intensity. 
In the first section, the Poet pursues 'Nature's most secret steps' (81), 
roaming through the sites of past empires till he reaches the most ancient, 
Thebes and Ethiopia, both considered the cradle of civilization according to 
21 
Volney, and sees 'The thrilling secrets of the birth of time' (128). From 
there he wanders on to the Vale of Kashmir, where he has his vision. For the 
description and significance of this location Shelley is largely indebted to 
Owenson, whose missionary Hilarion meets Luxima here, at the foot of 
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a lofty mountain, which seemed a monument of the first day of creation. 
It was a solemn and sequestered spot, where an eternal spring seemed to 
reign, and which looked like the cradle of infant Nature, where she 
first awoke in all her primeval bloom of beauty. It was a glen, skreened 
by a mighty mass of rocks, over whose bold fantastic forms and 
22 
variegated hues dashed the silvery foam of the mountain torrent. 
In Alastor this becomes a 'dell, where odorous plants entwine/ Beneath the 
hollow rocks a natural bower,/ Beside a sparkling rivulet' (146-8). These 
elements from Owenson 1s description, perhaps with reinforcement from 
Coleridge's 'Kubla Khan' (written in 1798), from now on in Shelley's Hark \vill 
be established symbols of an introspective awareness of the origins of mind 
and poetry, just as the 1 veil~d maid', recalling Luxima (and possibly 
Coleridge's 'Abyssinian maid'), is the first of a succession of feminine 
23 
Shelleyan epipsyches. A frequent characteristic of such figures is their 
association with external nature. The location of the Poet's vision, and 
nature's deadness once the vision has passed, make the 1 veil~d maid' no 
exception, and suggest that part of the significance of his dream of erotic 
union is the subjective mergence of mind and nature. 
The recovery of this dream is the apparent aim of the second stage of the 
Poet's quest. He pursues it, however, by courting death, seeking at once 
Nature's 'cradle, and his sepulchre' (430), as if aware that the original 
unity of nature and mind is not to be found this side of the grave. He finds 
his self-image in the 'silent well' (484) located in the Georgian Caucasus 
near the 1Chorasmian 1 (272), or Caspian, Sea, thought to be the site of the 
24 
Garden of Eden and therefore the origin of both life and death. But neither 
his wan reflection nor the 'Spirit' (479) embodied in the landscape is the 
'ideal prototype' he seeks, and hence the earlier erotic intensity is largely 
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absent. Although the 'Spirit' responds to him, nature's reflective likeness 
soon becomes more obviously personified as the 'starry eyes' (490), and hence 
gives way to difference and otherness as the eyes lead the Poet away from 
communion with nature, and away from the introspective enclosure of the woods, 
the twining odorous plants, and the fountain. 
In the final section of the narrative the Poet's remaining 'Hope and 
despair' (639) diminish yet further as he resigns himself to death. The 'two 
lessening points of light' are not personified as eyes, but remain objectively 
external, a weak self-reflection that is extinguished on death. Physical death 
is therefore tantamount to the death of desire. Once again he finds himself in 
a natural enclosure, a 'nook' (572), perhaps based on the Solitary's 'nook' in 
25 
The Excursion (III, 51). This spot marks the Poet's end but possibly a new 
beginning too, for it overlooks a panoramic landscape, suggestive of a future 
life, though, like the 'veil~d maid' and the reflection in the well, this 
might also be a 'treacherous likeness', concealing the 'immeasurable void' 
(569) into which the river of life falls. 
The gradual decline of the Poet contradicts the claim of the Preface that 
he was struck by a 'sudden darkness and extinction', and so lends support to 
the idea that his life is intended to parallel the decline in creativity and 
radicalism that Shelley saw in \'lordsworth, as Hueschke and Griggs have 
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argued. On such an interpretation there is also a rough correspondence 
between the section of the narrative describing the Poet's pursuit of 
'Nature's most secret steps' (67-106) and Hordsworth's descriptions of his 
youthful enjoyment of nature in 1Tintern Abbey' (1798) and the 'Immortality' 
ode (1807). On the other hand, if, as the Preface claims, the poem truly has 
an 'instruction' bas~d on the Poet's negative example, it is one that bears 
out the Handerer 1s correction of the Solitary: his condemnation of self-
destructive idealism, his warning that solitude's 'mild nature can be 
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terrible' (The Excursion IV, 1032), and his view that nature should be 
27 
regarded as a source of correction rather than vision. In his portrayal of 
the Poet, Shelley, it would seem, is torn between the opposing aspects of 
I·Jordsworth represented by the Solitary and the \vanderer--even as Hordsworth 
himself is. 
In the Preface to Alaster we can see Shelley attempting unsuccessfully to 
extricate himself from this dilemma. His misrepresentation of the Poet's quest 
in the first paragraph reveals his deep involvement in the fate of his hero, 
whose vlordsworthian decline and failure he is unwilling to face. Nevertheless, 
he cannot avoid facing it, and consequently in the next paragraph he adopts 
the stance of the Wanderer addressing the Solitary. Yet the moral is 
grudgingly given: 'The picture', we are told, 'is not barren of instruction'; 
the Poet's seclusion is 'self-centred', not 'selfish', as the 'meaner spirits' 
mentioned later are; and he is 'avenged by the furies of an irresistible 
passion' (H&E, p. 463, my emphases). It/hat is more, Shelley seems to excuse him 
28 
by going on to compare him favourably with the loveless 'meaner spirits'. 
O'Neill has suggested that this class of people, which he notes does not 
appear in the poem, is introduced to counter Wordsworth's disapproval of the 
disappointed idealist's 'wilful disesteem of life/ And proud insensibility to 
29 
hope'. This indeed seems likely, but given that the Poet is like as well as 
unlike Wordsworth, it comes as less of a surprise to note that there is a 
strong degree of similarity between the 'meaner spirits' and the Poet himself. 
Shelley writes of them as follows: 
They who, deluded by no generous error, instigated by no sacred thirst 
of doubtful knowledge, duped by no illustrious superstition, loving 
nothing on this earth, and cherishing no hopes beyond, yet keep aloof 
from sympathies with their kind, rejoicing neither in human joy nor 
mourning with human grief; these, and such as they, have their 
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apportioned curse. They languish, because none feel with them their 
common nature. They are morally dead. They are neither friends, nor 
lovers, nor fathers, nor citizens of the world, nor benefactors of their 
country. (M&E, p. 463) 
There is not a phrase here that cannot, with a little latitude of 
interpretation, be seen as applicable to the sceptical, idealist and 'self-
centred' Poet. Shelley has thus, inadvertently as it were, damned him further 
in seeking to defend him. The implication is that all erstwhile hopeful 
idealists, whether in the mould of the Solitary or the Wanderer, share a 
similar fate, and one form of solitude can readily assume the likeness of 
another. The 'meaner spirits' therefore have more to do with the poem than at 
first appears. The Preface goes on to distinguish the 'pure and tender-
hearted' and the 'selfish, blind, and torpid', both of which classes exemplify 
a kind of solitude, since both 'attempt to exist without human sympathy'. But 
which, ultimately, does the Poet more closely resemble? Is he indeed one of 
the 'luminaries of the world', or one of 'Those who love not their fellow-
beings[,] live unfruitful lives', and are doomed to a 'slow and poisonous 
decay'? In the second paragraph of the Preface we see Shelley admitting this 
painful question at the very moment that he fends it off. The lines from The 
Excursion referring to Margaret (I, 500-2) which he quotes at the end of the 
Preface--'The good die first,/ And those whose hearts are dry as summer's 
dust,/ Burn to the socket'--consequently express his deep ambivalence about 
Wordsworth and the idealism he both represents and condemns. 
The main difference between the responses of the two poets to the idealist 
dilemma is that whereas Wordsworth accommodates himself to the defeat of 
idealism, Shelley does not, and hence can say in his sonnet to Wordsworth: 
'One loss is mine/·Which thou too feel'st, yet I alone deplore' (5-6). In 
'Tintern Abbey' (1798) and the 'Immortality' ode (1807) Wordsworth seeks to 
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overcome his regret for a lost vision and nature-communion with a philosophic 
acceptance of the loss. In The Excursion this inward deliberation is 
dramatised and taken a stage further in the debate between the two main 
protagonists. The Wanderer rejects the Solitary's failed idealism, which was 
once his own, in favour of a conservative and Christian redefinition of it: 
hope is redirected towards the next world, and nature and solitude are found 
conducive not to visionary rapture but to patient humility. In decrying 
fruitless regret, however, the Handerer goes further than Wordsworth in the 
earlier poems, for he also denounces the object of that regret as a dangerous 
delusion, not recognizing, as the earlier Wordsworth does, that his new-found 
hope derives from the idealism it supersedes. For Shelley therefore the 
\vanderer, and by association vlordsworth, have betrayed their former selves, 
but Wordsworth even more so in that he undermines the Solitary's position by 
portraying him also as having lost his revolutionary faith. All three, 
therefore, in Shelley's eyes, stand condemned by Hargaret, who, like the Poet 
in Alaster, wastes away through clinging to a forlorn hope. The quotation from 
The Excursion at the end of the Preface is thus turned against i'Jords\-lorth, and 
can be read as an endorsement as well as a condemnation of the Poet. 
Wordsworth is always wary of the 'abyss of idealism', as he calls it in his 
. note to the 'Immortality' ode, and of the 'feeling or image of intense unity' 
which, in his fragmentary essay 'The Sublime and the Beautiful', he describes 
as the effect of the sublime, even though a former apprehension of the ideal 
30 
and the sublime are the bedrock of his poetry. This tendency to defer to a 
remote and safe distance an ideal unity with nature from which he continues to 
draw sustenance is recognized by Shelley when he says of Wordsworth in Peter 
Bell the Third (1819): 'He touched the hem of Nature's shift,/ Felt faint--and 
never dared uplift/ The closest, all-concealing tunic' (315-7). It is this 
attitude in Hordsworth that enables him to conceive of two aspects of nature, 
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solitude and the ideal, and to drive a wedge between them. For Shelley this is 
what constitutes his betrayal, for while he too is aware of these two aspects, 
he also finds that they are inseparable, and the knowledge that they are so is 
the basis of the irresolvable impasse of Alastor. 
ii 
In spite of Wordsworth's pervasive influence in the poem, Shelley's treatment 
of the Poet as a figure in the landscape owes him very little. Whereas 
Wordsworth's figures usually have a strong human presence which stands out 
against their natural surroundings, the Poet, who is like a 'Spirit of wind' 
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(259) and an 'elemental god' (351), is almost naturalised. Although at a 
moment of despair the Poet can say that nature 'echoes not my thoughts' (290) 
and decreasingly seeks an emo~ional bond with nature as the poem proceeds, his 
entire being in the poem is nevertheless conveyed to us in terms of his 
chameleonic response to the external world. Conversely, the external world is 
presented to us only as he subjectively perceives it, and is therefore 
entirely a landscape of the mind, without any of the objective solidity of 
Wordsworth's Lake District. The use of landscape in Alastor is much closer to 
that of certain novels whose idealist heroes find in nature the material of 
their dreams and desires. Godwin's Fleetwood, for example, tells how, 'I was 
engaged in imaginary scenes, constructed visionary plans, and found all nature 
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subservient to my command'. Chateaubriand's Rene says of the ideal creature 
of his dreams, 'I embraced her in the winds and thought I heard her in the 
river's moaning. Everything became this vision of my imagination--the stars in 
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the skies and the very principle of life in the universe'. The exotic 
adventure and scenery of Owenson's The Missionary likewise have an idealist 
cast, underlined by a Brahmin pundit's curiously Berkeleyan explanation to the 
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hero that 'matter has no essence, independent of perception.' One 
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manifestation of an immaterialist tendency that these novels share with 
Shelley's poetry is their emphasis, in descriptions of nature, on what Locke 
calls the secondary or sensible qualities of things, such as their colours, 
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odours and sounds. For the sceptical idealist, whether in the mould of 
Berkeley or Drummond, these qualities are purely subjective, offering no 
evidence of a primary material substance, and wholly deceptive in their 
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suggestion of any such unchanging reality outside mind. Shelley's famed lack 
of concreteness, for which he has often been contrasted with Wordsworth, can 
thus be seen to.derive from a philosophical and literary tradition which 
resists the dualism Wordsworth increasingly espouses. 
By 1815 Shelley was well-versed in this tradition and had formed the main 
philosophical allegiances of his adult career. Alastor clearly demonstrates 
the position, owing much to Drummond, which he is later to define in 'On 
Life'. For example, the mutually defining relationship of the Poet and his 
surroundings illustrates the two basic axioms of Shelley's philosophy laid 
down in this essay: that mind 'cannot create, it can only perceive', and that 
'nothing exists but as it is perceived'. Intended to be expressions of unity, 
these statements, as we have seen, nevertheless imply an irreducible 
difference and mutual dependence between perceiver and percept. The subject-
object tensions of such a philosophy are mirrored in Alastor by a 
corresponding attraction and repulsion between metaphorical sign and referent. 
Thus the Poet's increasing tendency through the three stages of his quest to 
view nature externally is paralleled by the poem's increasing use of an 
allegorical mode. After his dream, when he first becomes conscious of nature's 
otherness, his journey to the source of a river grows more obviously 
allegorical of an internal quest. On leaving behind him the 'secret well', and 
his hope of communing with nature, his journey down river becomes almost 
mechanically allegorical of his journey through life, to the extent that he 
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can spell out its meaning in an apostrophe to the stream (502-14). 
The tensions between objectification and identification are at their most 
intense in the long central section of the narrative, which partly for this 
reason is not only the mo'St obscure section of the poem, but also the most 
original and prophetic of Shelley's future development. Hhere there is no real 
distinction between ideas and external objects, there can also be none between 
sign and referent, with the result that we often find metaphors becoming 
confused with or displacing the meanings to which they refer, so producing 
the confusion of tenor and vehicle noted by Keach, and what Empson calls 
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'short-circuited' comparisons. For example, in the following lines there is 
an apparent reversal of the expected positions of the two terms of a simile 
describing the motion of the Poet's boat--a boat Hhich is itself a symbol for 
the mind in the sway of inspiration: 
As one that in a silver vision floats 
Obedient to the sHeep of odorous winds 
Upon resplendent clouds, so rapidly 
Along the dark and ruffled Haters fled 
The straining boat. (316-20) 
There is not merely a reversal, however, for at the same time that the boat is 
compared to a visionary, the 'latter 'floats/ Obedient to the ••• winds' like a 
boat. In the absence of a stable relationship of difference between them, sign 
and referent thus reflect backwards and forwards, as in a hall of mirrors, 
endlessly multiplying images, of ivhich the 1 prototype 1 , the origin of meaning 
is lost; hence 'almost all familiar objects are signs, standing not for 
themselves but for others, in their capacity of suggesting one thought, which 
shall lead to a train of thoughts' (R&P, p. 477). The poetry thus creates Hhat 
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Hillis Hiller, speaking of literary texts in general, and using Shelleyan 
metaphors, calls a 'textual web' that covers a 'vertigo of the underlying 
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nothingness'. Similarly in Alaster the voice of the 'veiled maid', 'Like 
woven sounds of streams and breezes, held/ ••• [the Poet's] inmost sense 
suspended in its web/ Of many-coloured woof and shifting hues' (155-7), and 
having woken from his dream, he finds his path beset by dizzying voids, 
chasms, depths and gulfs, which repeatedly reveal themselves beneath the 
network of images of which nature and mind are composed. 
This network, however, does not only cover an abyss. In \vhat is to become a 
recurrent metaphor, we read of 'some inconstant star/ Between one foliaged 
lattice twinkling fair' (463-4), and thus beckoning the Poet forward in hope. 
In the terms of 1 On Life 1 , the vie\v of life as a unity brings us not only to 
the 'dark abyss--of how little we know', but is also the object of our 'high 
aspirations "looking both before and after"' (R&P, pp. 478, 476). But the 
feared abyss and the desired telos are similar and in Alaster both appear in 
the guise of death, which is beneath the Poet, as it were, in the depths of 
the sea and whirlpools of the river upon which he is borne, and also ahead of 
him as the object of his quest. Thus the poem suggests a certain identity 
between means and end. The impulse that drives the Poet on is not merely the 
hope of some remote goal, but also the result of a process in which that goal 
is immediately involved; and in so far as one aspect of '\vhat the Poet seeks is 
the mergence of mind and nature, he is impelled not simply by the attractive 
forces leading to that end, but rather by an alternating push and pull between 
subject and object. At one level this process can be observed in the 
repetitive element in the three stages of the Poet's quest, each of which, as 
we have seen, ends with some kind of convergence or mirroring of mind and 
nature, which is immediately interrupted. But the same process also occurs at 
a lesser scale in the poem, as illustrated in these lines describing the Poet 
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at sea in a storm: 
Calm and rejoicing in the fearful V!ar 
Of wave ruining on Have, and blast on blast 
Descending, and black flood on vlhir lpool driven 
\'lith dark obliterating course, he sate ••• (326-29) 
The action of wave on \·lave and blast on blast resembles the repetitive 
activity of the mind as it successively creates self-images and dissolves them 
Vlith new ones. The 'black flood' is like the 'dark flood' (190) of sleep that 
obliterates the Poet's dream--and 'Sleep and death', he soon reminds us, are 
what divides him from 'Vision and Love' (366-69). The eclipse of consciousness 
that attends union \vi th his 'Vision 1 is thus both a remote absolute and a 
continuing experience. The Poet meanwhile is 'Calm', above the conflict which 
he is also actively engaged in, showing a combination of objectivity and 
subj ecti vi ty which the 1 icy summits 1 and the \'lave-lashed 1 cavern 1 d base 1 of 
the Caucasus (352-57), in an anticipation of 'Mont Blanc', also suggest. 
Shelley's fragment 'Difficulty of Analyzing the Human Mind', describing 
thought as 'like a river whose rapid and perpetual stream floVIS outward' 
provides a revealing commentary on the Poet's passage along the river: 
If it were possible to be where we have been, vitally and indeed--if, at 
the moment of our presence there, we could define the results of our 
experience,--if the passage from sensation to reflection--from a state 
of passive perception to voluntary contemplation, were not so dizzying 
and so tumultuous, this attempt would be less difficult. (I&P, VII, 64) 
This passage recalls HordsvJOrth's lines from 'Peele Castle' (1807) expressing 
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the same difficulty: 'Not for a moment could I now behold/ A smiling sea, and 
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be what I have been' (37-8). Yet in Alaster, in the Poet's ascent of the 
backward-flowing stream, Shelley does attempt to reverse the direction of 
thought's movement in order to recover an original sensation from self-
conscious reflection. In this process sensation and reflection are .themselves 
engaged in a rapid and revolving interplay, which is indeed 'dizzying', as the 
waters rise 'Circling immeasurably fast, ••• / With dizzy swiftness, round, and 
round, and round' (381-8). The water's 'dizzying' motion (suggesting both 
vertigo and vo'rtex) resembles the dialectical effect of Friedrich Schlegel's 
irony, in which, as Furst writes, 'The self became conscious of itself as a 
perceiving consciousness in a spiralling movement that encompassed the 
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opposing poles of self-immersion and self-detachment'. This motion also runs 
in two directions: if in Shelley's fragment it is not quite clear whether the 
'passage' described is backwards or forwards, nor is it in the poem, where the 
river flows variably upstream and downstream, and where the Poet seeks 
'Nature's ••• cradle, and his sepulchre' (429-30). For Shelley ends are origins, 
and being both they are also neither, but rather phases in a continuing cyclic 
process. 
Alaster thus shows Shelley's developing sense of a dialectical 
interrelationship between ideas of unity, origination and power and the 
processes which create and destroy them--a dialectic which eventually bears 
fruit in the optimism of Prometheus Unbound. In Alaster however the Poet's 
quest fails, for, as we have seen, over the course of the poe~ the reiterative 
process runs dovm, and he is left at the end in a state of v1eary hopelessness, 
like that of Rousseau and the other phantoms who fall by the wayside in The 
Triumph of Life. Indeed, what Paul de Han has explained as this poem's 
awareness of the inevitable disfiguring effect of figuration is anticipated in 
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Alastor. Here the attempt 'to be where we have been' is shown to be 
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impossible because, as the Poet's ageing and 'treacherous' (474) self-image in 
the well and various other mirror images in the poem make clear, a distorted 
reflection is all we ever see of an original sensation. 
One effect of the distorting image is the tendency to personification and 
dualism such as we observed in Queen Mab. Indeed, the passage from that poem 
explaining how the concept of God derives from a personification of natural 
phenomena is transferred almost unchanged to the Alastor volume as a poem in 
its own right with the title 'Superstition'. It is included partly no doubt, 
as Neil Fraistat suggests, to serve as a rejoinder to the Wanderer's views on 
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natural religion in The Excursion (IV, 631-762). Shelley's sense that 
Wordsworth was particularly inclined to animate the physical world is recorded 
in Peter Bell the Third, where we learn that Peter had the kind of mind that 
'made alive/ The things it wrought on; I believe/ Wakening a sort of thought 
in sense' (310-12). But as Keach points out, Shelley attacks Wordsworth in 
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this poem for characteristics that are in fact his own. In 'Superstition' he 
seems tacitly to acknowledge that he shares the personifying tendency, for the 
one change he introduces--the replacement of the term 'God' at the end of the 
original passage with a list of his attributes: 'name, and form,/ 
Intelligence, and unity, and power'--broadens its reference beyond the God of 
established religions to all spiritual self-projections, including those in 
his own work. The Assassins, written and left incomplete in 1814, is Shelley's 
first work after Queen Mab to give clear expression to the spiritualizing and 
personifying nature-love which 'Superstition' castigates. The Assassins, we 
are told, 'idolized nature and the God of nature' to the extent that 
eventually 'the wide circle of the universe ••• appeared too narrow and confined 
to satiate' (Murray, pp. 128-29) the longings which it inspired. In Alastor 
similarly, nature prompts a desire in the Poet for something beyond itself 
which is personified as the 'veiled maid' and later as 'Two starry eyes'. The 
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latter's emergence from and interruption of the Poet's rapt contemplation of 
nature is closely described. A 'Spirit' which is 'clothed' in the landscape, 
and therefore scarcely distinguishable from it, 
Held commune with him, as if he and it 
lvere all that was, --only ••• when his regard 
Was raised by intense pensiveness, ••• two eyes, 
Two starry eyes, hung in the gloom of thought (487-90) 
Thus the self-consciousness of 'intense pensiveness' breaks into the communion 
of mind and nature, transforming their subjective unity into a hypostasis 
which beckons the Poet away from communion with his immediate surroundings. In 
'0h 0 there are spirits of the air 1 (1816) we encounter these 'starry eyes' 
again, and here the equivalence between the mind's proneness to personify and 
the treachery of nature's images is made particularly clear, for the 'starry 
eyes' and the 'false earth' are closely linked and found equally inconstant. 
Nature's inconstancy or mutability is a major theme in the Alaster volume, 
and it is one that is fraught with ambiguity. This is partly because Shelley 
reflects two ancient but quite different traditions of dealing with the 
subject. Host commonly (as in Ecclesiastes, for example), the theme of 
mutability occasions a lament, a pessimistic view of earthly life, and, in 
religious writers, a reliance on Heaven's eternity. For a sceptical tradition 
(well represented by Lucretius), however, there is nothing outside the flux of 
nature, which is universal, eternal, even beneficent. In 'Hutability', 
published with Alaster, Shelley demonstrates both attitudes: he regrets an 
irretrievable past but submits himself willingly to an unpredictable future; 
and both are present in the paradox of its final line, 'Nought may endure but 
Mutability'. In lamenting mutability he particularly reflects Spenser's 
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1Mutabilitie 1 cantos in The Faerie Queene, Rousseau's Reveries of the.Solitary 
Walker and Wordsworth's The Excursion; while his acceptance of a universal 
flux derives mainly from such eighteenth century sceptical writers as Halbach, 
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Godwin and Darwin. The opposing standpoints, however, as Shelley is well 
aware, often have more in common than the conflict of dualist and monist 
philosophies at first suggests. The sceptics, for example, often stress a 
principle of permanence that lies within cycles of change. For Darwin, life 
and matter survive changes in form through a species of Pythagorean 
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transmigration. Halbach, after describing the continual circulation of 
matter, writes: 
such is the eternal circle, that all that exists, is forced to describe. 
It is thus that motion, breeds, preserves for a time, and successively 
destroys, parts of the universe, the one by the other, whilst the sum of 
. . t . 1 th 46 ex1s ence rema1ns a ways e same. 
This can be compared with Spenser's description of the role of change in 
sustaining the universe. The following stanza is Nature's judgement on the· 
dispute between Jove and the character Mutability concerning which of them has 
ultimate sway in the world: 
I well consider all that ye have said, 
And find that all things stedfastnesse do hate 
And changed be; yet, being rightly wayd, 
They are not changed from their first estate; 
But by their change their being do dilate, 
And turning to themselves at length againe 
Do worke their owne perfection so by fate: 
Then over them Change doth not rule and raigne, 
But they raigne over Change, and do their states maintaine. 47 
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The full importance to Shelley of the earth-born Titaness Mutability and her 
defiance of Jove appears later in his career, but already in the Alaster poems 
he has absorbed Spenser's sense of the interdependence of change and 
permanence, while resisting his confirmation of Jove's supremacy--as his 
'Nought may endure but lvlutability' succinctly demonstrates. Wordsworth, too, 
in The Excursion, has a more complex response to natural vicissitude than is 
expressed by the Wanderer's high-toned detachment. The Solitary shows an 
ambivalence not unlike Shelley's, in complaining at one moment that 
'Mutability is Nature's bane' (III, 458), and at another delighting in 
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nature's 'Alternate and revolving' (III, 316) patterns of change. Various 
related aspects of Shelley's response to the opposing notions of mutability in 
his predecessors can be observed. First, in showing the similarity between 
them he draws attention to their inconsistencies and to the dualist tendencies 
they all share--the materialist Halbach as well as the Christian Spenser. 
Secondly, he thereby also expresses his own acute ambivalence concerning 
mutability, aware of both its destructive and renovating potential, and its 
.simultaneous dependence on and opposition to the idea of an unmoving, 
unchanging centre. But thirdly and most importantly, mutability for Shelley 
has an internal aspect; and here it is the condition not merely of the mind's 
susceptibility to change, as in 'Mutability', but of the relationship between 
mind and nature in their oscillation between identity and difference. Nature's 
inconstancy, in other words, represents a relationship of subject and object 
which veers between unity and separation, between nature's responsiveness to 
the mind and its alienation, and between the mind's participation in natural 
processes of change and its aspiration to a fixity outside them. The complex 
situation consequently arises whereby mutability symbolizes an alternation 
between different attitudes to mutability. 
To understand Shelley's concept of mutability thus is to recognize how 
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deeply ambivalent his sonnet 'To Wordsworth' is in its treatment of both 
Wordsworth himself and its themes of loss and inconstancy. The valued 
Wordsworth of the past, the poem tells us, 'wept to know/ That things depart' 
(1-2), and was like a 'star' (6) and a 'rock-built refuge' (9) above a 
turbulent sea of change. Yet his attitude of lament, of looking down on the 
world's turbulence from a position of remoteness and security, though 
representing a fidelity to what has been lost, is also a kind of infidelity to 
a necessary process of change, both in nature and politics. The attempt to 
preserve an image of the ideal by standing apart from the mutable world is 
self-defeating, and leads only to the political and religious conservatism 
that the poem laments as Wordsworth's betrayal. 'The irony which evolves is 
this: the speaker's regret over the loss is paradoxically bound to his 
condemnation'; this comment by Kim Blank on Shelley's other poem about 
Wordsworth, 'Verses Written on a Celandine' (written 1816), is equally 
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applicable here. Wordsworth's loss of childhood and youth is equivalent to 
Shelley's loss of the former Wordsworth, and in lamenting the loss, the sonnet 
repeats his error, thus demonstrating the unavoidable defeat of its own 
Wordsworthian idealism. 
Shelley's ambivalence concerning mutability is thus closely bound up with 
his dilemma as an idealist. In the Alastor volume there are the beginnings of 
a sense that mutability, in its widest signification, has a renovating as well 
as a disfiguring power. ~lherever in the poems we find the expression of a 
willingness to embrace the uncertainty of change or death--as in 'Stanzas.--
April, 1814 1 , 'On Death', 'A Summer Evening Churchyard', 'Mutability', as well 
as in parts of Alastor--there is a flickering optimism that anticipates 
Shelley's later more successful attempts to win hope from despair. For 
example, the Poet's passage by boat, though ultimately failing of its purpose, 
is the precursor of several later such voyages in which Shelleyan figures 
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venture joyously upon the unknown. In the Alastor poems and throughout 
Shelley's career the moon is a recurrent symbol of inconstancy, and one that 
particularly stresses its connection with the objective vision of self-
consciousness; thus the Poet, waking from his dream of unity, gazes 'on the 
empty scene as vacantly/ As ocean's moon looks on the moon in heaven' (201-2). 
The moon, however, is also a symbol of.renewal, as is made explicit in Peter 
Bell the Third, where Nature 1 s reply to the coy Wordsworth \·Tho dares not lift 
her hem is a quotation from Boccaccio: 'Bocca baciata non perde ventura/ Anzi 
rinnuova come fa la luna' (iv, 328~9)--'A mouth that's been kissed does not 
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lose its charm;/ Rather it renews itself as does the moon'. Likewise in 
Alastor the moon that sinks at the Poet's death (whose blood 'ever beat in 
mystic sympathy/ With nature's ebb and flow', 652-3) carries a faint 
suggestion that its eclipse is hot final. 
The dominant attitude of. the Alastor poems, however, is one of backward-
looking regret rather than forward-looking expectancy, and mutability is 
associated with loss rather than renewal. Nature's images are treacherously 
distorting, enticing the Poet on, but eventually draining him of hope that 
they can disclose the unitary origin he seeks. The narrator, who undergoes a 
parallel transition from hope to despair, begins the poem with an invocation 
to the parental nature of Queen Hab and to the inspiriting nature of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge--a combination which is itself revealing of the 
proximity of the materialist and the dualist positions--but he ends with the 
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realization that 'Nature's vast frame' (719) is not as he conceived it. The 
idea of nature as a personified origin has at least been discredited, even if 
a more progressive and hopeful conception has yet to be fully achieved. 
iii 
The common eighteenth-century idea that nature constitutes a language, usually 
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understood as the language of God, often informs the Romantic desire for 
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communion with nature. In its non-religious form it is frequently found in 
the work of Shelley. In Alastor, for example, the Spirit by the Hell 'Held 
commune' with the Poet, 'for speech assuming' the forms of the landscape (486-
7). 'On Love' speaks of the 'eloquence in the tongueless Hind', while 'On 
Life' offers the view that 'almost all familiar objects are signs' (R&P, pp. 
474, 477) like words. Since nature and language share the same status as a 
system of signs, both are equally the material of the poet. The sentence from 
Tasso quoted in 'On Life' and the Defence--'Non merita nome di creatore, 
sennon Iddio ed il Poeta' (R&P, pp. 475, 506)--for Shelley offers more than a 
simple parallel between God and the poet with their different spheres of 
creativity; in the terms of his 'intellectual philosophy' they are really not 
distinguishable. 'dhen therefore the narrator in Alastor invokes the 'Great 
Parent' (52) in Wordsworthian language there is a suggestion that this parent 
is the 'Poet of Nature 1 , lvordsworth himself, and that the narrator 1 s 1 natural 
piety 1 ( 3) is directed to\vards V/ords\..rorth 1 s poetry as well as tmvards the 
natural Horld. 
An implication of the nature-language identification is that almost 
everything the poem says about nature could also be said about language and 
poetry, and particularly its own language and poe~ry. The Poet's pursuit of a 
self-image projected upon nature is therefore a representation of the poem's 
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pursuit of itself within itself, as Tilottama Rajan recognizes. In thus 
representing and also being a quest, Alastor resembles those works which 
Roland Barthes describes as being 'by a fundanental ruse, nothing but their 
mm project: the \mrk is I'<'Titten in seeking the work, Hhich begins fictively 
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when it ends practically.' Yet it is important to stress that in Alastor 
there is difference as Hell as identity betHeen the practical quest and the 
fictive quest. i·Ioreover, the author, Hho suffers a demise in the Barthesian 
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scheme, is not quite killed off in Shelley's poem, though he remains 
tantalisingly difficult to locate. 
The narrator is a primary agent of the poem's self-reflexiveness. Contrary 
to Wasserman's contention that he and the Poet are characterised differently, 
the Poet, as various other critics have argued, is rather his self-projection, 
just as the 'veiled maid'--'Herself a poet' (161)--is a self-projection of the 
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Poet. The narrator's desolate pessimism at the end of the poem and his sense 
of the destruction of his earlier hopes for some positive revelation in the 
telling of his tale certainly point to his personal involvement in the fate of 
the Poet. At the same time he is not clearly distinguished from the author who 
writes the Preface, whose admiring sympathy for the Poet he shares. In fact 
the only thing that clearly does differentiate him is his fictive belief in 
the actual existence of the Poet. By virtue of this one differenc~, however, 
he plays a vital role in enabling Shelley to preserve a distance from his 
narrative while at the same time vicariously identifying with it. In this 
respect he performs a similar function to the fictional voices which utter the 
prose introductions to Julian and l4addalo and Epipsychidion. \ihile apparently 
drawing attention to the duality of author and text, reality and fiction, they 
actually serve to break it down. 
The Preface contributes to this effect. Like all authorial prefaces, it 
purportedly locates the author outside the main text as the origin of its 
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meaning. Hence it offers to explain the poem's 'allegorical' import and 
moral 'instruction' (M&E, p. 463). But not only does the poem itself resist 
any such closed interpretation, but, as we have seen, the authorial detachment 
of the Preface is subverted from within by an alternative voice warmly 
identifying with the Poet. While the real author remains out of sight, the 
Preface-writer is shown to be as much a part of the fiction as the narrator 
and the Poet; he shares their hope and despair and is a vicarious participant 
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in the quest. The author is therefore excluded from but also inscribed in the 
text, absent and present like Shelley's skylark--'Thou art unseen,--but yet I 
hear thy shrill delight' ('To a Skylark', 20)--an invisibly remote creator who 
is himself created in the act of singing. He is thus involved in a dialectical 
interplay with the text by which both remain as elusive as the 'veiled maid'. 
She, indeed, is the sought-after image of which he is the indefinitely 
deferred meaning. 
The narrator's relation to his narrative is emblematic of Shelley's 
relation to his poem, both being marked by an alternation between 
identification and objectification. This alternation is evident in the 
invocation and coda as it is in the Preface. The narrator invokes Nature 
initially in a tone of passionate and sexual entreaty, but then switches 
suddenly to say, 'though ne'er yet/ Thou hast unveil 1d thy inmost sanctuary,/ 
Enough from incommunicable dream/ ••• Has shone within me' (37-41), and 
refraining as it were from lifting Na~ure 1 s hem, he appropriately lapses into 
Wordsworthian language to complete his invocation. But as he makes clear, only 
by adopting such a stance, making do with 'Enough' but not all, and remaining 
objectively outside the sanctuary, is he able to begin his tale. A 
consequence, however, of this necessary authorial detachment is that the 
Poet's quest for unity is defeated from the very beginning, just as the poem 
as a whole is defeated by the authorial detachment of the Preface-writer. 
At the end of the poem, the narrator shows the same ambiguous attitude. He 
elaborately invests the Poet's death with pathos but at the same time denies 
that the expression of pathos is possible, thus giving an ambivalent gloss to 
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Wordsworth's 'too deep for tears'; and while he claims that the Poet will 
live on in the 'simple strain' (703-12) he has uttered, he also asserts that 
the 'feeble imagery' and 'cold powers' of poetry are inadequate to mourn his 
death. The poem cannot surmount this contradiction, which reflects its own 
90 
failure to convey a unified meaning. Like the Poet, the poem also in a sense 
dies without fulfilling its quest, or knowing whether there is a possibility 
of life and meaning beyond its own enclosed, deceptively reflective world, and 
beyond its own death. 
By definition, such survival is only to be sought outside the confines of 
the text. In The Revolt of Islam there is a suggestion as to where it might be 
found. The mysterious Woman in the first canto describes how her revolutionary 
fervour in youth was partly learned from a poet like the one in Alastor: 
A dying poet gave me books, and blessed 
With wild but holy talk the sweet unrest 
In which I watched him as he died away--
A youth with hoary hair--a fleeting guest 
Of our lone mountains: and this lore did sway 
My spirit like a storm, contending there alway. (I, xxxvii, 453-59) 
Here the death of the poet is not regarded as a defeat. Rather, in the act of 
dying he transmits his life to the Woman and so ensures his survival. 
Similarly, through the dying Poet in Alastor, Shelley, a 'fleeting guest' in 
his ovm poem, transmits himself and his meaning to the reader. The poem, too, 
though dying away like the Poet, is recuperated beyond its own termination, 
and paradoxically lives on as a successful poetic record of the inevitability 
of poetic failure. 
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C h a p t e r 4 
The 1816 Odes: 'Fleeting Power' 
If the critical reception of Alastor seemed to Shelley an unwelcome 
confirmation of what the poem suggests are its own 'cold powers' (710), his 
two lyrics of the summer of 1816, 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' and 'Mont 
Blanc', show a remarkable recovery of confidence in the power of poetry and in 
hie own powers as a poet. In fact, one of the ways these poems not only 
demonstrate but explain his new-found assurance is by boldly addressing the 
very notion of 'power'. This is one of the most problematic concepts in 
Shelley's writing, drawing from him, in different contexts, the extremest 
responses of antipathy and desire. On the one hand, from the very beginning of 
his career, whether as a materialist or a sceptical idealist, and for 
political as well as philosophical reasons, he is opposed to the notion of a 
primal power or cause. On the other, power is the term he applies variously to 
love, to the wind that draws music and poetry from the lyre, and to 'the 
interfused and overruling Spirit of all the energy and wisdom included within 
1 
the circle of existing things'. The question of how he can sustain such 
contrary attitudes is crucial to an interpretation of his poetry from 1816 
onwards, and in so clearly raising it the two odes have proved something of a 
touchstone for critical responses to his work. 
Wasserman believes that a 'conviction' of an ultimate cause based on 
imagination overrides Shelley's rational doubt in the two odes, and that power 
and 'Intellectual Beauty' are therefore to be understood as transcendent 
realities, if sceptically provisional ones, which manifest themselves in the 
2 
world of change. The majority of critics have since rejected the notion of 
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the 'One Mind' on which Wasserman bases his reading, and instead regard the 
transcendentalist language of the poems as a means of expressing subjective 
3 
experience. On this view, power is an imaginative hypothesis with an ethical 
or psychological significance rather than a metaphysical one. Hogle takes this 
approach a stage further by interpreting power as the process of transference 
4 
by which such hypotheses are conceived. His interpretation of the poems 
consequently appears as a mirror image of Wasserman's, whose terms it inverts. 
Thus, while the 'secret strength of things' in 'Mont Blanc' (139) is 
understood by Wasserman as the 'motionless Power', which reveals itself, in 
'successive transformations of transcendent snow', as flowing glaciers, 
streams and rivers, for Hogle it represents the mobility of transference, 
5 
which conceals itself behind ideas of static absoluteness. At issue between 
them is the notion of causality: the power which Wasserman regards as a first 
6 
cause is for Hogle only the 'effect of its own effects' --that is, power as 
cause is only a manifestation of Shelley's revisionary conception of power as 
transference. 
Shelley has himself been exercised by this question long before 1816. 
Despite his repeated rehearsals of Hume's sceptical arguments about cause in 
The Necessity of Atheism (Murray, p. 4), the Notes to Queen Mab (M&E, pp. 375-
76), and A Refutation of Atheism (Murray, p. 121), his concept of power 
remains uncertain. In the Queen Mab Note he writes, 1What is power?--id guod 
potest, that which can produce any given effect. To deny power is to say that 
nothing can or has the power to be or act' (M&E, P• 378). Here power appears 
to be a property of existing things, though there is an element of circularity 
in the notion of things possessing the 'power to be 1 • In the poem, however, 
power and necessity are much closer to an originary force: 1Spirit of Nature! 
all-sufficing Power,/ Necessity! thou mother of the world!' (VI, 197-8). We 
find the same inconsistency in a letter to Hitchener of 11·June 1811. Here he 
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describes God as 'the existing power of existence' (Jones, I, 101), a 
description which corresponds to the definition of power in the Queen Hab 
Note. The evident circularity of his phrase is underlined in the letter by his 
speaking of God and power both as 'adjuncts' to the substantial universe and 
as 'the unknown cause, the supposititious [sic] origin of all existence' 
(Jones, I, 100). According to Sir \'lilliam Drummond, Shelley 1 s uncertainty is 
one which has long bedevilled metaphysics: 
Is power a cause, or an effect? Philosophers do not appear to have 
decided this question. Sometimes they speak of power, as if it were the 
principle which had occasioned all things, and by which the universe 
itself was produced; at other times they they seem to consider it, as 
having resulted from some being already existing •••• Power cannot be at 
once the principle and the attribute of being. It cannot be both the 
8 
consequence and the origin of existing substance. 
In A Refutation of Deism Shelley refers in a footnote to Drummond's 'very 
profound disquisition' on power and echoes him in the text: 'If Power be an 
attribute of existing substance, substance could not have derived its origin 
from power' (Hurray, p. 121). Eusebes, the Christian who speaks these \vords 
and who plays devil 1s advocate in most of the dialogue, does not, however, 
consider the possibility that power might be the principle rather than the 
attribute of being. Thus, although Theosophus the deist, who believes in a 
iubstantial God, is confuted, Shelley skirts the question concerning power 
posed by Drummond. In Alaster there is again an ambiguity in his attitude. The 
Preface tells us that power 'strikes the luminaries of the world with sudden 
darkness and extinction, by awakening them to too exquisite a perception of 
its influences' (M&E, p. 463). The poem itself, in contrast, resolutely avoids 
naming or defining the mysterious force that lures the Poet to his 
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destruction. It is as if here Shelley heeds his own warning in the last two 
lines of 'Superstition' that to give the world's influences and their causes 
'name and form,/ Intelligence, and unity and power', is to elevate an 
attribute into a principle. 
In the 1816 odes, however, Shelley uses the term power quite freely and 
without apparent wariness of its philosophical implications. We are therefore 
compelled to ask: what precisely is his concept of power in these poems, and 
how has it changed since formerly? Neither Wasserman nor Hogle, I suggest, 
accurately represents Shelley's position. While Wasserman's view is 
incompatible with Shelley's consistently stated scepticism concerning first 
causes, Hogle's contention that power is 'the effect of its own effects' 
shares the same circularity as Shelley's earlier definitions of power and God, 
and in the final analysis does not escape the notion of a first cause. 
Moreover, despite Shelley's oft-expressed adherence to Hume's argument on 
causality and his admiration for Drummond, his poetry is not so closely tied 
to their philosophies as Hogle suggests. In the ensuing discussion of 'Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty' and 'Mont Blanc' I shall mediate between these two 
critics' views by arguing that Shelley is still divided between the 
alternative conceptions of power as a principle and as an attribute. However, 
I also intend to show that he now develops a Romantic ironic understanding of 
their dialectical interrelationship, whereby each depends on but also 
undermines the other. Seen in this light, power can no longer be interpreted 
merely as an imaginative hypothesis_, for the dialectic which renders cause and 
effect interdependent also destroys any notion of priority between reality and 
art, referent and sign. Shelley's confidence in handling the idea of power in 
I the 1816 odes derives therefore from a sense not of its fictionality, but of 
its creative and revolutionary potential. 
His elaboration of a new conception of power in these poems is inseparably 
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connected with and to a large extent determined by a parallel development in 
his understanding of the relationship between subject and object. As a result 
of his visit in 1816 to Switzerland, where the poems were written, and of the 
various literary and landscape influences with which it was associated, 
Shelley's awareness of the complex intertwinings of mind and nature, 
imagination and experience, books and life was considerably deepened. I 
propose therefore to look first at certain relevant aspects of this Swiss 
experience, before going on to address directly the poems which emerged from 
it. 
i 
One of the books which helped to form Shelley's idea of Switzerland before he 
went there was Godwin's Fleetwood (1805). Ruffigny, the character in the novel 
who becomes the hero's mentor, is a venerable Swiss who lives alone in the 
mountains of the Canton of Uri. When Fleetwood goes to visit him there, the 
old man describes his mode of life as follows: 
1 
'I pass some hours of every day ••• in this apartment; but my life is 
principally in the open air: I think more than I read; and I am more 
attached to the great and living volume of nature, than to the cold, 
insensible, mechanically constructed pages and sheets that have been 
produced by my fellow creatures. Let no man despise the oracles of 
books 0 A book is a dead man, a sort of mummy, embowelled and embalmed, 
_/";--- --
but that once had flesh, and motion, and a boundless variety of 
determinations and actions. I am glad that I can, even upon these terms, 
converse with the dead, with the wise and the good of revolving 
centuries. Without books I should not understand the volume of 
nature •••• The furniture of these shelves constitutes an elaborate and 
invaluable commentary; but the objects beyond those windows, and the 
circles and communities of my contemporaries, are the text to which that 
commentary relates.' 9 
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There is some irony that Godwin, who is not renowned for his sympathy with 
nature, and had never visited Switzerland, should put these words into the 
mouth of a character whose existence belongs wholly to the 'cold, insensible, 
mechanically constructed pages' of a book. However, when read through the eyes 
of Shelley, the passage acquires a new resonance, for it accurately describes 
the mutually dependent relationship between nature and books that is 
repeatedly revealed in his life, his writing, and in the interaction between 
the two. 
Indeed, it is never more clearly revealed than in the influence upon him of 
Fleetwood itself. From the very first, Shelley's letters to Godwin in 1812 
model his relationship with the philosopher on that of Fleetwood and 
10 
Ruffigny. Returning from Ireland in April 1812, he at first sought a house 
in Merionethshire, as 'the scene of Fleetwood's early life', and invited 
Godwin to Wales in order 'that I s[hould] first meet you in a spot like that 
in which Fleetwood met Ruffigny; that then every lesson of your wisdom might 
become associated in my mind with the forms of Nature where she sports in the 
simplicity of her loveliness and magnificence, and each become imperishable 
11 
together.' The interpenetration of fiction and reality, mind and nature 
could hardly be plainer. In 1814 Fleetwood is again relived ~hen Shelley, Mary 
Godwin and Claire Clairmont, on their elopement tour abroad, intend to settle 
in Uri. Like Fleetwood, they make a tour of Lake Lucerne by boat, and the 
scenery they witness is described in History of a Six Weeks' Tour (1817) much 
12 
as it is in the novel. 
Switzerland was almost inevitably their destination again in 1816, and not 
only because Claire Clairmont and Shelley, for their separate reasons, hoped 
to meet Byron there. Other literary figures high in Shelley's esteem had 
connections with this country: Rousseau was a native of Geneva and his Julie, 
ou la nouvelle Heloise is set there; Wordsworth had visited in 1790 on a 
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walking tour which he draws on in Descriptive Sketches (1793); and Coleridge 
had written 'Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni 1 (1802). 
Switzerland, moreover, as Fleetwood emphasizes, was a republic renowned for 
its freedom-loving traditions, where Shelley, who was not sure of returning 
13 
home, might feel politically comfortable. His party was also following a 
fashion: Switzerland was now a popular resort as a result of the grand tour 
14 
and the growing taste for mountain scenery in the eighteenth century. 
Thus Shelley went to Switzerland heavily laden with preconceptions and 
prepared responses, and we can see him experiencing the country both through 
and against these in his letters and poems. Various remarks to Peacock show 
him to be ruefully aware of treading a well-worn tourist route, and of 
15 
responding to the landscape with conventional raptures. By describing 
himself in a number of hotel registers as a 'Democrat, Philanthropist and 
Atheist' he clearly intended to dissociate himself from the mass of visitors 
who, ever since Gray had found the Alps 'pregnant with religion and poetry', 
had been responding to the mountains with religious enthusiasm, even though 
his own 1extatic wonder, not unallied to madness' is hardly different, despite 
16 
his non-belief. Similarly, in his two odes he may reject the supernaturalism 
of his literary models in their treatment of the external world, but he also 
acknowledges that the landscape would be a vacancy without their mediating 
function. His attitude is therefore comparable to Ruffigny 1s: 'living' nature 
may seem anterior to 'dead' books, but without them it is meaningless; and 
while they provide a 'commentary' on nature, nature is itself a 'volume' and a 
'text', implying derivation from and reference to an anterior mind. There is 
therefore no clear priority but rather an interdependence between mind and 
nature. In Shelley's two poems we can even detect echoes of Ruffigny's remark 
that, despite a preference for the open air, he is glad to 'converse with the 
dead, with the wise and good of revolving centuries'. In the Scrape Davies 
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manuscript of 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' (M&E, pp. 525-8) the poet speaks 
of having had 'Hopes of strange converse with the storied dead' (52). These 
hopes were thwarted, and it was the return of spring, 'wooing/ All vocal 
things that live' (56-7), that made the Spirit of Beauty present, though in 
the next stanza 'joy' and 'hope' are also known through 'studious zeal'--that 
is, through books rather than nature. In 'Mont Blanc' 'the wise, and great, 
and good/ Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel' the mountain's voice, which 
is otherwise 'not understood' (81-3), and yet the ultimate source of this 
voice in either nature or mind is again left undefined. 
His intense preoccupation while in Switzerland with the mind-nature 
relationship is undoubtedly connected with his reading of Wordsworth and 
17 
Coleridge, who were much in his thoughts at the time. When he writes to 
Peacock from Geneva on 15 May 1816 that he misses England, and mentions as 
among his special ties 'Our Poets & our Philosophers, our mountains & our 
lakes' (Jones, I, 475)--almost in one breath, as if they were indissolubly 
connected--he is probably thinking mainly of these two Lake poets. However, in 
his next letter of 12 July, Rousseau and his novel Julie, ou la nouvelle 
Heloise (1761) are in the forefront of his mind, and it is under their 
influence that he continues to consider the relative claims of mind and 
nature; though for Shelley the question receives an added piquancy from the 
experience he describes of reading the novel while sailing around Lake Geneva 
where its events are set. One of the novel's themes is the power of love to 
transform not only those it touches but nature as well: St Preux, for example, 
writes to Julie, 'Let us animate all nature, which is absolutely dead without 
18 
the genial warmth of love.' Both Byron and Shelley refer to their passion as 
an 'overflowing' of Rousseau's own passionate genius, which to Shelley seems 
to overflow into the actual scenery of the lake, subordinating its reality to 
19 
the novel's fiction. The places Rousseau describes, he writes, 
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present themselves to the imagination as monuments of things that were 
once familiar, and of beings that were once dear to it. They were 
created indeed by one mind, but a mind so powerfully bright as to cast a 
shade of falsehood on the records that are called reality (Murray, p. 
21?). 
Here Shelley clearly echoes the sentiments of Rousseau's lovers who in later 
20 
life see these same scenes as memorials of their former passion. Although by 
this remark he seems to be deifying the creative imagination, as St Preux does 
his love, neither Shelley nor Rousseau actually privileges mind over nature in 
this way. Shelley can state the exact opposite point of view, writing in the 
same letter to Peacock that 1Meillerie is indeed enchanted ground, were 
Rousseau no magician' (Murray, p, 215); and Rousseau, likewise, speaks of 'a 
kind of supernatural beauty' belonging to the mountains of Valois, 'which 
21 
charms both the senses and the mind'. At the same time, both writers also 
see the subject-object relation as reciprocal. In Rousseau's novel Julie tends 
to speak of love in terms of rendering and receiving: 'The source of true 
happiness', she writes, 'is not confined to the desired object, nor to the 
heart which possesses it, but consists in a certain relation between the one 
and the other'; and her perception of the outer world is similarly reciprocal: 
'The delightful solitude of the groves seemed to heighten our sensibility, and 
the woods themselves appeared to receive additional beauty from the presence 
22 
of two such faithful lovers.' In his letter to Peacock Shelley expresses a 
.comparable view of the relationship between the novel and its setting: 'It is 
inconceivable', he says, 'what an enchantment the scene lends to those 
delineations, from which its own most touching charm arises'; and likewise to 
Hogg he writes of Julie 'giving & receiving influences from the scenes by 
23 
which it was inspired'. In his letters Shelley thus follows Rousseau quite 
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closely in that his uncertainty of the priority of nature or mind tends 
towards a view of their reciprocity. 
It is possible to see 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' and 'Mont Blanc' as 
respectively emphasizing the two sides of the issue: while the 'Hymn' 
addresses intellectual realities, one may argue, as Blank does, that in 'Mont 
24 
Blanc' the mind is more influenced than influencing. There are other ways in 
which the two poems seem to counterbalance one another: one is concerned with 
beauty, the other with the sublime; one is distinctly emotional, the other, at 
times, icily cerebral; and one professes a form of faith, while the other is 
pervaded with doubt. These oppositions, however, like that between mind and 
nature, are found to be based on complementarity and mutual dependence once 
the poems are examined in more detail. 
ii 
'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' 
Shelley's title, 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty', adroitly anticipates some 
important and contradictory aspects of the poem. It draws attention to a wide 
range of religious antecedents by its use of the term 'Hymn', and specifically 
25 
recalls Spenser's 'An Hymn of Heavenly Beauty' (1596). But at the same time 
the notion of 'Intellectual Beauty' places the poem in the eighteenth-century 
tradition of hymns to abstract concepts, and sharply distinguishes the title 
from Spenser's by implying the radical scepticism of what he calls in 'On 
Life' the 'intellectual system' of Drummond (R&P, p. 476). The poem, 
accordingly, employs a religious form and language for an anti-religious 
purpose. This strategy, however, raises a crucial question: what ultimately is 
the difference, in ontological terms, between the 'Spirit of BEAUTY' (14), by 
whose 'spells' (83) the poet is bound to a secular alternative to faith, and 
26 
the 'God and ghosts and Heaven' whose 'Frail spells' (27-29) it replaces? 
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The common critical response that Shelley is proposing a humanist hypothesis, 
which may 'exalt and ennoble' without being true, is inadequate, I suggest, on 
27 
two counts. First, it pays insufficient regard to Shelley's acute awareness 
of the deifying effect of poetry and personification, and of the essential 
similarity therefore of the two kinds of spells. Second, it tends to miss the 
genuinely revisionary nature of the Spirit, which is as it were divided 
against itself in its resistance to its own hypostasis. In the following 
discussion of Shelley's 'Hymn' I shall argue that it is this very 
contradiction within the Spirit of Beauty that constitutes its poetic and 
revolutionary 'power' (78). 
First of all, the 'Intellectual Beauty' of the title, with which the Spirit 
is synonymous, is itself an ambiguous concept, and not only to be thought of 
in sceptical terms. As Matthews and Everest have indicated (pp. 523-4), the 
term was widely current in contemporary writing, and was generally used to 
distinguish an inward beauty of the mind from an outward, sensuous beauty. It 
is in this sense that the phrase is used, for example, in C.M. Wieland's 
Agathon (1766), as translated by J. Richardson in 1773, where reference is 
made to the 'Platonic maxim, that external beauty is a reflection of the 
28 
intellectual beauty of the soul.' This understanding of 'intellectual 
beauty' obviously runs counter to the sceptical notions of Drummond, and 
Wasserman for this reason rejects it, though his curiously contradictory 
insistence that 'Intellectual Beauty ••• is a divinity of the mind only' 
29 
actually lends weight to a Platonic interpretation of the term. It is true 
1 that the poem shows little direct influence of Plato, but the Platonic 
reference of its title .is strongly suggested by the fact that Shelley's only 
30 
other use of the term occurs in his translation of Plato's Symposium. 
Although the translation was written two years after the 'Hymn', his re-use of 
a phrase from the title of one of his own poems is likely to have been 
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deliberate, particularly as in Plato's Greek the word 'beauty' is unqualified. 
Moreover, the repetition does seem to indicate a significant similarity 
between Shelley's and Plato's conceptions of beauty. In the Symposium Diotima 
explains that the true lover of beauty, after proceeding from a love of 
beautiful forms to a love of wisdom and the beauty in souls, would, in 
Shelley's words, 
turn towards the wide ocean of intellectual beauty, and from the sight 
of the lovely and majestic forms which it contains, would abundantly 
bring forth his conceptions in philosophy; ••• [until eventually he 
beheld] the divine, the original, the supreme, the self-consistent, the 
monoeidic beautiful itself. 40 
All earthly beauty, it would appear, is a participation-in the divine beauty, 
and the beauty of mind mediates between them, without being clearly separable 
from either. Diotima's distinctions between divine, mental and physical beauty 
are therefore somewhat imprecise. In Shelley's 'Hymn' we can find the same 
mutually informing categories of beauty, for the Spirit, which is the 'shadow 
of some unseen Power', visits 'Each human heart and countenance' (7) and 
shines upon 'human thought ••• [and] form' (15). Furthermore, the distinctions 
between. the types of beauty represented here are again far from clear. The 
Spirit could be the same as the 'unseen Power' or only its manifestation: it 
is the 'shadow 1of this power, but also has its own 'shadow' (46, 59); and 
although, like power, it is 'unseen' (2), it also has 'hues' (14), is 'fair' 
(83), and in various ways manifests itself in the external world. Moreover, 
just as the 'wide ocean of intellectual beauty' in the translation of the 
Symposium appears to be at once exclusive and inclusive of lower and higher 
grades of beauty, the identification of the 'Intellectual Beauty' of Shelley's 
title with either the visible or invisible aspects of the spirit, or with 
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both, is left unclear. 
The title, then, while expressing scepticism concerning transcendent and 
external realities, at the same time admits both, just as the 'intellectual 
philosophy' as expounded in 'On Life' purports to demonstrate the unity of 
life, yet cannot quite collapse the dualisms of subject and object and of time 
and eternity. Shelley's use of the term 'intellectual' thus encapsulates the 
peculiar contradictions of sceptical idealism as he conceives it. In the poem 
we find that 'Intellectual Beauty', far from having a purely mental existence, 
is constantly reconstituted and dissolved by the dynamic interrelation between 
noumenal and phenomenal worlds. This interrelation is somewhat differently 
depicted in what are discernible as the poem's two parts: the first four 
stanzas, reflecting the poem's origins in hymns to abstract qualities, attempt 
a general description of the nature and operations of the Spirit of Beauty; 
the final three give a brief history of the poet's relationship with it in the 
manner of Wordsworth's 'Immortality' ode. 
The first part proceeds by repeatedly qualifying its own statements and 
heading off false inferences, swinging back and forth between affirmation and 
doubt. By the end of stanza 4 it achieves a view of the 'Spirit of Beauty' 
that is a considerable refinement, though not quite a revision, of the poem's 
opening proposition: 'The awful shadow of some unseen Power/ Floats though 
unseen among us'. The similes following this statement in the first stanza, 
and describing the spirit's veiled and evanescent appearances in the world, 
begin the refining process. They conclude by likening these appearances to 
'aught that for its grace may be/ Dear, yet dearer for its mystery' (11-12). 
In context, 'grace' and 'mystery' refer respectively to physical beauty and 
spiritual origin, and yet both are religious terms, and equally suggestive of 
a supernatural influence upon the natural. The priority of one to the other is 
thus tacitly questioned. The preceding similes likewise depict an interaction 
. 1 1 0 
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between different phenomena rather than a unidirectional influence of one upon 
the other: 'moonbeams' and 'piny mountain', 'clouds' and 'starlight', 'memory' 
and 'music' (5-10) could all equally be a 'grace' or a 'mystery'. Moreover, 
although these similes employ the word 'Like' in emphatic anaphora, we cannot 
fail to read them as instances rather than likenesses of beauty--which again 
undermines the idea of the 'Spirit of Beauty' as an original essence 
independent of its physical manifestations. Thus the first stanza confirms the 
ambiguity of the spirit's description as a 'shadow', hovering between presence 
and absence, the visible and the invisible. 
This ambiguity is continued in the next stanza, which laments the very 
inconstancy which in the first stanza has been celebrated as part of the 
spirit's 'mystery'. In response to his own question 'Why dost thou pass 
away ••• ?' (16), the poet says, 
Ask why the sunlight not forever 
Weaves rainbows o'er yon mountain river, 
Why aught should fail and fade that once is shewn. (18-20) 
Again there is an uncertainty concerning the relationship between the earthly 
mutability described here and the spirit's inconstancy: which is an expression 
of which, and which therefore is cause, and which effect? This uncertainty is 
also evident within the image that Shelley employs here. At first it seems 
that the Spirit of Beauty, 'that dost consecrate/ With thine own hues all thou 
dost shine upon' (13-14), is being likened to the 'sunlight', but since the 
'hues' of light are the result of refraction, the Spirit is really more like 
·the 'rainbows' caused by the interaction of spiritual light and earthly water. 
This reading of the Spirit as effect rather than cause is reinforced by the 
later comparison of the Spirit's light to 'music by the night wind sent/ 
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Through strings of some still instrument' (33-4). However, although 'rainbows' 
and 'music', as analogues of the Spirit, are products, in both comparisons an 
ambiguity remains, since spiritual 'sunlight' and 'wind' are clearly spoken of 
as creative agents. 
The complex relationship of the seen to the unseen is more fully explained 
as that of mutability and permanence. The essence of beauty, we have learned 
from stanza 1, is its evanescence. A paradox of the same order is expressed by 
the idea that 'Nought may endure but Mutability', where mutability and 
permanence can be understood both to depend on and to cancel each other. 
Stanzas 2, 3 and 4 explore this relationship further. Following the poet's 
loss of a sense of power and permanence in the face of the Spirit's departure 
in stanza 2, he refuses in stanza 3 the consolation offered by the fictions of 
religion. Only the 'Spirit of Beauty', he claims, can offset 'Doubt, chance, 
and mutability' (31). These, however, are the very qualities that make the 
~ 'Spirit of Beauty' what it is. In stanza 4 he draws closer to a recognition of 
this essential contradiction. He acknowledges the double aspect of the Spirit, 
which is 'unknown and awful' but has a 'glorious train' of qualities, such as 
'Love, Hope, and Self-esteem' (37-41), which are experienced transiently in 
the human world. Faith is inevitably absent from Shelley's version of the 
theological virtues, but if his poem nevertheless expresses a kind of faith, 
it is because faith and doubt are dialectically related in the same way as 
permanence and change, faith resting on a sceptical questioning of its every 
formulation. The paradox of the poem is most completely expressed in the 
striking description of the Spirit as 'Like darkness to a dying flame' (45). 
The darkness here is both desired and feared: it keeps the flame alive but 
also threatens to engulf it; it is the darkness of the 'night wind' and the 
'midnight stream' (33-35), which signify the principle of movement and change 
'that to human thought ••• [is] nourishment' (44), but it is also the 'gloom' 
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(23) of 'This dim vast vale of tears' (17); it is thus both a means of renewed 
life and an ultimate end. This paradox achieves its complete realization in 
Adonais, with the poet's recovery of hope through his final willing embrace of 
death. In the 'Hymn' Shelley shrinks from this total submission to mutability, 
begging the spirit, 'Depart not--lest the grave should be,/ Like life and 
fear, a dark reality' (47-8). This demand for permanence represents a failure 
of Shelleyan faith, as it is equally a failure of doubt. The apparent loss of 
nerve is symptomatic of a conflict in the poem which is not to be confused 
with its dialectical contraries. Despite the interrelational and ironic 
significance of the Spirit of Beauty, in the last resort it is exempt from the 
processes it represents, as we shall again find in the final stanza. 
The second section of the poem begins in stanza 5 with a corrective to the 
fears with which stanza 4 ends. His youthful pursuit of 'ghosts' of the 
'departed dead', and invocation of the 'poisonous names' of religion (49-53), 
are comparable to his urging the invisible Spirit of Beauty not to depart. But 
the spirit, he finds, is not to be sought outside nature, by active pursuit, 
or by a backward-looking regret for what has departed; rather, it takes him 
unawares with the coming of spring, descending 'like the truth/ Of nature 
on ••• [his] passive youth' (78-9), and is experienced as a forward-looking 
expectation, as the promise of 'buds and blossoming' (58). 
Present 'joy' (68) and future 1hope 1 (69), desire and its fulfilment, are 
related in another manifestation of the poem's dialectic between the here and 
the beyond in stanza 6, which in this respect prefigures Prometheus Unbound, 
Act II, Scene v, where Asia, like the poet in the 'Hymn', joyfully awaits the 
imminent release of the 'world from its dark slavery' ('Hymn', 70). The term 
'awful LOVELINESS' (71) is almost an oxymoron in suggesting both the beautiful 
and the sublime, and thus brings the seen and unseen realms into relationship 
once again; as does the poet's hope that 'thou ••• /Wouldst give whate 1er these 
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words cannot express' (?0-2), which shows a confidence in the convergence of 
sign and referent such as the Poet in Alaster despairs of. 
In the final stanza, however, the commitment to interrelational process is 
considerably weakened. He celebrates afternoon and autumn, not as harbingers 
of more creative times and seasons, but for their own serene harmony, and he 
asks the Spirit to 'supply/ Its calm' (80-1) without anticipation of 
succeeding storm, which is its usual Shelleyan corollary. The tone of 
resignation is usually attributed to the influence of Wordsworth's 
, 1 'Immortality' ode, but at least as influential is the fourth volume of Julie, 
in which St Preux gladly acknowledges that at last 'a peaceful serenity has 
32 
succeeded to the storm of the passions'. Shelley's self-dedication to the 
spirit in this stanza is related to his earlier plea, 'Depart not', though it. 
takes the form of a bias towards faith rather than doubt: both attitudes 
assume a primal power, the priority of permanence to change, instead of an 
interrelation between the two, and both are found in Wordsworth's poem and 
Rousseau's novel. Like other critics, therefore, if for somewhat different 
33 
reasons, I find the last stanza sits incongruously with those that precede. 
In the first published version of the poem in 181?, this weakness is even 
compounded by a change Shelley makes to the 1816 Scrape Davies version. The 
earlier 'fleeting Power' of the penultimate line is now replaced by 'SPIRIT 
fair'. It is the former oxymoron, however, which more accurately captures ·the 
spirit of the poem, for if 'Intellectual Beauty' is indeed to be addressed as 
a power, it is one only by virtue of its state of constant transition and 
self-effacement. 
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iii 
'Hont Blanc' 
The conception of power in 'Mont Blanc' is in its main e~phasis the reverse of 
what it is in 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty'. Whereas in the latter poem power 
is experienced in the human realm as an inward, transforming presence, in 
1Hont Blanc' it is a remote, inhuman, amoral cause, like Necessity in Queen 
Mab, and is imaged upon an external landscape which is as 'vacant and 
desolate' as life in the absence of pmver in the 'Hymn' ~17). 'No voice from 
I 
I 
some sublimer world 1 is heard in the 1 Hymn 1 ( 25), but in! 'Mont Blanc 1 the 
'voice' of the 'great Mountain' (80) is both felt and interpreted. 
This difference between the two poems can in part be ~derstood in terms of 
I 
the genres to which they separately belong. Through prai~e or petition a hymn 
' inevitably internalizes and humanizes its addressee, everi if this is a mere 
abstraction. As Queen Hab illustrates, an impersonal force like Necessity may 
need 'no prayers or praises', but nevertheless becomes a personified self-
projection the moment it is apostrophised. In Shelley's 'Hymn', the apparently 
abstract 'Intellectual Beauty' of the title is likewise ~umanized as an object 
of worship and desire in the poem, becoming 1-1ha t in 1 On Love 1 is called an 
1antitype 1 of the self or 'a soul within our soul' (R&P, ·p. 474). 'Hont 
34 
Blanc', though classed as a hymn by Bloom, owes more tq an eighteenth-
century loco-descriptive tradition of poetry, of which \·Jordsworth 1 s 1 Tin tern 
Abbey' is its most immediate example. In fact, Shelley uses this tradition as 
a counter to Coleridge's 'Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni 1 • As a 
hymn to a landscape that has been read about but not seen, Coleridge's poem 
is, one might say, almost entirely a product of mind. For. Shelley in 'Mont 
35 
Blanc 1 , on the other hand, 1 Nature was the poet 1 , in the sense that the poem 
I 
records a direct encounter with 'the naked countenance of earth' (98), and 
aims at a certain fidelity of description. His subtitle, 'Lines Hritten in the 
11 5 
Vale of Chamouni', as Blank points out, echoes Wordsworth's 'Lines Written a 
Few ~tiles above Tintern Abbey', but it also somewhat pointedly refers to 
36 
Coleridge's title. As Shelley writes in his Preface to History of a Six 
Weeks' Tour (1817), his poem 'rests its claim to approbation on an attempt to 
imitate the untameable wildness and inaccessible solemnity' of the Alps 
(Murray, p. 181); and in its pursuit of this aim, even F.R. Leavis allows the 
37 
poem a 'certain vividness'. But the poem's specificity to place and its 
descriptive accuracy are for Shelley not only a means of conveying the 'deep 
and powerful feelings' (Murray, p. 180) excited by the landscape, of relating 
outer to inner in the way Leavis expects, but also of doing exactly the 
opposite: that is, showing the landscape to be literally 'untameable 1 and 
'inaccessible', even by human thought, and using the mountain's blank 
externality as an image of a wholly external and impersonal, 'Remote, serene, 
and inaccessible' (97) power. Implicit within such a conception of power is a 
rejection of the conventionally religious response to the sublime exemplified 
by Coleridge, who is less concerned with seeing the mountain as it is than 
with investing its 'naked countenance' with his own God-adoring soul. This 
power is also the reverse of the Rousseauistic power of mind, which casts 'a 
shade of falsehood on the records that are called reality'. Confronted with 
Mont Blanc Shelley discovers the limits of the mind's unaided powers of 
imagination: as he writes to Peacock, 'I never knew--! never imagined what 
38 
mountains were before.' Unknown to Shelley, Wordsworth in The Prelude also 
records that when he first saw Mont Blanc his mental preconception was ousted 
by reality: 
That day we first 
Beheld the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved 
To have a soulless image on the eye 
Which had usurped upon a living thought 
That never more could be. (The Prelude (1805), vi, 524-8) 
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In Shelley's poem, likewise, 'the very spirit fails' (97), defeated in its 
attempt to inhabit and humanise the mountain's usurping 'soulless image'. 
However, he does not 1grieve 1 , nor does he seek compensation in the 
doraesticated Vale of Chamonix, which for Hordsworth made 'rich amends,/ And 
reconciled us to realities' (The Prelude (1805), VI, 531-2). Instead, he 
contemplates a reconciliation with nature enabling him to 'Interpret, or make 
felt, or deeply feel' (83) its sublime otherness, as represented by the voice 
of the 'great Hountain 1 (80). 
Such a reconciliation involves a contradiction, however, for by definition 
this otherness lies beyond human·understanding or feeling. Frances Ferguson 
describes this contradiction when she suggests that 'Mont Blanc' •attempts to 
think of the mountain as physical and without metaphysical attributes, and 
fails; it attempts to imagine a gap between the mountain and the significances 
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that people attach to it, and fails'. She argues further that this failure 
reveals in Shelley a Wordsworthian sense of the exquisite mutual fittedness of 
nature and mind, and that consequently the sublime experience becomes an 
assertion of the transcendental power of human thought. I, too, shall argue 
that the poem's conception of power is ultimately not one of pure externality, 
and that the poem at least partially 1 fails 1 in the -.ray Ferguson describes, 
but I shall also show that for Shelley the imagined 1gap 1 between nature and 
mind that she speaks of is as real and important as their correspondence. For 
this reason I find the poem's idea of power bears traces of the dualism of 
Locke, and is not so strictly phenomenalist and Humean as a number of critics 
40 
have assumed it to be. 
The first two sections of 'Mont Blanc', dealing with the relationship of 
mind to the flow of sensations passing through it, show the presence of both 
these types of philosophy in.the conflicting subject-object tendencies towards 
mergence and separation. Section 1 introduces the subject of the interaction 
11 7 
of inner and outer with the image of the river of the mind. Here, as Blank has 
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noted, there are three separate but overlapping metaphors, each of which, in 
a slightly different way, explores the relationship of give and take, 
difference and identity, between the mind and its contents. In the first of 
these, occupying the first three and a half lines, the contents of mind are 
represented as a river, which, in 'reflecting gloom' and 'lending splendour' 
(3-4), both affect and are affected by the mind which contains them. But since 
the valley of the mind is not actually mentioned, a sense is also conveyed 
that the river is all there is, and that mind and its objects are therefore 
~ne. The next metaphor--'where from secret springs/ The source of human 
thought its tribute brings/ Of waters' (4-6)--again distinguishes inwardly and 
outwardly produced thoughts, but unites them in one river. In the third 
metaphor, which occupies the rest of the section, the sounds of the 'feeble 
brook' (7-8) and the cascading river are likewise blended without quite 
becoming indistinguishable. In the way that this first section stands apart 
from yet also merges with the sections that follow--just as its metaphorical 
river seems to merge with the actual Ravine of Arve--it is itself in a sense a 
'feeble brook ••• with a sound but half its own' (6). 
The poem's enactment of its own meaning, and consequent confusion of 
metaphor and reality, become more pronounced in the second section. Although 
the Ravine of Arve is clearly a real external object, with an almost 
overwhelmingly vivid presence, the opening 'Thus thou' (12) has the curious 
effect of subordinating it to the river of the mind in Section 1, and in fact 
the Arve is explicitly spoken of as the 'likeness' of an original 'Power' from 
which it 'comes down' (16), and the ravine as an image of the poet's 
'own ••• human mind' (36). The dual function of the ravine as 'both object and 
emblem of the poet's thinking', as O'Neill describes it, is not untypical of 
Shelley's self-reflexive tendency to confuse the distinction between the 
1 1 8 
externally real and the internally metaphorical, thus denying the priority of 
42 
one to the other. The confusion of functions is inherently dynamic, creating 
between ravine and mind a constant interplay of dependence and contention, 
which is represented by the interaction of 'uoods' and 'winds', 'river' and 
'rocks', 'cloud shadows and sunbeams' (10-11, 15). And this interplay is also 
both object and emblem, a third entity between the mind and the ravine, which 
intimates an elusive higher reality prior to them both. Thus the contending 
elements produce an effect of religious mystery: the windswept pines, 
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'swinging' (23) like censers (as Bloom has remarked), release 'odours' (23), 
reminiscent of the 'incense' in Coleridge's 'Hymn' (80); a waterfall 'Robes 
some unsculptured image' (27), recalling the 'white robed waterfall' and 
monumental rocks in Wordsworth's The Excursion (iii, 47-67); and the roar of 
the ravine masks a 'strange sleep' of 'deep eternity' (27-9). These 
intimations, however, are themselves only passing 'shadows' and 'Ghosts' (45-
6), which offer no assurance of a supporting substance. 
A further corollary of the dual role of the ravine as object and emblem of 
the poet's thought is that he is both participant in and observer of the scene 
before him--both 'Holding an unremitting interchange/ Hith the clear universe 
of things around' (39-40) and musing, in the process, on his.'own separate 
fantasy' (36). Shelley does not claim like Coleridge to be rapt in self-
forgetfulness, as if hearing 'some sweet beguiling melody,/ So sweet, we know 
not we are listening to it' ('Hymn', 17-8). Yet he· does hint at the 
possibility of such a state in the 'strange sleep' of silence that lies behind 
'the voices of the desart' (27-8), or the play of thought. These voices, as 
the imperfect likenesses of the 'Power' from which they 'come down', mask the 
very silence they aspire to, just as 'reflection' distorts the 'sensation' 
which it originates from and seeks to reproduce. Shelley nevertheless attempts 
once again in 'Mont Blanc' that same 'dizzying and tumultuous' ascent of the 
11 9 
river of thought which he has previously attempted in Alastor, and which he 
describes as being so difficult in his fragment 'Difficulty of Analyzing the 
Human Hind'. 
On this occasion, however, the attempt is successful, to judge by the final 
·exclamation 'thou art there 01 (48), 1vhich is addressed to the 'Dizzy Ravine' 
(34) certainly, but also to power as the source of thought--power which cannot 
be named \·rithout it becoming yet another 'shade', 'phantom' or 'faint image'. 
This final coming together of noisy ravine and still power, of image and 
reality, is not quite the same as the subject-object unity represented by the 
dream of the 'veiled maid' in Alastor. Rather, it shows that the endless 
deferral of an external or ultimate reality by a flow of interrelating mental 
images has, after all, a converse implication, which i'Tasserman defines vrhen he 
writes that, although it is in vain, 'the act of searching for the coincidence 
of the thing-in-itself and mental image is itself constitutive of reality for 
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the human mind'. However, with his commitment to the idea of a Shelleyan 
'One Hind' of existence, which transcends human reality and is distinct from 
'Power' or 'Ultimate Cause', Wasserman misses the full import of the dialectic 
45 
he identifies in 'Hont Blanc'. For the poem erodes the differences not only 
between thoughts and things but also between the ontological categories that 
Wasserman insists on. This is made particularly evident in the concluding, and 
highly ambiguous, lines 34-8 of Section 2. Attempts to explicate this passage 
almost inevitably fall foul of its deliberate intention to dissolve 
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grammatical and semantic distinctions. The main difficulty concerns the 
conceptual definition of the 'Dizzy Ravine', addressed as 'thou', 'thee' or 
'thy' throughout the passage. First, as object and emblem of the poet's 
thought, the ravine is both identifiable with his mind and separate from it: 
'when I gaze on thee/ I seem ••• / To muse on my own separate fantasy,/ Hy own, 
my human mind' (34-7). In the ensuing lines this confusion increases, until 
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eventually only a barely coherent syntax distinguishes the ravine from the 
'legion of wild thoughts' (41), the 'still cave' (44), or even the 'breast' 
(47) where thoughts and images originate. Blending empirical and Platonic 
philosophical influences, the passage thus leaves unspecified whether the 
ravine is external actuality or internal image, ideal form or insubstantial 
shadow, reality of power or only its 'likeness'. But the effect is not so much 
to merge the opposing concepts as to reveal their dynamic interdependence and 
to deny the priority of one over the other. The final affirmation, 'thou art 
there!'• (48), embraces within its conception of 'thou' the whole complex of 
interrelating oppositions represented by the 'many-coloured, many-voiced' (13) 
ravine; and this dynamic all-inclusive 'thou' is power, which under another 
aspect symbolised by the mountain becomes the 'still and solemn power of many 
sights,/ And many sounds' (128-9); but here, before it is graced with a name, 
it is less a principle than an attribute which is constituted of the interplay 
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of its own representations. 
Thus 'Mont Blanc' reveals a confidence, largely lacking in Alaster, in the 
capacity of thought and language to embody reality, even though, 
paradoxically, the existence of that reality remains always in doubt. But this 
victory in defeat is not permanent or assured, for the experience of power as 
interrelational process, as an attribute of being, is inevitably superseded by 
the contemplation of power as a primal, subsuming principle, just as immediate 
sensation is always superseded by self-conscious reflection. This transition 
is marked in the poem by the poet's turning from the ravine to the mountain at 
the beginning of Section 3. His sceptical opening, 'Some say that gleams of a 
remoter world/ Visit the soul in sleep,--that death is slumber' (49-50), and 
his self-questioning 'do I lie/ In dream?' (54-5), indicate that he is 
actually emerging from that self-oblivious state--akin to the 'strange sleep' 
of the landscape--which by the end of the previous section the ravine has all 
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but induced. 
At this point further significant comparisons with Alastor suggest 
themselves. In that poem, also, the Poet's vision is attributed on waking to 
the unconscious realms of sleep and death (209-13). Later, while he communes 
with a spirit of the landscape, 'as if he and it were all that was, ••• his 
regard/ Was raised by intense pensiveness' to behold 'Two starry eyes, hung in 
the gloom of thought' (487-90). In 'Mont Blanc', similarly, after his 
communion with the ravine, the poet 'look[s] on high' to see in the shape of 
the mountain the 'unfurled/ ••• veil of life and death' (52-4). Thus in both 
poems the intercommunion of mind and nature is interrupted by a self-conscious 
awareness of a third entity, a notion of transcendence, which emerges from 
that communion and becomes in turn the object of the mind's attention. In 
'Mont Blanc', however, the passing of a state of visionary absorption, with 
the transition from sensation to reflection, is not an occasion for despair as 
in Alastor, and nor does the notion of power any longer present the impasse of 
an unbridgeable gap between its reality and its representation. In Alastor the 
main symbol of power is the Poet's dream of union with the 'veiled maid', but 
between her presence in the dream and her absence in the waking world there is 
no reconciliation. But in 'Mont Blanc' there is not a complete separation 
between this experience of power as presence and the subsequent projection of 
power as absence. For, as Ferguson haS"Shown, just as there is a reciprocity 
as well as an opposition between the River Arve and its valley, so is there 
between the ravine and the mountain, each as it were requiring and defining 
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the other; and just as the poet does not completely internalize the ravine, 
nor does he succeed in viewing the mountain as purely physical and external. 
E.B. Murray has pointed out that when Shelley visited the mountain he did 
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not actually see its peak because it was covered in cloud. His position 
after all was therefore not totally different from that of Coleridge, who had 
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not seen the mountain at all and in his poem thoroughly humanises it by the 
exercise of his inward imagination. To a lesser extent Shelley does the same 
in 'Hont Blanc'. He does so mainly by addressing the mountain, like the 
ravine, as 'Thou' (80), despite its utterly illi~ospitable landscape, and by 
giving it a 'voice', like the 'voices' of the 'many-voiced vale', even though 
its snows are 'silent', and 'None can reply' to questions concerning its 
origins (74-5). The same ambivalence can be understood to lie behind the 
'awful doubt, or faith so mild' (77) that the mountain teaches. Kapstein 
suggests that this 'doubt' and 'faith' can be explained in terms of Shelley's 
necessarianism, as learnt from Halbach and Godwin and expressed in Queen Hab, 
and refer respectively to a disbelief in nature's good intentions towards 
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mankind and to an acceptance of this state of affairs. Ho\-Tever, Shelley has 
long left behind the materialism on which such views are based, and although 
they are not irrelevant, they do not provide a sufficient basis for 
interpretation here. 'Doubt' and 'faith' are rather alternative responses to 
the sublime, one reflecting a sense of its inhuman vacancy, and the other 
stemming from the mind's inevitable tendency to give it meaning. In the 
fragment, 'The Coliseum', written in 1818, Shelley puts into the mouth of a 
blind old man an account of the sublime experience. This account is hardly to 
be taken as Shelley's own, since it emphasizes the response of faith: 
sublimity excites us, the old man says, 'because we enter into the 
meditations, designs and destinies of something beyond ourselves •••• And this 
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is Love. This is the religion of eternity' (I&P, VI, 304). However, in his 
idea that there are two circles which surround our internal nature, one 'which 
comprehends, as \-Tell as one \vhich mutually excludes, all things which feel' 
(I&P, VI, 303), he provides the basis for an explanation of Shelley's response 
to the sublime in 'Hont Blanc'. Here doubt and faith·(responses to what the 
old man calls 'awfulness and beauty', I&P, VI, 304) correspond to the two 
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the two kinds of circle and interact in a similar 'ltmy: the circle of the 
comprehensive imagination is inevitably too small when confronted with the 
infinite, and therefore itself becomes exclusive, prompting the need for a yet 
larger circle, which again proves inadequate, and so on. Between the 
impossibility of not projecting an interpretation on the landscape and the 
impossibility of providing an adequate one there is therefore a constant 
tension. Hence the 'mightier world of sleep' seems to 'Spread far around and 
inaccessibly/ Its circles' (55-7), in the same way that the Colosseum's walls 
are built in a series of concentric circles. 
The description of faith as 'So solemn, so serene' (78) clearly echoes the 
lines, 1 ~he day becomes more solemn and serene/ \·lhen noon is past 1 in the last 
stanza of 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' (73-4), where the poet espouses a 
similar faith. But Shelley appears to be questioning the conclusion to this 
poem in 'Mont Blanc', not only in his explicit juxtaposition of faith and 
doubt, but in the ambiguous statement 'that man may be/ But for such faith 
with nature reconciled' (78-9). His eventual preference for the difficult 'But 
for such faith' in the place of the much clearer 'In such a faith' in the 
Scrape Davies manuscript suggests that he consciously adopts a more complex 
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attitude to the idea of faith than is expressed in the ~· At a certain 
level faith does indeed reconcile mind and nature, as Rousseau, Wordsworth and 
Coleridge bear witness, each laying claim to a relationship with nature that 
has a supernatural underpinning. But for Shelley, such faith also alienates, 
because it only ever rests on a mental image which falls short of, distorts 
and eclipses external reality. His religiously-inclined predecessors are 
therefore like the blind old man in 'The Coliseum', whose inability to see the 
otherness of the outer world frees his inward vision to remake nature in its 
own image. 'Mont Blanc' demonstrates that there is no complete reconciliation 
of mind and nature, but that through their dialectical interplay it is 
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possible to experience the reality of both, which is also the reality of 
power. 
The contradictory nature of Shelley's attitude to faith and power is 
clearly revealed when he writes, 'Thou hast a voice, great Hountain, to 
repeal/ Large codes of fraud and 1me 1 ( 80-1 ) • The voice of the god-like and 
monarchical Mont Blanc is able, paradoxically, to overturn religious and 
social hierarchies. The mountain's voice, however, recalls the voices of the 
ravine, and represents not only authoritarian power but power as 
interrelational process, which both enthrones and dethrones notions of 
primacy. This is 'not understood/ By all' (81-2), or even by 'the wise, and 
great, and good', who, like \vordsworth and Coleridge, may 'Interpret, or make 
felt, or deeply feel' (81-3), but at the same time 'deny and abjure ••• the 
Power which is seated on the throne of their own soul' (A Defence of Poetrv, 
R&P, p. 508). 
In Section 4 the dual aspect of power is considered again in the 
emphatically drawn contrast between the cycles of growth and destruction 
evident in nature and power that 'dwells apart in its tranquillity/ Remote, 
serene, and inaccessible' (96-7). But in various ways the poem undermines this 
contrast and shows the realms of permanent power and changeful nature to be 
mutually informing. To which realm, for example, do the creeping glaciers 
belong? They would seem to be alien to the 'dead and living world' (113) whose 
limits they overthrow, and yet 'the flood of ruin/ ••• that from the boundaries 
of the sky/ Rolls its perpetual stream' (107-9) shows that motion and 
destruction belong even to the remote peaks. In his letter to Peacock from 
Chamonix Shelley emphasizes the living movement that be~ongs to the seemingly 
lifeless mountains: 'In these regions everything changes, and is in 
motion •••• One would think that Hont Blanc, like the god of_the Stoics, was a 
vast animal, and that the frozen blood for ever circulated through his stony 
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veins'. To convey his sense of the absolute power embodied in the mountain 
he enjoins Peacock to imagine Ahrimanes 'throned among these desolating snows, 
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among these palaces of death and frost•. But such images of human kingship 
in the poem actually make power seem rather less 'Remote, serene, and 
inaccessible' than has been stated, particularly as we are told that the 'city 
of death, distinct with many a tower/ And wall impregnable' is after all 'not 
a city, but a flood of ruin' (105-8), calling to mind the fate of Louis XVI 
and the French Revolution. 
The 'flood of ruin' could, of course, also refer to the desolating wars 
waged by Napoleon. The question therefore arises as to which comes first: 
tyranny or revolution, power or change. 'Earthquake, and fiery flood' are 
cited as instances of natural mutability, and yet in the previous section the 
'Earthquake-demon' and 'a sea/ Of fire' (72-4) are suggested as possible 
causes of the mountains. Power, it would seem, might be the effect of change 
as well as its cause. Shelley's scientific interest in glaciers and the nature 
of their movement has a bearing on this issue. In his letter to Peacock he 
mentions both the naturalist Horace Benedict de Saussure's belief that 
glaciers have 'their periods of increase and decay' and Buffon's rival theory 
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that glacial ice will ultimately spread to cover the earth. However, he 
steers a course between them to argue his own view that, since the snow on the 
mountains 'perpetually augments, ••• the glaciers [too] must augment and will 
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subsist, at least until they have overflowed this vale.' In the poem, where 
the glaciers seem to belong to both a natural and a 'remoter world' (49), we 
again find Shelley combining a knowledge of their place within the 
hydrological cycle with an absolutist view of their power. He speaks first of 
their advance as inexorable, and the land they overcome 'Never to be 
reclaimed' (114), but the section ends with a description of the life-giving 
river, which is fed by the glaciers, feeds the ocean in turn, and 'Breathes 
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its swift vapours to the circling air' (126)--it only remaining to be added 
that the 'circling' of these vapours eventually returns the snow to the 
mountains. The reference to torrents 'from ••• secret chasms in tumult welling' 
(122) recalls Coleridge's 'Kubla Khan', whose 'sacred river' also has 
associations of fertility and war, but Shelley probably has in mind at the 
same time the actual source of the River Arveiron, which issues from a cave at 
the base of one of the glaciers of Mont Blanc, and which he saw on his visit 
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to Mont Blanc. This is also described by Dorothy Wordsworth in her 'Journal 
of a Tour on the Continent' (1820), and in the significance she attaches to 
the scene her account has a curious correspondence with Shelley's poem. She 
writes: 
No spectacle that I ever beheld--not even the ocean itself--has had an 
equal power over my mind in bringing together thoughts connected with 
duration and decay--eternity, and perpetual wasting--the visible and 
invisible power of God and Nature. 57 
Mountain, glacier and river bring together similar opposing thoughts for 
Shelley, though in a way that reveals their dialectical interdependence: the 
invisible primal power and the visible dynamic power of nature are both 
unlimited, and yet each also makes and unmakes the other. 
The final section unambiguously asserts that 'the power is there' (12?), 
that the 'secret strength of things' (139) inhabits Mont Blanc. But with its 
description of snow falling on the mountain it also completes the previous 
section's ·account of the hydrological cycle, and thus affirms the all-
pervasive power of natural process at the same time. The interaction of 
'flakes' of snow, which are the congealed images of 'swift vapours 1 , with the 
'sinking sun' and distant 'star-beams' is an interplay of frozen and fading 
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metaphors respectively representing the earthly and the heavenly. Neamvhile, 
'Winds contend/ Silently there' (134-5), stressing the convergence of 
turbulent interaction and silent power. Horeover, 'none beholds' (132) the 
falling snow, which indicates that the apprehension of power and the 
completion of its cycle depends on the imaginative 'tribute' (5) of the human 
mind (143). The last three lines make the same point more forcibly--
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, 
If to the human mind's imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? (142-4) 
The question fittingly concludes the poem on a note of sceptical uncertainty. 
The notion of power is indispensable to the activity of the mind in its 
relations with the external world, and yet because the dependency is mutual, 
there can be no certainty that either the external world or power are more 
than projections of the mind. Between these two propositions the entire mental 
drama of the poem is enacted. 
'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' and 'Mont Blanc' occupy a central place in 
Shelley's canon, for in these poems he first develops a full dialectical 
awareness of the relations between mind and its objects. In so doing he 
discovers how the opposing notions of power as cause and as effect can be 
conceived as engaged in a mutually creative and destructive interplay. Power 
is thus reclaimed from religio~s faith and the repressive ideologies of his 
predecessors to become an essential component within a new liberating 
aesthetic. In the poems we have been considering this aesthetic is exercised 
within the relatively private form of lyric. Huch of Shelley's future poetry 
will be devoted to exploring its possibilities in other genres and in more 
public and political areas of concern. 
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C h a p t e r 5 
Prometheus Unbound: 'The Embrace of Beauty' 
Following the mainly personal and epistemological preoccupations of his poems 
1 
of 1815-16, Shelley's sense of a 'slow, gradual, silent change' away from 
post-revolutionary despondency in the English political climate of 1817 was 
accompanied by his own more hopeful literary re-engagement with moral and 
political themes. His main production of that year, The Revolt of Islam, was, 
as he explains in the poem's Preface, expressly intended as a response and an 
encouragement to the perceived alteration in the public mood. Expressing a 
more tenuous hope than Queen Mab, it acknowledges the difficulties that lie in 
the path of reform, and, in accordance with Godwinian gradualism, defers its 
2 
expectation of a total social transformation to the distant future. 
Prometheus Unbound, written in Italy during a period of intense creative 
activity between September 1818 and December 1819, and Shelley's outstanding 
poetic expression of revolutionary optimism, combines aspects of both the 
earlier poems: it again seeks to justify the recovery of radical hope in the 
aftermath of the failed French Revolution, but, as in Queen Vab, it also 
offers a vision of a complete human and natural renovation. 
In recasting the themes of the earlier poems Prometheus Unbound far 
surpasses them both--a judgement most critics have shared with Shelley 
3 
himself. Yet it is by no means an unflawed work, and in fact suffers from 
similar kinds of incoherence to those that mar Queen Nab and The Revolt of 
Islam. This chapter begins with a consideration of these common failings as a 
prelude to attempting to answer certain questions to which they give rise. 
First, what, if anything, predisposes Prometheus Unbound, like its two 
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predecessors, to the particular faults it displays? Secondly, if the usual 
assessment of the relative merits of the three poems is valid, what enables 
Prometheus Unbound to rise above its faults in a way that the other two do 
not? Finally, how far are its conceptual disjunctures even an inevitable 
concomitant of its peculiar achievement? In its pursuit of a revolutionary 
ideal--an aim which is, after all, inherently contradictory--the play runs so 
perilously close to self-defeat that this question is difficult to answer 
finally. Where 'Hope creates/ From its own wreck the thing it contemplates' 
(IV, 573-4), not only do success and failure have a way of looking the same, 
but productive failure becomes difficult to distinguish from the unproductive. 
We can, however, examine the nature of the play's paradoxes, and attempt to 
identify patterns of thought against which questions of coherence can be 
weighed. In this endeavour, it will be found that the dialectic Shelley has 
evolved in his understanding of the relations between mind and nature lies at 
the heart of its conception of the Promethean liberation. 
One particular natural image which occurs in all three poems, and which 
draws attention to some of the different kinds of inconsistency they share, is 
the idea of perpetual spring, used as an emblem of a regenerate world. This 
concept, linking connotations of hope and change with the idea of eternity, is 
an apt symbol for the conjunction of earth and heaven, and illustrates the 
poems' common unitive tendency, which we have already observed in Queen Mab, 
and which is most clearly expressed in the two later poems by the reunion of 
hero and heroine at the climax of their plots. However, it raises various 
awkward questions. The most obvious of these concerns immortality, which on 
the one hand is a sine gua non of the ideal state which a perpetual spring 
represents, but on the other is inconceivable, or at least undesirable 
(witness Ahasuerus), in the realm of nature. In each poem Shelley is forced to 
find a way round this problem. In Queen Mab's renovated world mankind will 
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enjoy an immortality which is, however, only virtual and subjective; and since 
death is inevitable, in Canto IX a paradisal afterlife is envisaged, even 
though this defeats the object of the earthly paradise described in Canto 
VIII. In The Revolt of Islam, after the defeat of the revolutionary forces, 
Cythna urges Laon to take comfort from an 'everlasting Spring' (IX, xxvi, 
3699) within his own heart. Yet this inward immortality is not expected to be 
realized outwardly, except as a survival through time in the memories of 
future generations. In Prometheus Unbound Act III the contradiction is faced 
more openly. Pervaded by the 'warmth of an immortal youth', the Earth tells us 
that, although 'disease and pain' are banished, 'death' is not (III, iii, 89; 
94; 105). Asia's response, 10 mother! lvherefore speak the name of death!' 
(III, iii, 108), sounds like the play's acknowledgement that the Promethean 
revolution is not all it might be in the human sphere. Thus in all three poems 
the image of perpetual spring re-emphasizes a dualism whose defeat it is meant 
to represent. 
Shelley's use of the image is revealing of certain figural confusions as 
well as metaphysical ones. It is never quite clear to what extent the prophecy 
of a perpetual spring, which Shelley derives from both literary and scientific 
authorities, belongs to the realm of fancy or fact, and is intended 
4 
metaphorically or literally. This type of ambiguity, which we have already 
noticed in Queen Nab, besets·the visionary purposes of all three poems. In The 
Revolt of Islam, Canto I, for example, the narrative moves seamlessly from the 
poet's despair about the outcome of the French Revolution at the beginning to 
his arrival at the Temple of the Spirit at the end, making no clear division 
between reality and fiction. Similarly, Haurice Bowra notes that in Prometheus 
Unbound the new dawn is marked by manifestations as various as the brotherhood 
of man and poisonless nightshade berries--which are apparently of quite 
5 
different figurative status. Such inconsistencies leave us in doubt as to 
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whether the poems refer to a world outside or enact their own, whether they 
teach 'reasoned principles of moral conduct' or offer (as Shelley claims) 
1 beautiful idealisms of moral excellence 1 , and \.fhether, in Bowra 1 s terms, they 
are intended as a 1 prophecy 1 of i.fha t will actually happen or only a 'summons 1 
6 
to exercise reason and love. 
Confusions of this kind are inseparable from what appears to be a more 
compositional incoherence afflicting the three poems. As befits their 
universal theme, all three, in Curran's words, are 'encyclopedic in structure 
7 
and content'. It is questionable, however, whether Prometheus achieves the 
successful synthesis of its component elements that Curran believes 
8 
distinguishes it from the other two. In~ Defence of Poetrv Shelley draws a 
distinction between a 'poem', which relates to the unchangeable and universal, 
and a 'story', which, like a 'moral aim' (-R&P, pp. 485, 488), belongs to a 
particular period and place, and is rendered obsolete by time. \ihere exactly a 
'story' or a 'moral aim' ends and a 'poem' begins is a question Shelley does 
not pursue, but his distinctions do suggest something of the uncomfortable mix 
of rhetorical modes and literary genres to be found in the three poems. If 
Queen Hab shows a conflict between tts dream-vision framework and materialist 
polemic, the Revolt, as many critics have found, suffers a much more serious 
disjunction between its elements of epic narrative and allegorical myth, 
despite Shelley's assertion that ·~is one of the qualifications aimed at' 
9 
in the poem. Prometheus, likewise, is pulled in the contrary directions of 
10 
externalizing drama and internalizing lyric. In each case the values 
associated with the opposing genres belong on the one hand to what Shelley 
calls a 'poem', and on the other to a 'story' or a 'moral aim', and are thus 
parallel to the notions of eternity and time that are unsuccessfully wedded in 
the concept of everlasting spring. 
Despite such contradictions in Prometheus Unbound, a long tradition of 
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criticism has found the main force of its meaning to be unitive. Thus for 
critics from Mary Shelley to M.H. Abrams the reunion of Prometheus and Asia 
11 
stands for the reintegration of the human race with nature. R.H. Fogle 
describes the poem as 'a gigantic effort to synthesize the abstract with the 
12 
concrete, the ideal with the actual'. Others, seeing Asia as embodying love 
and other human qualities rather than nature, regard the poem as imaging the 
13 
attainment of a psychic or social wholeness. Wasserman and Curran· also see· 
the play as syncretic, in fulfilment of the wish Shelley expresses in a letter 
to Peacock of 23-24 January 1819 to compose a work 'embodying the discoveries 
of all ages, & harmonizing the contending creeds by which mankind have been 
14 
ruled 1 • 
Many other critics, on the other hand, responding to the evident 
disharmonizing and disunifying forces in the play, have seen its main 
achievement as the dramatisation of a non-dualist process of constant 
transformation rather than the expression of an ideal unity. Thus Carl Grabo 
and Linda Lewis argue that, in accordance with Godwinian perfectibilism, 
Shelley portrays not the attainment of perfection, but the infinite progress 
15 
towards it. Considering the poem's ontology rather than its politics, Daniel 
Hughes suggests it repeatedly enacts the restoration of the mind's sense of 
16 
its potentiality through the collapse of its actualized conceptions. For 
several critics the liberation of Prometheus is primarily a figure for the 
play's own continual process of releasing language from the authority of 
17 
external reference. Hogle disputes Curran's view of the play as a syncretic 
key to all mythologies, and considers rather that through a process of 
18 
transference it unsettles the hierarchical myths it juxtaposes. All such 
interpretations, however, are open to the objection that in arguing the 
priority of perfectibility to perfection, of potentiality to actuality, of 
language to thought, or of transference to its own self-projections, they 
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overlook the interdependence of these contraries. Moreover, the non-
teleological process each describes is itself in danger of being reified as 
another form of Jovian power, thus replacing one type of dualism with another. 
Conscious of such pitfalls in post-structuralist criticism generally, 
Tilottama Rajan suggests that the reader has a role in reconstructing meaning 
from the disunified text of Prometheus Unbound, arguing that the drama 
'responds to ••• an approach which intertextualizes fiction and reality, and 
19 
recognizes that they mutually make and remake each other.' A reading of the 
play which is congruent with this view is offered by Isobel Armstrong, who 
argues that Shelley constructs 1a world which has relationships, but without 
priorities, a world where mind and language are each dependent, but without 
being secondary to each other', and that within this world the paradigms of 
reciprocity, dialogue and dialectic are the means by which relationships of 
20 
domination are broken. Through its examination of the interrelations of 
nature and mind in the play this chapter will find much to endorse this view. 
In the first section it will consider Prometheus Unbound in relation to the 
earlier poems, 'Mont Blanc' and The Revolt of Islam, as a means of placing it 
in the evolution of Shelley's thought. The second will look generally at his 
attitude to nature and its connection with his other ideas at the time of 
writing his play. Subsequent sections will then examine acts of the play in 
turn, except that the last will take Acts III and IV together. 
i 
Even at the outset it is clear that the unity of heaven and earth, as 
represented by the image of perpetual spring, is an idea that is incompatible 
with a dialectical tension and process. That Shelley should use such an image 
in The Revolt of Islam and Prometheus Unbound might seem surprising 
considering that in 'Mont Blanc', as we have seen, he has already arrived at a 
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dialectical understanding of the relationship between permanence and change. A 
partial explanation for the seemingly backward step in his thinking is that 
the epistemological dialectic that he evolves in the 1816 odes does not 
translate easily to his new political subject-matter. For the cycles of change 
that constitute a vital part of that dialectic are precisely what he wishes to 
see come to an end in the political sphere, where they are, after all, 
attended by rather more serious practical consequences than are the 
fluctuating transactions of individual mind and external nature. Hence, even 
in a work of such political realism as A Philosophical View of Reform (written 
1819~20) he can express a lively hope in the eventual accomplishment of a 
perfect and permanent social order, while remaining resolutely sceptical 
concerning any comparable teleology in metaphysics. Indeed, he consciously 
upholds this distinction, writing that 'It is in politics rather than in 
21 
religion that faith is meritorious'. The 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' 
reflects this view in rejecting the 'Frail spells' of religion but concluding 
with an avowal of political hope. However, as previously argued, the 'Hymn''s 
conclusion contradicts its metaphysical logic. The Revolt and Prometheus, it 
could be said, commit the same error on a larger scale in basing their 
political optimism on a metaphysical dualism which they repudiate. On the 
other hand, in the period these poems were written Shelley seems increasingly 
to recognize, despite his remarks in A Philosophical View of Reform, that the 
distinction between religious and political faith is a misleading one; and the 
primary indication that he does so is his tendency, which is much more 
pronounced in Prometheus than in the Revolt, to apply to their moral and 
political concerns the same dialectic that is more consistently deployed in 
'Mont Blanc'. 
The thematic structure of 'Mont Blanc' clearly anticipates that of 
Prometheus Unbound Acts I and II, and in the poet's apprehension of the Alpine 
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landscape we find the same basic pattern of relationships that underpins the 
action of the play. His rendering and receiving interrelationship with the 
Ravine of Arve and imaginative entry into the 'cave of the witch Poesy' 
parallels Asia's journey~in pursuit of echoes from her valley to the cave of 
Demogorgon, and his projection of a remote power on to the mountain is like 
the mountain-bound Prometheus's projection of Jupiter. In adapting the scheme 
of 'Mont Blanc' Shelley also switches from an epistemological emphasis to a 
political and moral one: the mind-nature interrelation associated with the 
ravine becomes human love, embodied in Asia, and the power of the mountain 
.becomes the more overtly political power of Jupiter. A further change Shelley 
makes in Prometheus is to reverse the order in which mountain and valley 
appear. In this way Act II ends with the equivalent of the moment of visionary 
climax at the end of the second section of 'Mont Blanc', and thus the play is 
given an upward trajectory through its first two acts instead of the parabolic 
one of the ode. The change becomes the,basis of a significant departure from 
the reciprocity of valley and mountain in 'Mont Blanc', for as the play moves 
into the third act the overthrow of power by love becomes permanent, thus 
terminating the dialectical oscillation, and, as in the 'Hymn', turning a 
process of constant change into a fixed ontological principle. This reversal 
contradicts one of the fundamental principles of the play, the unending 
interrelationship of love and power, eros and thanatos, which, like their 
counterparts in 'Mont Blanc', are linked in a cycle in which love inevitably 
turns into power, and power is only dethroned by love, and which thus are 
constantly creating and destroying each other. Their interchangeability is 
demonstrated in the Sixth Spirit's song in Act I. Having read how Agathon in 
Plato's Symposium applies Homer's description of the tender-footed goddess 
Calamity to Love, Shelley in turn, as Webb observes, simply reverses the 
22 
process and applies Agathon's description of Love to Desolation. 
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In The Revolt of Islam we can see the emergence of the dialectic of love 
and power that Shelley develops in Prometheus Unbound. The entanglement of 
good and evil is conveyed in various ways, notably by the image of the snake 
and eagle wreathed in fight at the beginning (I, viii-xiv, 192-252). The plot 
involving the separation of Laon and Cythna at the hands of Othman, the 
imprisonment of one on a mountain-top and the other in a cave, and their 
reunion, recalls the structure of 'Mont Blanc' and anticipates the plot of 
Prometheus, both of which are vehicles for the expression of a dialectical 
pattern of ideas. There are, however, divergences between the plots of the two 
poems that show Shelley in the Revolt to be still grappling unsuccessfully 
with certain contrarieties in his attempt to find a basis for political hope. 
The most important difference is that in the Revolt the reunion of the 
protagonists is not accompanied by the fall of the tyrant, as it is in 
Prometheus. Having dedicated themselves to the revolution of the Golden City, 
Laon and Cythna suddenly accept its defeat with perfect equanimity, and direct 
their hopes instead to an indefinitely distant spring of freedom and to an 
'everlasting Spring' of personal immortality. The result is that at this point 
in the work there is a sharp divergence between its public and private themes-
-between the temporal 'story' of political revolution and the eternal 'poem' 
which is more concerned with the protagonists' inward transformations, or, in 
the words of the Preface, 'the growth and progress of individual mind' 
(Hutchinson, p. 32). Cythna 1 s image of 'everlasting Spring', which in David 
Duff's view creates 'a perfect link between ••• the prophecy of revolution and 
the doctrine of individual transcendence', is therefore rather an attempt to 
23 
conceal the unbridgeable gap between them. Although in Prometheus Unbound 
Act III Shelley again uses this image to mask a disjunction between the 
political and the psychic, they are nevertheless brought much closer together 
by the poem's investment of both kinds of hope in the liberation of Prometheus 
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and his reunion with Asia. 
A further illustration of the progress Shelley makes between 1817 and 1819 
towards a dialectical understanding of the relation of inner and outer, the 
temporal and the eternal, is found in a comparison between Cythna's speech in 
which she urges Laon to hope with images of autumn winds and winged seeds (IX, 
xx-xxxvi, 3640-3792) and the poem it anticipates, the 'Ode to the West Wind'. 
In both autumn is viewed as the seed-time for the coming spring, but for the 
poet of the ode it is much more than this: he invokes its processes of death 
and decay not merely in the expectation of future rebirth but because 
destruction is•itself a form of preservation which makes rebirth a present 
reality. Thus the poem suggests a convergence of change and permanence that 
eludes Cythna in the Revolt. Hope of a coming spring nevertheless remains 
essential to this process, but unlike Cythna, the poet of the ode does not 
dwell on the interval of winter, for while the stagnation of this season is 
compatible with her gradualist expectations, it is antithetical to the west 
wind's immediately transforming power. Hence, if winter comes, spring follows 
close behind. 
Prometheus Unbound, begun only a year after the Revolt was completed, is 
clearly an attempt to correct the earlier poem's main failings. The 
disappointments of the defeat of revolution are now more squarely faced. Hope 
is not transferred to some remote, unearthly goal, but is sought in the very 
processes in which defeat inevitably plays a part. Godwinian gradualism is 
consequently tempered by a sense of the immediate possibilities of the 
present. Moreover, the imaginative transformation of external nature is 
recognised as a double-edged weapon, which can both dethrone and reinstate 
projections of Jovian authority. 
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At the basis of the dialectical relationship between power and love is a 
similar one between mind and nature. The connection between the two pairs of 
contraries, and an important aspect of the dialectic they share, are 
implicitly conveyed by Asia's speech to Demogorgon in which she gives a 
history of Prometheus's relations with Jupiter (II, v, 32-109). The 
disconcerting truth that she unwittingly reveals in this speech is that the 
'wisdom, which is strength' (II, iv, 44) which Prometheus originally granted 
to Jupiter is essentially the same gift of knowledge that he bestows on the 
human race to alleviate the ills of Jupiter's reign. If their similarity is 
not immediately apparent, that is because Jupiter's power is manifestly 
political, while mankind exercises dominion only in the natural sphere. 
Prometheus's gifts of speech, science, medicine, navigation all in different 
ways bring the physical world under human control. A certain illusory 
immortality--and hence transcendence of the natural world--is also granted: 
Prometheus awakens hopes which 'hide with thin and rainbow wings/ The shape of 
Death' (II, iv, 62-3); poetry's listeners become 1Godlike ••• exempt from mortal 
care' (II, iv, 78-9); and sculpture 'mimicked and then mocked/ ••• The human 
form, till marble grew divine' (II, iv, 80-2)--that is, at first imitated 
nature, and then transcended it. In this description of the artistic 
manipulation of materials Asia's speech reveals Shelley's deep awareness of 
the political implications of aesthetic idealism. At one level the 
24 
'alleviations' (II, iv, 98) of art are displacements of political realities; 
at another they involve an exploitation of nature--or a 'mocking' in both 
senses of the word--which is equivalent to the political exploitation of 
people. The phrase, 'the Celt knew the Indian' (II, iv, 94), is expressive of 
various forms of domination, and not only suggests a political, commercial and 
intellectual appropriation of the east by the west, but reflects on the union 
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of Prometheus and Asia, mind and nature. Asia's dilemma, in short, is that 
the love which binds them, and the aesthetic and political ideal which their 
union represents, are close kin to the power that drives them apart. Hence, 
while 'Man looks on his creation like a God', he also becomes 'the scorn of 
Ear~h,/ The outcast, the abandoned, the alone' (II, iv, 102-5). 
Asia's complaint to Demogorgon is similar in its sentiments to stanza 17 of 
the 'Ode to Liberty' (1820). Here the poet addresses Liberty to deplore the 
fact that human mastery of the external world can coexist with submission to 
political tyranny. The 'He' of the first line is the 'power unknown' (233) in 
the previous stanza, but he fulfils the same educative ·role as Prometheus in 
Asia's speech. 
He who taught man to vanquish whatsoever 
Can be between the cradle and the grave 
Crowned him the King of Life. Oh, vain endeavour! 
If on his own high will, a willing slave, 
He has enthroned the oppression and the oppressor. 
What if earth can clothe and feed 
Amplest millions at their need, 
And power in thought be as the tree within the seed? 
Or what if Art, an ardent intercessor, 
Diving on fiery wings to Nature's throne, 
Checks the great mother stooping to caress her, 
And cries: Give me, thy child, dominion 
Over all height and depth? if Life can breed 
New wants, and wealth from those who toil and groan 
Rend of thy gifts and hers a thousandfold for one! (241-255) 
What is the point, the poet asks, of mastering nature through technology and 
art if the wealthy continue to enjoy the gifts of liberty and nature ('thy' 
26 
and 'hers', 255) at the expense of the poor? There is, however, a 
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significant irony within .the expression of the question, in that the language 
of domination is used equally of the Promethean gifts of knowledge and art and 
the Jovian reign of oppression. Various critics have attempted to explain 
Shelley's use of the vocabulary of oppression for radical ends, but none 
sufficiently acknowledges as a factor his view of good and evil, of revolution 
27 
and reaction, as 'inextricably entangled'. The language of the stanza from 
the 'Ode to Liberty' and of Asia's speech to Demogorgon implicitly answers the 
questions they raise: the reason mankind's efforts to transform the world 
through the power of mind fail to extirpate the evil of oppression is that 
they share oppression's taint. 
Prometheus Unbound and the 'Ode to Liberty', however, are themselves 
pervaded by precisely this kind of idealist aspiration. The fourth stanza of 
the ode, for example, describes how art, poetry and philosophy distilled from 
nature the elements of Greek civilisation, until 
Athens arose: a city such as vision 
Builds from the purple crags and silver towers 
Of battlemented cloud, 
Peopled with forms that mock the eternal dead 
In marble immortality. (61-74) 
Recalling the Temple of the Spirit in The Revolt of Islam, this visionary 
blend of Hellenism and romance well illustrates the idealism of the poet 
described in the Fourth Spirit's song in Prometheus Unbound, who creates from 
the visible world 'Forms more real than living man,/ Nurslings of 
immortality! 1 (I, 748-9). This idealist aspect of the Greek spirit in 
Shelley 1 s drama derives from various influences to \vhich Shelley \vas subject 
after leaving England, all of which involve an attitude to nature such as 
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Asia's speech describes. The most important of these are Plato's dialogues, 
and his Symposium in particular, which Shelley translated in 1818. Prometheus 
is deeply imbued with the thought of this work, but especially with its idea 
28 
that a love of beauty in external forms leads on to a love of ideal beauty. 
He was also influenced by certain commentators on Greek art, who tended to 
interpret it in Platonic terms. A.W. Schlegel, whose A Course of Lectures on 
Dramatic Art and Literature (1809-11) Shelley was reading during the journey 
to Italy, describes Greek tragedy as ideal in conception: 
The ideality of the representation chiefly consisted in the elevation of 
everything in it to a higher sphere. Tragic poetry wished to separate 
the image of reality from the level of nature to which man is in reality 
chained down, like a slave to the soi1. 29 
At the same time he emphasizes that the Greeks succeeded in 'combining the 
ideal with the real, or, to drop school terms, an elevation more than human 
30 
with all the truth of life'. J.J. Winckelmann, whose Histoire de l'art chez 
les anciens (1764) Shelley began reading in December 1818, has a similarly 
31 
Platonic appreciation of Greek sculpture. His Reflections Concerning the 
Imitation of the Grecian Artists in Painting and Sculpture (1766), which 
Shelley may or may not have known, but which enunciates some of the theory 
underlying the Histoire, stresses the importance for Greek artists of drawing 
on the actual forms of nature, but also argues: 
[The] multiplied occasions of observing nature in all her motion, and in 
all her various aspects, not only rendered the Grecian artists capable 
of representing her various beauties with energy and truth, but also 
encouraged them to go yet further, and to make a new step towards 
perfection, under the guidance of those very principles which Nature had 
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furnished them with. After contemplating nature in her fairest forms, 
they imagined forms yet more fair and striking: they thus acquired ideas 
of beauty superior to those Nature herself had exhibited •••• This ideal 
beauty had no existence but in their elevated conceptions, but it far 
surpassed anything which had hitherto passed for beauty in the esteem of 
mankind. 32 
Vlinckelmann no doubt ~nfluenced Shelley 1 s appreciation of the classical art 
which he encountered in Italy, and particularly Rome, and which was another 
source of his interest in Hellenism. During his first year in Italy, where he 
arrived in March 1818, he travelled much of the country's length and breadth, 
and as Hary Shelley writes, and his letters show, he \·las deeply impressed by 
33 
the 'wonders of Nature and Art in that divine land.' He was often 
particularly struck by the close conjunction of the two. For example, of the 
landscape around Lake Como he writes, 'The union of culture & the untameable 
profusion & loveliness of nature is here so close that the line where they are 
34 
divided can scarcely be discovered'. The ancient remains that he found in 
Rome and Pompeii represented this union of nature and art to perfection, and 
caused him to speculate on the cause of Greek cultural excellence: 
I nou understand why the Greeks were such great Poets, and, above all I 
can account, it seems to me, for the harmony the unity the perfection 
the uniform excellence of all their works of art. They lived in a 
perpetual commerce with external nature and nourished themselves on the 
spirit of its forms. Their theatres were all open to the mountains & the 
sky. Their columns that ideal type of a sacred forest with roof of 
interwoven tracery admitted the light & wind, the odour & the freshness 
of the country penetrated the cities. Their temples were mostly 
upaithric, and the flying clouds, the stars or the deep sky were seen 
above. 0, but for that series of \aetched wars which terminated in the 
Roman conquest of the world, but for the Christian religion which put a 
finishing stroke to the ancient system; but for those changes which 
149 
conducted Athens to its ruin, to what an eminence might not humanity 
have arrived! 35 
Shelley clearly has in mind the same buildings and the same thoughts when Asia 
describes how, through the influence of Prometheus, 
Cities then 
i·lere built, and through their snow-like columns flowed 
The warm winds, and the azure aether shone, 
And the blue sea and shado•zy hills were seen ••• (II, 94-7) 
Altho~gh these passages show that Shelley considered the Greeks' aesthetic and 
political excellence to be based on their close contact with nature, he 
frequently expresses his appreciation of Greek art, as i·!inckelmann does, in 
terms of its ideal beauty and transcendent abstractness. After his first visit 
to Rome in November 1818 he writes to Peacock: 'Behold the wrecks of what a 
36 
great nation once dedicated to the abstractions of the mind.' Concerning the 
ivall paintings he saw at Pompeii in January 1819 he ~~rites, 'There is an ideal 
life in the forms of these paintings of an incomparable loveliness •••• It seems 
as if from the atmosphere of mental beauty that surrounded them, every human 
being then caught a splendour not his own, 1 and of some figures in bas-relief 
he says that they demonstrate 'the supernatural loveliness of ••• [the Greek] 
genius. They scarcely touch the ground with their feet, & their wind-uplifted 
37 
robes seem in the place of wings'. 
In Prometheus Unbound, and particularly in its last three acts, v1hich were 
written after his experiences of Pompeii and Rome, Shelley would seem to be 
trying to replicate something of the 'atmosphere of mental beauty' which he 
saw in the Greek paintings. At the birth of Asia, Panthea tells us, love burst 
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from her, 'like the atmosphere/ Of the sun's fire filling the living world' 
(II, v, 26-7), and the Earth in Act IV is \aapped in 'the animation of 
delight/ ••• , like an atmosphere of light' (322-J). Indeed, there is a sense in 
which the drama as a whole attempts to dissolve external reference in order to 
create its own ideal world which floats freely of the ground. Among various 
critics who see the play in this light, Tetreault suggests that it aspires to 
the kind of aesthetic autonomy and abstract idealism belonging to music, and 
that, 'Concerned with the world not as it is but as it could be, it stands 
38 
apart from nature but not from social engagement'. Such a statement, 
however, reveals the serious inadequacies of the point of view it represents: 
it disregards the poet's dependence on nature--the fact that art is nature's 
'child' ('Ode to Liberty', 252); it makes an unjustifiable separation between 
nature on the one hand and culture and society on the other; above all, it 
overlooks the play's continual dismantling of its own ideal formulations. 
Asia's speech to Demogorgon should be enough to correct these errors. 
However, the mission of Prometheus and the role of nature within it has a 
further aspect of which this speech reveals nothing. Asia at this point makes 
no mention of how the very self-defeat which she describes, which is the 
situation of Prometheus in Act I, can be turned to creative good, nor how the 
one-sided relationship of mind and nature can be changed to achieve this end. 
Considering that it is primarily she who shows how in Act II this revolution 
is to be realized, her omission might seem curious, except that Prometheus's 
unbinding has yet to occur. For this liberation, which frometheus and Asia 
achieve between them, is in fact a demonstration of how the mind can, by 
renouncing its will-driven urge to master the external world, reverse its 
tendency to transcendence, and unbuild its own constructions of power by which 
it has become enslaved. Indeed, perhaps the main achievement of Prometheus 
Unbound and its accompanying lyrics is their development of this act of 
1 51 
renunciation into a process of poetic self-renewal, in which metaphors and 
'beautiful idealisms' which have become dead, conservative and abstract are 
repeatedly broken up to reveal once more the 'before unapprehended relations 
39 
of things'. 
In this process the external world plays an indispensable role, for the 
'relations' to which Shelley here refers in the Defence are specified as 
'subsisting, first between existence and perception, and secondly between 
perception and expression' (R&P, p. 482)--between, in other words, nature and 
mind, and mind and poetry. In these two kinds of relations nature can be 
understood as having the same dual function O'Neill identifies as belonging to 
the ravine in 'Mont Blanc': first, it is the object of mind, and secondly, it 
is an emblem of the mind's relations with that object; and these two functions 
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are never separate but constantly play off against each other. The 'Ode to 
the West Wind' and 'The Cloud', both published with Prometheus Unbound, well 
demonstrate the poetic process of renovation through destruction, and the 
double role of nature within it. In the former, in which the poet commits his 
'dead thoughts' to the wind to quicken a 'new birth' (63-4), the wind, as well 
as being the external presence in which the mind seeks to lose itself, is also 
emblematic, through its seasonal and destructive character, of the cyclical 
process that characterizes the relations of mind and nature. 1The Cloud', 
similarly, subjectively depicts the interaction of the cloud, an image of 
mind, with the surrounding elements, but at the same time objectively 
allegorizes this interaction as the cloud's participation in the hydrological 
, 
cyc~e. 
Asia has a dual function in the play which is comparable to that of 
external nature in these lyrics, and it is primarily in this sense that Mary 
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Shelley's association of her with nature is justifiable. Firstly she is the 
'antitype' of Prometheus, whose separation from her parallels his alienation 
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from the natural world. In this role she embodies the natural qualities of the 
heart, contrasting with his intellectualism, and her parentage, as Curran 
notes, connects her with the earth, whereas he is associated with heavenly 
~ 
fire. Her name also establishes an east-west contrast with the Greek 
Prometheus, recalling the similar opposition between occidental culture, 
reason and will, and oriental nature, beauty and sensibility, as represented 
by the two protagonists, Hilarion and Luxima, in Owenson's The Missionary. 
Secondly, like the revolutions of change in nature, her actions serve as an 
emblem of the creative and liberating relationship that can exist between mind 
and the external world, and indeed between Prometheus and herself. The ways in 
which they do so will be considered in the discussion of Act 2, but they are 
prefigured in the Preface by Shelley's description of the ruinous and 
overgrown Baths of Caracalla in Rome, where in springtime, he tells us, the 
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poem was chiefly written. A symbol of political and artistic power, this 
building has been reduced to ruins but also transformed to living beauty by 
the destructive agency of nature. 
iii 
It is generally understood that in Act I Prometheus undergoes a moral 
reformation which sets in train the events of Act II and leads ultimately to 
his unbinding. The nature of his reformation, however, has been a matter of 
dispute. Most critics have interpreted it to involve his recantation of his 
curse against Jupiter, though there have been differences between them as to 
~ 
when exactly in the act his repentance takes place. Others have disputed 
that Prometheus repents at all, arguing that his retraction of the curse would 
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be tantamount to his ceasing to resist Jupiter's tyranny. According to this 
view, the primary virtue that he displays and develops in Act I is the will to 
endure. The issue is of importance not only for the way in which we read the 
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first act, but for its implications concerning the nature of Prometheus's and 
the world's eventual release from slavery. If his reformation consists of a 
unique and decisive moral conversion, a turning from hatred to forgiveness, a 
consequence is that his redemption will likewise involve a decisive break in 
history, and the world's final conversion from hatred to love. If, on the 
other hand, his main achievement in Act I is a strengthening, if also a 
purifying, of his will to resist, rather than a fundamental change of moral 
perspective, there is no intrinsic reason why it should result in his complete 
and lasting emancipation; rather, it implies that, as Demogorgon indicates at 
the end of the play, tyranny is never finally defeated, and the cycles of 
history never certainly concluded. In the following discussion it will be 
argued that there is a validity in both these views of Prometheus's moral 
reform, but that Act I can be read in a way that accommodates both, despite 
their apparent irreconcileability. 
The Promethean virtues are accurately summarised by Demogorgon at the very 
end of the play: 
To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite; 
To forgive wrongs darker than Death or Night; 
To defy Power which seems Omnipotent; 
To love, and bear; to hope, till Hope creates 
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates; 
Neither to change nor falter nor repent: 
This, like thy glory, Titan! is to be 
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free; 
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory. (IV, 570-78) 
What is immediately striking here is the contrast between the exhortations to 
forgive and defy, to love and not repent. These attitudes, however, are not 
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absolutely incompatible, and in the course of Act I Prometheus does in fact 
practise them all. For Shelley this involves bringing together the literary 
models for Prometheus in such a way as to retain and enhance what he regards 
as their admirable qualities, while progressively discarding their 
reprehensible ones. Thus the vengeful pride which accompanies Satan's 'firm 
and patient opposition' to tyranny in Paradise Lost is corrected in Shelley's 
Titan by qualities of self-knowledge and penitence taken from Milton's Samson, 
and by the charity and championship of humankind that belong to Prometheus in 
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Hesiod, Aeschylus and Byron, and to the Bible's and Milton's Christ. At the 
same time, the willingness of Prometheus to compromise with Zeus in 
Aeschylus's version of the myth is replaced in Shelley's by an unyielding 
resistance to his tormentor that is shared by all his other major exemplars, 
the biblical Jesus excepted. In Act I Prometheus undergoes two ordeals by 
which the reproachable elements of his character are purged: first, through 
the re-enactment of his curse against Jupiter he sheds his Satanic hatred and 
pride; and second, by withstanding the temptations and torments inflicted on 
him by Mercury and the Furies he strengthens his resolve to resist any 
concession to tyranny. 
Despite this process of purification, however, the conflict between his 
tendencies to defiance and forbearance is not truly resolved, for he 
oscillates between them rather than combines them, and he does so from the 
opening of the act to the close. During the act he addresses two speeches to 
Jupiter, one at the very beginning (I, 1-59), and another immediately after 
being tortured by the Furies (I, 634-45). Although the later one is much 
shorter, the two speeches are remarkably similar, both in tone and process of 
thought. The second speech even begins with a refrain which is familiar from 
the first: 
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I 
Ah woe! 
Ah woe! Alas! pain, pain ever, forever! 
I close my tearless eyes, but see more clear 
Thy works within my woe-illumed mind, 
Thou subtle Tyrant! ••• Peace is in the grave--
The grave hides all things beautiful and good--
I am a God and cannot find it there, 
Nor would I seek it: for, though dread revenge, 
This is defeat, fierce King, not victory. 
The sights with which thou torturest gird my soul 
With new endurance, till the hour arrives 
When they shall be no types of things which are. (I, 635-645) 
In Prometheus's opening speech one can trace the same succession of thoughts: 
tortured vituperation of Jupiter, despair of release, then willing endurance 
of pain in the knowledge that the reign of Jupiter will eventually end. Like 
Byron's Prometheus, Shelley's Titan struggles 'Between the suffering and the 
will,/ Which torture where they cannot kill' ('Prometheus', 16-17), but unlike 
Byron's Prometheus, he looks forward to ultimate emancipation. Yet what his 
two speeches to Jupiter also suggest is that this expectation is less a 
reliable prophecy of escape from the oscillation between the suffering and the 
will than a component element within that oscillation, for it is too closely 
bound up with both to be a credible means of breaking the cycle in which they 
are involved. If his own prophecy of his eventual triumph is thus cast into 
doubt, so also is that of the Chorus of Spirits, who say to Prometheus, 
Though Ruin now Love's shadow be, 
Following him destroyingly 
On Death's white and winged steed, 
Thou shalt quell this Horseman grim, 
Woundless though in heart and limb. (I, 780-88) 
156 
Prometheus's conquest of love's shadow, ruin, is unlikely to be conclusive if 
ruin is 'Woundless', and if love is his only weapon, as he states a few lines 
further on: 'Most vain all hope but love' (I, 808)--especially as love, as the 1 
Sixth Spirit has just made clear, bears so close a relation to desolation. 
The unresolved tension between defiance and forgiveness in Prometheus and 
the doubt which hangs over his foretelling of release from the cycles of pain 
in which this tension meshes him are correlative to one of Act I's other main 
themes: the supreme difficulty and inevitable counter-productiveness of 
attempting to achieve lasting political progress. The cycles of hate and love 
are there equally ineluctable. The act does, however, offer another 
perspective on these dilemmas. Although there appears to be no prospect of 
ever escaping the wheel of pain for either Prometheus or the human race, it is 
his recognition and acceptance of this situation that ultimately become a 
source of hope. Similarly, although in one sense Prometheus makes practically 
no progress in virtue in the act, there is another in which he does undergo a 
fundamental moral reform. The key to his regeneration is his repentance, 
though it is not of the kind that derives from a knowledge that Jupiter's days 
are numbered, nor is it like the submission that enables the Titan of 
Aeschylus to treat with the oppressor of mankind. It is closer to the self-
sacrifice of Jesus, whose crucified form, presented to him by the Furies, 
tortures mainly because it is his own likeness. Even Jesus fails, for his name 
has 'become a curse' (I, 604), but this same failure Prometheus eventually 
accepts for himself,.recognizing that there is no alternative in a world 
'where the most admirable tendencies to happiness and preservation are forever 
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baffled by misery and decay'. 
Prometheus is brought to this point of resignation mainly through the 
complex moral and psychological struggle that is involved in the 'recall' (I, 
59) of his own curse. To a large extent this struggle is conveyed in terms of 
his relationship with external nature. Not only are the effects of the curse 
described largely in terms of the natural world's response to it, but the 
Earth and her children, the Mountains, Springs, Air and Hhirhlinds, are said 
to retain the curse in their keeping, and it is they upon whom Prometheus 
initially calls for its repetition. The passage in which he does so offers the 
first indication of the nature of the curse: 
Ye Hountains, 
\ihose many-voiced Echoes, through the mist 
Of cataracts, flung the thunder of that spell! 
Ye icy Springs, stagnant with wrinkling frost, 
\f.hich vibrated to hear me, and then crept 
Shuddering through India! Thou serenest Air, 
Through which the Sun walks burning without beams! 
And ye swift Hhirlwinds, who on poised wings 
Hung mute and moveless o'er yon hushed abyss, 
As thunder louder than your own made rock 
The orbed world! If then my words had power 
--Though I ao changed so that aught evil Hish 
Is dead within, although no memory be 
Of what is hate--let them not lose it now! 
vlhat was that curse? for ye all heard me speak. (I, 59-73) 
vlhatever the negative aspects of the curse, the main reason Prometheus wants 
to hear his words again is to recover their 1power 1 --power as it is 
experienced by the mind in dynamic interaction with the external world, and 
which is analogous to the 'electric life' of poetry as the forms of nature are 
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analogous to the forms of language. Each of the phenomena of nature 
addressed is linked with an image of this power: the echoes and thunder among 
the mountains; the thawing of the frozen springs; the air transmitting the 
sun's invisible rays; and the whirlwinds poised over an abyss, like Hilton's 
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muse, the Holy Spirit. The Earth testifies to the liberating force of the 
curse when she speaks of Prometheus arising 'like a cloud/ Of glory, ••• a 
spirit of keen joy', at 'tThose voice her 'pining sons uplifted their prostrate 
brm.,rs 1 (I, 157-60). On the other hand, the images of volcanic thunder, Hhich 
'made rock/ The orbed Horld 1 --punning on the monarchical orb, as well as on 
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1rock 1--indicates the correlation of the curse to Jovian oppressive power. 
As the words eventually uttered by the Phantasm of Jupiter demonstrate 
clearly, Prometheus's hate-filled curse constitutes the very evil which it 
imprecates. The Voices of nature to \vhom Prometheus addresses his appeal 
flatly contradict the Earth's claim that they 'meditate/ In secret joy and 
hope those dreadful words' (184-5), for they respond by making clear that they 
prefer a stable tyranny to the earth-shattering violence of revolutionary 
change. 
The dual aspect of the curse and of the power associated 'vtith it underlies 
the ambiguity of Prometheus's wish to 'recall' his words, and suggests that 
the two possible meanings of remembering and revoking are in fact inseparable. 
He does in fact wish to do both, and it is the tension between the contrary 
attitudes associated with these desires that racks him so painfully in his 
opening speech, and causes his abrupt changes and conflicts of mood. The 
Satanic defiance of the first 23 lines per~etuate~ even while it opposes the 
dualism that the projection of his o\vn mind as Jupiter represents. Hence, his 
hatred is baffled by Jupiter's remote sublimity as the eagle is baffled by the 
mountain. But a further effect of his dualism, as Lloyd Abbey notes, is his 
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complete alienation from the external world. The baffled eagle, therefore, 
is also an image of how, as in 1Nont Blanc', the apprehending mind and senses 
are repelled by the landscape, here represented by the 'Black, wintry, dead, 
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unmeasured' (I, 21-22) precipice on \vhich Prometheus hangs. 
At this point there is a change of tone as he ceases to address Jupiter and 
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appeals instead to the natural elements: 
No change, no pause, no hope!--Yet I endure. 
I ask the Earth, have not the mountains felt? 
I ask yon Heaven--the all-beholding Sun, 
Has it not seen? The Sea, in storm or calm, 
Heaven's ever-changing Shadow, spread below--
Have its deaf waves not heard my agony? 
Ah me, alas, pain, pain ever, forever! (I, 24-30) 
The lines echo the despairing grief both of Prometheus's opening words calling 
on the forces of nature in Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound and of Milton's 
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questioning of the winds in Lycidas. In doing so they replace the 
intellectually abstract and 'eyeless' (9) hatred of the opening lines with a 
sense of a broken human relationship with the external world, one which 
depends on the sensual faculties of feeling, seeing and hearing. They thus 
express a desire such as we feel, according to 'On Love', 'when we find within 
our own thoughts the chasm of an insufficient void and seek to awaken in all 
things that are, a community with what we experience within ourselves' (R&P, 
473). It is therefore fitting that the lines should also remind us of the 
final question of 'Mont Blanc': 'And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and 
sea,/ If to the human mind's imaginings/ Silence and solitude were vacancy?' 
Just as in that poem interrelationship and power, the ravine and the mountain, 
are dialectically related, so are the mutually engendering and mutually 
frustrating tendencies to love and hatred shown by Prometheus in his opening 
speech. 
It is in the context of this moral and emotional entrapment that we should 
see Prometheus's wish to have his curse recalled, a wish which, while it 
evinces his desire for escape, only succeeds in miring him further. Although 
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he claims that 'pity', 'grief' and 'misery' have driven out 'Disdain', 
'exultation' and 'hate' (53-8), the sudden conversion is neither 
psychologically convincing nor borne out by the rest of the act. In an 
important sense what makes his curse a curse, rather than the liberating act 
that Prometheus and the Earth both remember, is precisely his desire for its 
recall. His state of mind at the beginning of Act I is therefore comparable, 
as G. Kim Blank has observed, to that of the Poet in Alastor, whose attempt to 
rediscover the primal unity symbolised by the 'veiled maid' turns her memory 
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into a 'blighting curse' (679). And just as nature for the Poet becomes 
remote and unresponsive, so here it fails to respond to Prometheus's demand 
for the repetition of his words. Moreover, the association of Coleridge wit~ 
'the false earth's inconstancy' in 10h! there are spirits of the air' in the 
Alastor volume is repeated here, for the First and Second Voices, representing 
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the mountains and the springs, are clearly reminiscent of his poems. 
Despite his complaint against the Voices' political infidelity, however, 
Prometheus (again like the Alastor Poet) shares the dualism of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge that enables them to enlist nature in the conservative cause by 
seeing in the external world the symbols of an original unity. His response to 
the Voices begins: 'I hear a sound of voices--not the voice/ Which I gave 
forth' (I, 112-3), which introduces the dualist distinction between the 
languages of the living and the dead, and recalls the difference defined in 
the Defence between the 'original conception' and the 'composition' of 
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poetry. He then upbraids the natural world as follows: 
Mother, thy sons and thou 
Scorn him, without whose all-enduring will 
Beneath the fierce omnipotence of Jove 
Both they and thou had vani3hed like thin mist 
Unrolled on the morning wind! (I, 113-7) 
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These lines echo Aeschylus's account of Jupiter's intention to eradicate the 
human race, but in their Shelleyan context their main significance is 
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epistemological. Prometheus believes that Jupiter threatens the existence of 
the external world, but rather it is the creative and destructive activity of 
his own curse which, by assimilating, transforming and finally alienating its 
materials, constitutes a tyranny over nature, depriving it of its stable 
otherness. If his defiance of Jupiter is one product of his forgotten curse, 
another is his memory of the exiled Asia, and their former unity. The intense 
nostalgia with which he looks down on 'rock-embosomed lawns and snow-fed 
streams/ ••• ,/ Through whose o'er-shadowing woods I wandered once/ With Asia' 
(120-3), is thus a condition of his enslavement, not a means to his release. 
Only when he eventually establishes communication with the Earth does an 
escape from his impasse begin to become possible. Their communication, 
however, does not imply the unitive sympathy with external nature that 
Prometheus has been seeking, but rather brings painful seif-knowledge: hence, 
though he feels 'like one mingled in entwining love,/ Yet 'tis not pleasure' 
(I, 143-4). As the physical earth and a deity who is the mother of Prometheus, 
the Earth straddles the divine and human worlds, and in effect interprets the 
language of the dead for her son. But just as the Chorus in Samson Agonistes, 
on whom her function is partly based, affects Samson differently than it 
intends, so the Earth misjudges the effect of her words on Prometheus. Unlike 
the Voices of natUre, she distinguishes between his curse and Jupiter's 
violent reaction to it, but by her use of volcanic imagery to describe both 
she inadvertently reveals the close connection between them. Moreover, in 
speaking of the curs~ as a 'treasured spell' (I, 184) which her children dare 
not utter, she shows how through a want of courage they allow it to justify 
the perpetuation of tyranny. Prometheus at last begins to understand the true 
effect of his curse. 
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His response is of great significance for what it implies about the change 
overtaking him: 
Venerable mother! 
All else who live and suffer take from thee 
Some comfort; flowers and fruits and happy sounds 
And love, though fleeting; these may not be mine. 
But mine own words, I pray, deny me not. (I, 186-90) 
Having been seeking since almost the start of the play to establish communion 
with nature through the mediation of the senses, he now renounces all that 
nature offers, even love; and although he once again asks for the curse to be 
repeated he does so without the earlier straining urgency of tone. In effect, 
he gives up his resistance to the dualisms of mind and nature, thought and 
language, into which his curse has betrayed him, and implicitly acknowledges 
the futility and harm of nostalgically nursing a 'treasured spell' of love and 
hatred. Once again he asks that his curse be repeated, but he seeks no longer 
to remember its unitive or revoke its disunitive power, but rather to abandon 
its power altogether. As a result, his words can at last be uttered. 'They 
shall be told' (I, 191), the Earth promptly replies; and because the 
Phantasm's 'empty voice' is uninformed by 'thought' (I, 249), it is the words 
alone, divested of their power, that he repeats. In a different sense from 
that originally intended, Prometheus does succeed in both remembering and 
revoking his curse, thus confirming the correlation between them. 
Prometheus's ascetic self-renunciation is confirmed at the end of the act 
when he abandons himself to his destiny. Although it is the means by which he 
breaks the love-hate stalemate, and leads eventually to his release, we are 
constantly reminded in Act I of the other perspective on human history which 
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sees nothing but defeats, and which therefore ensures his act of conversion 
cannot be final. Even in Act I it is not the only occasion of his willing 
acceptance of suffering. For example, each utterance of his refrain, 'alas, 
pain, pain ever, forever' (I, 23, 30, 635), is accompanied by a determination 
to endure indefinitely, and then followed, against apparent logic, by a 
recovery of hope that his pain is of limited duration. Thus the dialectic in 
which he is involved is fuelled by the contrary notions of perpetual process 
and teleology. Paradoxically, he escapes the process of history by yielding 
himself to it, and ensures that process continues by breaking out of its 
cycles. 
The dualism of the Earth's 'two worlds of life and death' (I, 195) 
corresponds to both the subject-object and metaphysical dualisms that 
Prometheus has been attempting to collapse. A cancelled line in the manuscript 
referring to these two worlds--'Which thou henceforth art doomed to 
interweave'--is suggestive of the cycles of creation and destruction, unity 
and disunity, which Prometheus is indeed destined to pursue, and may have been 
deleted because it contradicts his absolute release from this process in Act 
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III. In fact the most important lesson he learns in Act I is that the 
process is irresistible, and that the desire to reverse it or end it in order 
to recover a lost unity is self-defeating. It remains to Asia to capitalize on 
this discovery and to demonstrate how the same cycles of change can be turned 
to good. 
iv 
Since in Act I Prometheus achieves the reformation which makes possible his 
release in Act III, the purpose of Act II, whose action lies outside the 
Promethean myth as Shelley inherits it, is not immediately apparent. The most 
important truth Asia learns from Demogorgon--that 'eternal Love' (II, iv, 120) 
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is subject to none--has, after all, already been acknowledged, if less 
portentously, in Prometheus's remark, 'Most vain all hope but love'. However, 
if the play's main achievement--as regards both itself as a text and the 
action it represents--is the realization of that love, then Act II must be 
seen as central. Indeed, from this point of view, it usurps the function of 
Act III, where the unbinding of Prometheus and the inauguration of a new age 
are more obvious expressions of love's realization. Yet there is little sense 
that any of the events of Act III constitutes the play's moment of climax, 
which seems already to have passed; and conversely, although the release of 
Prometheus is held in anticipation throughout Act II, the impression is 
nevertheless also conveyed that his hour is already come. 'This is the season, 
this the day, the hour' (II, i, 13), Asia proclaims at the beginning of the 
act, and the spring and dawn she announces are fitting emblems of the promise 
which is also a fulfilment. Similarly, the arrival of the Spirits of the Hour 
and the transfiguration of Asia at the end of the act effectively forestall 
the supposedly more important events they adumbrate. 
Like his reformation, Prometheus's redemption is not so easily pinned down 
to a particular moment as the play's outward plotting seems to suggest. In 
fact both are to be defined in terms of a continuing process as much as a 
single event. In Act II Asia's role is to enact the process which, merely in 
leading towards, itself becomes the realization of freedom and love. Thus 
desire and its fulfilment are dialectically related in the same way that 
despair and hope are for Prometheus. Indeed he and she are caught in the same 
cycle, but their attitudes towards it are quite different~ Prometheus 
initially is paralysed by a retrospective regret, an intense desire to 
'recall' the half-remembered reality of power which the temporal cycle has 
left behind, and his main achievement is to abandon that regret. Asia picks up 
where he leaves off: in her journey to the cave of Demogorgon she looks always 
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ahead (in truth, more a 1forethinker' than he is), and repeatedly re-enacts 
his abandonment of the spent images of power and self in pursuit of new ones, 
her own self-prqjected echoes, which in turn are allowed to die, 'As dew-stars 
glisten/ Then fade away' (II, i, 167-8). Thus, whereas he, with the help of 
Jupiter's Phantasm, remembers his curse in order to forget it, she constantly 
forgets in order to remember. In Plato's Symposium Diotima, in a speech that 
was clearly of particular importance to Shelley, describes a similar mental 
process as follows: 
Manners, morals, opinions, desires, pleasures, sorrows, fears; none of 
these ever remain unchanged in the same persons; but some die away, and 
others are produced. And, what is yet more strange is, that not only 
does some knowledge spring up, and another decay, and that we are never 
the same with respect to our knowledge, but that each several object of 
our thoughts suffers the same revolution. That which is called 
meditation, or the exercise of memory, is the science of the escape or 
departure of knowledge; for forgetfulness is the going out of knowledge; 
and meditation, calling up a new memory in the place of that which has 
departed; preserves knowledge; so that, though forever displaced and 
restored, it seems to be the same. In this manner every thing mortal is 
preserved: not that it is constant and eternal, like that which is 
divine; but that in the place of what has grown old and is departed, it 
leaves another new like that which it was itself. By this contrivance, 0 
Socrates, does what is mortal, the body and all other things, partake of 
immortality; that which is immortal, is immortal in another manner. 
Wonder not, if everything by nature cherishes that which was produced 
from itself, for this earnest Love is a tendency towards eternity. 59 
As usual in his adaptation of Plato, Shelley pushes his idea that the mortal 
participates in the immortal towards a full dialectic in which neither takes 
precedence, but otherwise Diotima's speech comes close to describing Shelley's 
poetic practice generally, and is particularly influential on his conception 
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of Asia's role in Prometheus Unbound Act II. 
In the first scene she sets in motion the process of remembering and 
forgetting by her response to Panthea's and her own dreams. Panthea's first 
dream, envisioning the transfiguration of Prometheus, is significantly 
different in various ways from the other two, suggesting a distinction like 
that between the fading 'white star' and eclipsing 'roseate sunlight' (II, 17, 
25) in Asia's opening speech. First, Panthea's dream of Prometheus has a unity 
and coherence, making it readily understood as a prophecy of his release, 
whereas the others seem incomplete, reaching beyond themselves with the words 
'follow, follow' (II, i, 132, 153-62). Secondly, despite its sensual imagery, 
the first dream represents an experience of unity that is essentially 
suprasensual, as Panthea's words make clear: 'I saw not--heard not--moved not-
-only felt/ His presence flow and mingle through my blood' (II, i, 79-80); the 
subsequent ones, in contrast, belong to the realm of nature and time, and have 
a historical reference. Thirdly, while the first dream is transmitted from one 
sister to the other by means of the eyes, the latter two are conveyed 
verbally. These various differences suggest that whereas Panthea's dream of 
Prometheus represents an unmediated apprehension of power, the later two 
dreams, which complement each other, belong to that dialogic, rotational 
process that can recover power only by relinquishing successively its every 
formulation. Her dream of Prometheus troubles Panthea with vague longings, but 
it has no such effect on Asia, who, having interpreted it to mean 'we shall 
meet again' (II, i, 124), merely says, 'The dream is told'. Like Prometheus's 
curse, it is recalled in order to be set aside, and thereby ultimately to be 
realized as the fulfilment of its prophecy. Thus Asia initiates the process 
that will bring this end about. Accordingly, Panthea's other dream immediately 
appears, at first only as the embodiment of movement, a shape whose 'rude 
hair/ Roughens the wind that lifts it' (II, i, 127-8), and which thus images 
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the reciprocal action which motivates Asia's quest. This dream and Asia's 
dream are then fully called to mind through the echoic effect of the sisters' 
dialogue, and provide brief allegories of the French Revolution and its 
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aftermath. But they give promise of a recovery of the hopes that have been 
lost through the repeated, 'follow, follow', a refrain which sings in the 
pines like 'the farewell of ghosts' (II, i, 158)--or like the departure of 
dead memories that must be abandoned in order that new life can be breathed. 
into them. 
The lyrical elements in the act draw attention to various aspects of the 
process by which Asia is drawn towards the throne of Demogorgon, and in this 
way serve as a gloss on the dramatic action conducted in blank verse. The 
dialectical nature of her progress is particularly apparent in the Song of the 
Spirits in Scene iii, where it is likened to the downward spiralling motion 
(as in Alaster's whirlpools) produced by the polar forces of attraction and 
repulsion: 
While the sound, whirls around, 
Down down! 
As the fawn draws the hound, 
As the lightning the vapour 
As a weak moth the taper; 
Death, Despair; Love, Sorrow; 
Time both; to-day, to-morrow; 
As steel obeys the Spirit of the stone, 
Down, down! (II, iii, 63-71) 
Here rhythm and rhyme emphasize the reciprocating action of binary opposites. 
lr 
In most of these either one of each pair ~ight be said to 'draw' the other, as 
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Frederick Burwick has pointed out. This ambiguity underlies another: on the 
one hand, Asia's forward motion in pursuit of her own echoes sustains itself 
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by projecting a goal that always lies ahead; on the other, she is not the 
author of her own progress but is subject to an external force driving her 
towards her final destination. In fact Act II gives no priority to either of 
these explanations of her quest: rather, her progress and her goal are 
interdependent, and attract, repel, create and displace each other much as the 
various polarities do in the Song of the Spirits. Thus Asia's journey images a 
world in which 'mind produces motion' and 'motion produces mind' (R&P, p. 478) 
in equal measure, and 'Demogorgon's mighty law~ (II, ii, 43), often 
interpreted as the rule of necessity, is more accurately understood as the 
interaction between the equal forces of desire and destiny. 
A cqrollary of this dialectical interdependence is that the unity to which 
polar forces tend, and which is the promised reward of Asia and Prometheus, is 
both a means and an end of progress. Such images of mental self~containment as 
the 'fountain-lighted caves' (II, i, 184) and 'interwoven bowers' (II, ii, 6) 
through which Asia passes are auguries of her eventual reunion with Prometheus 
and of the cave in which they live, with its fountain and curtaining 
vegetation, but they also represent states of transition within a larger 
revolving world outside them--just as the bubbles, bells of flowers and drops 
of dew, inhabited, according to the Fauns, by spirits, are microcosms that 
have only a brief existence within the subsuming cycles of nature. Thus the 
'ideal life', the perfect harmony of mind and nature, which Shelley admires in 
Greek art, is never statically realized in his own work, but only seen as a 
phase in a continuing oscillation between coalescence and dissolution. 
The cyclical nature of Asia's mental progress--involving, as it does, a 
constant repetition of loss and gain--lends to Act II a pervasive emotional 
tone of intermingled sadness and joy. Hence spring comes 'as the memory of a 
dream/ Which now is sad because it hath been sweet' (II, i, 8-9), and the rise 
and fall of the nightingales' song (enacting the 'cyclic poem' mentioned in 
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the Defence, R&P p. 482) is 'So sweet that joy is almost pain' (II, ii, 40). 
The same pathos is captured in the image of 1 unbewailin~ flowers' (II, iv, 
16), a negative formation that keeps us aware of the positive it denies--that 
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flowers have reason to bewail because of their brevity. Significantly, the 
1 autumnal tone 1 of Shelley 1 s west wind is also 1 Svl8et though in sadness 1 ( 1 Ode 
to the Hest Hind', 60-1), indicating the close relation between spring and 
autumn, death and rebirth. An extension of this emotional quality is an 
emphasis on weakness, or willing submission to the dialectical process and an 
acceptance of loss: 'Resist not the weakness--/ Such strength is in meekness' 
(II, iii, 93-4), the Spirits tell Asia. 
Geoffrey Hatthews has demonstrated the importance of volcanic imagery in 
Act II, and suggested that the landscape through which the Oceanids are led 
owes much to Shelley's visit to the volcanic terrain around Naples in late 
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1818 and early 1819. However, although he points out the destructive and 
preservative effects of volcanoes, by concentrating his attention on the 
second act, and therefore on the revolutionary associations of Shelley's 
interest in vulcanism, he omits to note the continuity of the volcanic theme 
between Acts I and II, and the link it establishes between revolution and 
tyranny. This connection is implied by the Echoes when they urge Asia to 
follow them 
Through the many-folded mountains, 
To the rents and gulphs and chasms 
\·!here the Earth reposed from spasms 
On the day when He and thou 
Parted--to commingle now. (II, i, 201-05) 
Volcanic action, evidently, was instrumental in separating Prometheus and 
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Asia, just as it will be in reuniting them. As \·Je have seen in Act I, the 
Voices of the elements and the Earth reveal the close similarity bet\·Jeen 
tyrannical and revolutionary seismic activity (I, 38). The volcanic peak of 
which the crater is Demogorgon's cave can consequently be seen to counterpoint 
the mountain on which Prometheus hangs. Similarly, the 'deep intoxication' of 
those who drink its 'oracular vapour' and their 'voice which is contagion to 
the world' (II, iii, 4-10) represent only an alternative aspect of 
Prometheus's curse and its 'contagion' (I, 178) of hate. Asia describes the 
scene as 'weak yet beautiful', a description v1hich in a certain sense applies 
to herself, just as the bleak precipice in Act I is a reflection of the 
unregenerate Prometheus. As in the 1816 odes, Shelley thus suggests the 
mutuality of beauty and sublimity. 
In Asia's description of the mountain Shelley responds, as he has 
previously done in 'Hont Blanc', to Coleridge's 'Hymn Before Sunrise, in the 
Vale of Chamouni', though he does so now in a quite different way. Asia 
replicates Coleridge's attitude of worship, but the power she venerates is 
revolutionary rather than monarchical: her mountains are defiantly 'sky-
cleaving' (II, iii, 28), whereas his are subordinately 'sky-pointing' (70); 
and while the avalanche she describes is noisily revolutionary, the one in 
Coleridge's poem is more like a silent gesture of divine authority. 
Nevertheless, the na ture-1vorship that they share reveals an important 
relationship between their opposing religious and political attitudes. The 
weakness of the earth she worships and of its creator Spirit may suggest the 
wise weakness recommended by the Song of Spirits, but it is also an 'evil 
stain' (II, iii, 15). The nature and origin of this evil become plainer in the 
next scene when she asks Demogorgon, 
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And who made terror, madness, crime, remorse, 
vfuich from the links of the great chain of things 
To every thought within the mind of man 
Sway and drag heavily ••• ? (II, iv, 19-22) 
Demogorgon 1 s answer-- 1He reigns' (II, iv, 28)--is implicit in the question: 
the hierarchical view of nature represented by the chain of being (as 
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described, for example, by Dante, Milton and Pope), and endorsed by the 
nature-worship of both Coleridge and Asia, is itself responsible for the evils 
she speaks of. Yet only through her subjection to the mountain's intoxicating 
vapour can Asia descend to Demogorgon's cave to release his revolutionary 
power. 
The paradoxes of Act II are summed up in the figure of Demogorgon. In his 
long literary ancestry he displays somewhat conflicting characteristics: on 
the one hand, he is the father of the gods, and creator of the world, like the 
Demiurge in Plato's Timaeus; on the other, he is a dark and terrible chthonic 
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god, often associated with chaos, as in Lucan, Spenser and Milton. In 
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Boccaccio's De genealogia deorum (1494), an important source for Shelley, 
both these sides to his nature are described, and Shelley draws on both to 
convey the creative and destructive potentialities of his own Demogorgon, a 
power who is the same time power's antithesis--'a mighty Darkness/ Filling the 
seat of power' (II, iv, 2-3). In the Song of Spirits he is described in a way 
that justifies Mary Shelley's definition of him as 'the Primal Power of the 
world': he is the 'One alone', 'the Eternal, the Immortal' (II, iii, 79, 95), 
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by whose irresistible will the Promethean age approaches. He speaks, 
however, not as a god but as an oracle, whose riddling, parrying answers to 
Asia's questions put in doubt the very idea of a supreme power. Whereas she 
was told earlier that she would awaken 'a voice unspoken' (II, i, 190), he now 
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tells her that 1 a voice/ Is wanting 1 (II, i v, 115-6). 
The speech in which he does so, however, marks a subtle turn in their 
dialogue. Answering her question, 1\f.ho is the naster of the slave?' (II, iv, 
114), Demogorgon becomes suddenly less enigmatic and evasive: 
--If the Abysm 
Could vomit forth its secrets:--but a voice 
Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless; 
For what would it avail to bid thee gaze 
On the revolving world? what to bid speak 
Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change? To these 
All things are subject but eternal Love. (II, iv, 114-20) 
Roland Duerksen suggests that an identity is implied here between 'eternal 
Love' and the imageless 'deep truth'--an inference that the Platonic concept 
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of 'eternal Love' certainly invites. But this raises the question of how the 
idealism of the one notion is to be reconciled with the scepticism of the 
other. I·lore precisely, '1-Jha t is the nature of this 1 eternal Love 1 which neither 
is subject to the temporality of the 'revolving world', nor (since 'the deep 
truth is irnageless') can be claimed to transcend it; which, in short, is 
neither slave nor master? An answer is suggested in the scene's subsequent 
action. Asia's next question flows from the answer she has just received, for 
in asking 'lf.hen shall the destined hour arrive? 1 (II, i v, 128) she is in 
effect asking when 'eternal Love' will be made manifest. Demogorgon, in 
response, not only announces the hour's immediate arrival, but also issues 
forth from his cave as a volcanic eruption, the 'terrible shadow [that] 
floats/ Up from its throne' (II, iv, 150-51). Thus he re-assumes his role as 
power as well as oracle. And thus, after all, the abysm does 'vomit forth its 
secrets' in a very literal way, and a 'voice' is very far from 'wanting'. 
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Demogorgon himself is those secrets, that voice, and ('Ungazed upon and 
shapeless' (II, iv, 5) as he is) the imageless deep truth. A further inference 
to be drawn is that he is also 'eternal Love'--not love as it is exercised and 
felt, and is embodied in Asia--but love as a moral force in the world, whose 
eruptive power the Earth is later to describe arising 'Out of the lampless 
caves of unimagined being,/ 1-li~h earthquake shock and swiftness' (IV, 378-79). 
Like love, he is both power and the process which creates and destroys it, 
both end and means, and therefore neither slave nor master. Appropriately, his 
symbol is the 1 ouroboros 1 , the 'snake-like Doom coiled underneath his throne' 
(II, iii, 97), whose tail-biting circle represents the interdependence of time 
and eternity. 
Whereas Act 2 Scene 4 dramatizes the moral and intellectual basis of love's 
release into the world, the transfiguration of Asia in Scene 5 represents its 
emotional realization. It thus forms the play's emotional climax, even though 
it is tangential to the main action. The reason it can serve this function, 
while the events of Act 3 cannot, is that the longed-for moment of 
Prometheus's unbinding still lies ahead, even if it is now an imminent 
certainty. In fact Asia's transfiguration expresses and depends on this close 
yet incomplete convergence of desire and its fulfilment. In the manuscript 
there is an additional passage after the 'Life of Life' lyric in which Panthea 
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claims that, although her voice uttered it, Prometheus speaks through her. 
It seems that Shelley wanted him to be both present and absent--a state that 
would well reflect the scene's emotional tenor, for in the alternation between 
desire and its fulfilment they are here held finely and temporarily in 
balance. On the one hand, love as desire takes the form of a mutual and equal 
relationship between subject and object. Thus 'all love is sweet,/ Given or 
returned 1 ; it 1t1akes the reptile equal to the God' (II, v, 39-43); and while 
Asia, in the guise of Venus, radiates her love to the whole world, all things 
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seek her sympathy in turn. On the other hand, as the fulfilment of this desire 
love is represented as a metaphysical transforming power, of which Asia is 
conceived as the source, a role which the 'Life of Life' lyric and her 
portrayal as Venus emphasize. This supramundane love grows out of mutual love 
but ultimately overwhelms it: 
Lamp of Earth! where 1er thou movest 
Its dim shapes are clad with brightness 
And the souls of whom thou lovest 
Walk upon the winds with lightness 
Till they fail, as I am failing, 
Dizzy, lost ••• yet unbewailing! (II, v, 66-71) 
Thus the outward 'shapes' and the inward 'souls' are transformed but finally 
'fail' to sustain the love which in its earthly form is an expression of their 
interrelation. The implications of such failure are not pursued here: hence 
the Voice which sings these words remains 1unbewailing 1 • 
For the moment the critical turn of the cycle is delayed. Asia's final 
lyric reaffirms the mutuality of love, telling the previous singer that he is 
the helmsman of the 'enchanted Boat' (II, v, 72) of her soul. But although 
Asia is content to 'float ever--forever' (II, v, 78) upon the waves of the 
other's singing, 'Without a course--without a star' (II, v, 89), her voyage is 
not wholly directionless. In the first stanza her boat is borne downstream 
upon a 'many winding River/ Between mountains, woods, abysses,/ A Paradise of 
wildernesses' to the ocean. In the last she seems to make a return voyage, for 
not only does she travel backwards in time through 'Age', 'Manhood', 'Youth' 
and 'Infancy', but the landscape she ends up in is very like the river where 
she started: 'A Paradise of vaulted bowers/ ••• And watery paths that wind 
between/ Wildernesses calm and green' (II, v, 104-7). The outward and return 
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parts of her voyage are in some sense concurrent: she flees 'Through Death and 
Birth to a diviner day' (II, v, 103) as if crossing both of life's limits at 
the same time. In fact Asia's boat, in sailing from paradise to paradise and 
taking in a 'happy Heaven', 'Elysian garden islets' and 'Realms where the air 
vle breathe is Love 1 (II, v, 87, 91 , 97) on the way, carries her to a 
destination that she never actually leaves. Thus the final lyric of the act 
weds being and becoming, the past, present and future, love as a divine power 
and love as an interactive process as closely as they can be. 
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Act III, viTi tten in the spring of 1819, and Act IV, \ITi tten mainly in the 
autumn, represent t\vo quite different but in some \vays complementary attempts 
to describe the dawn of the Promethean era, and thereby to bring the drama to 
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a close. Act III externalises the transformed world in dramatic blank verse, 
and in language which is essentially allegorical; Act IV, on the other hand, 
attempts its imaginative realisation through a predominantly lyrical and 
symbolic mode. The problem that both acts face, however, is that the 
successful accomplishment of revolution cannot be conceived separately from 
the revolutionary process that brings it about; and this process involves, at 
the rhetorical level, a mutual dependence and frustration of the objective and 
subjective apprehensions of meaning that the two acts respectively exemplify. 
Thus both depictions of the achievement of freedom run counter to the 
dialectical means by which it has been won in the previous two acts. The only 
fitting conclusion to the labours of Prometheus and Asia has already been 
provided in the last scene of Act II, where drama and lyric, allegory and 
symbol, are held in mutually sustaining equipoise. Although Acts III and IV 
are therefore inevitably a cause of weakness and disjunction in the play, they 
are, however, in large part redeemed not only by some of Shelley's very finest 
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poetry but by their own awareness of the difficulties they create and the 
/ 
strategies they adopt to mitigate them. Both resist the closure implied by the 
finality of Jupiter's defeat, and find ways to extend and elaborate the 
interrelational process perfected by Asia in the previous act. 
In Act III one of the main hazards of attempting to describe the attainment 
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of the 'far goal of Time' (III, iv, 174) is that of anticlimax. But here 
Shelley exploits the act's 'rhetoric of temporality' (to use de !{an's 
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phrase) to avoid describing the present instant of mankind's liberation: in 
the first three scenes, before Prometheus has taken up residence in his cave, 
this event still belongs to the future; in the last, it is reported in the 
past tense by the Spirit of the Earth and the Spirit of the Hour. Moreover, 
despite Jupiter's fall, it is admitted that 'Heaven' remains 1unascended 1 
(III, iv, 203). The possibility of anticlimax is further offset by a pervasive 
Shakespearian tone of pathos. At his release, Prometheus expresses no 
exultation but, describing to Asia the life that awaits them in the cave, 
sounds like King Lear speaking to Cordelia as they are led away to captivity, 
and his mingling of joy and sadness is also a prolongation of the emotional 
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tone of Act II: 
And if ye sigh, then I will smile, and thou 
lone, shall chant fragments of sea-music, 
Until I weep, when ye shall smile away 
The tears she brought, which yet were sweet to shed. (III, iii, 26-9) 
The cave is a retreat from the world just as Lear imagines his prison to 
be, but, as Jacobs points out, not only is there a constant exchange between 
its occupants, and a searching 'For hidden thoughts each lovelier than the 
last' (III, iii, 35), like the seeking of images in 'Mont Blanc''s 'cave of 
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the witch Poesy', but they also enjoy an 'unremitting interchange' with the 
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outside uorld. The 'echoes of the human world' come like bees--frequently 
for Shelley the intermediaries between nature and mind; and once again love is 
'Given and returned' (III, iii, 60) between the gods and humankind. The full 
complexity of the interrelationship between inner and outer, the divine and 
the human, is reflected in the following lines: 
And lovely apparitions dim at first, 
Then radiant--as the mind, arising bright 
From the embrace of beauty (whence the forms 
Of which these are the phantoms) casts on them 
The gathered rays which are reality--
Shall visit us, the progeny immortal 
Of Painting, Sculpture and rapt Poesy 
And arts, though unimagined, yet to be. (III, iii, 49-56) 
\ 
The origin of the thought here is Diotima's definition of love as 'the desire 
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of generation in the beautiful' in Plato's Svrnposium. As part of her 
argument about love being a desire for 'something immortal in mortality', she 
explains that souls, like bodieJ, seek an intercourse with beauty from a 
desire of the progeny it \fill bJ.ing forth, and that thus they repeatedly 
I 76 replace the old with the new to \achieve a kind of permanence. Through the 
deliberate ambiguity of his language, however, Shelley once again breaks down 
Plato's hierarchical distinction between the temporal and eternal. The 
ontological status of 'apparitions', 'beauty', 'forms', 'phantoms' and 
' reality ' is undefined , and the \rord ' Of' in line 55 , leaves uncertain whether 
the 1apparitions 1--the 'progeny immortal 1--are the same as or derive from the 
I 
arts of painting, sculpture and poetry. Art, therefore, can be seen not merely 
I 
I 
as a product of but as a component within the mind-beauty interchange--as both 
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reality and image; and the 'gathered rays' cast a supernal light only as they 
also represent the mutual illumination of all the entities involved. 
In another and more ominous way the cave resists the stasis and closure its 
retreat seems to imply. It has at least an implicit identity with Demogorgon's 
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cave and (as Cronin notes) the abyss into which Jupiter is hurled. All are 
volcanic craters which can erupt at any time. Moreover, the volcanic relation 
between Promethean love and Jovian power is underlined yet further by the 
Earth's account of how the cavern's volcanic vapours, which were once 
?? 
inflaming in their effect, have become purifying. Stage directions state 
that the action of Act III Scene iv and of the whole of Act IV, where the 
dawning of the new era is described, takes place with the cave in the 
background. So while the last two acts tend to 'take for granted that the 
ideological battle has been won', as O'Neill puts it, the presence of the cave 
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serves as a reminder of the potential instability of the victory. 
Demogorgon's intervention at the end of the play, which does in fact take the 
form of a volcanic eruption, explicitly warns of the possible recommencement 
of the former cycles of destruction, and asserts the continuing need for the 
moral virtues exercised by Prometheus in Act I. 
Despite the doubts which hang over the Promethean triumph, Act IV does 
successfully provide the kind of ecstatic finale--clearly lacking in Act III--
that the mood of joyous expectation at the end of Act II requires. Moreover, 
in several ways the last act fittingly celebrates the liberation of Prometheus 
as the achievement of a new attitude to change rather than the transcendence 
of change. The flight of the past Hours 'To the dark, to the past, to the 
dead' (IV, 39) and the withdrawal of 'the figured curtain of sleep' (IV, 58) 
from the present Hours are equivalent to the process of forgetting and 
remembering, revoking and restoring, begun by Prometheus and continued by 
Asia. The replacement of the Hours' nostalgic lament for 'the Father of many a 
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cancelled year' (IV, 11) by the Spirits' self-abandonment to time's 'dance and 
song/ By the whirlwind of gladness borne along' (IV, 85) reflects an essential 
aspect of the psychic revolution accomplished in the first two acts. In 
particular, the whirling .dance of the Spirits and Hours, and then of the Earth 
and Moon, reproduces the revolving interrelationship of contrary forces that 
is the impetus of Asia's quest in Act II. 
The pairing of the Moon and Earth, while not exactly parallel to that of 
Prometheus and Asia, nevertheless reproduces several of the interacting 
attributes of mind that they represent. On the one hand, lone's vision of the 
Moon, suggests the faculty of conscious, rational objectivity: its 'dusk aery 
veil' has a distancing effect on the external world of 'hills and woods' (IV, 
211-12), and the child within, gleaming with the white light of reason and 
eternity, wakefully guides its chariot's progress. Panthea's vision of the 
Earth, on the other hand, with its sleeping child, whose murmuring, Ione tells 
us, mocks the harmony of the many-coloured spheres revolving around it, 
suggests the unconscious, subjective imagination, and the principle of energy 
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and change. Linked by forces of attraction and repulsion, the two spheres 
are like 'two runnels of a rivulet/ ••• / Turning their dear disunion to an 
isle/ Of lovely grief' (IV, 196-201)--again combining joy and sadness--and 
eyentually circle around each other in a 'polar Paradise' (IV, 465) of love. 
Just as the two visions emanate from a single source--perhaps reflecting 
Erasmus Darwin's theory that earth and moon were once one planet--so, as Hogle 
points out, Shelley's.descriptions of both of them draw on chariots described 
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by Ezekiel, Dante and Milton. Differences, accordingly, are predicated upon 
certain similarities. The Moon is subject to 1interlunar dreams' (IV, 209) and 
therefore not a figure of complete objectivity and fixity. Its eyes of 'liquid 
darkness' pouring 'fire that is not brightness' (IV, 226, 230)--reminiscent, 
as Grabo notes, of Demogorgon 1s 'mighty Darkness' and 'rays of gloom' (II, iv, 
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2-3)--suggest unknowable volcanic depths which contrast sharply with its cold, 
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white radiance. Conversely, the Spirit of the Earth demonstrates a capacity 
for selfconsciousness when its 'swords of azure fire' (IV, 271)--corresponding 
t 
to the Moon's 'quivering moonbeam' (IV, 231)--'Make bare the secrets of the 
Earth's deep heart' (IV, 279). As an image of mind, the 'self-destroying' (IV, 
249) activity of the concentric spheres (IV, 238) also implies an exercise of 
selfconscious thought as well as unselfconscious feeling. One of the ways in 
which the mind spins with 'self-destroying swiftness' is demonstrated by 
Asia's revolving oscillation between sensation and reflection on her way to 
Demogorgon 1 s cave. But the concentric spheres also recall the lines in 'Mont 
Blanc' where the poet, hovering between trance and wakefulness, asks: 
do I lie 
In dream, and does the mightier world of sleep 
Spread far around and inaccessibly 
Its circles? (54-7) 
These circles too might be regarded as 'self-destroying' in that the interplay 
of objective and subjective faculties produces an ever-expanding and hence 
self-cancelling series of circles in the mind's attempt to grasp the infinite. 
In Prometheus Unbound such 1imagery ••• drawn from the operations of the 
human mind' also draws heavily on the operations of the natural world as these 
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were understood by contemporary science. As in Queen Mab, Erasmus Darwin is 
a primary influence upon Shelley's analogising of the human and natural 
spheres. Both poets, for example, equate human love with the cohesive forces 
of gravitation, electricity and magnetism which bind the elements of the 
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universe. Darwin's description in The Botanic Garden (1789-91) of the newly 
created universe, in which 'Orbs wheel in orbs, round centres centres roll,/ 
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And form, self-balanced, one revolving whole' (I, i, 111-12), is probably a 
source for Panthea's vision of the Earth; and his understanding of the 
circulation of matter, whereby 'Organic forms with chemic changes strive,/ 
Live but to die, and die but to revive' (The Temple of Nature, ii, 41-2), 
seems to inform her description of the revolving and 'self-destroying' 
spheres. As a number of commentators have pointed out, her vision also 
reflects current theories about the constitution of matter, particularly as 
formulated by Sir Humphry Davy, who not only speculates that molecular 
particles perpetually rotate around each other, but argues, like Darwin, that 
through a process of 'solution and consolidation, decay and revolution' matter 
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constantly assumes new forms to maintain a systematic harmony. 
Although reminiscent of Queen Hab in its assumption that nature and mind 
share similar structures, Prometheus Unbound Act 4 shows a much deeper 
understanding of the complexity of the relationship between them. The earlier 
poem's incipient sense that natural processes are not only identical to mental 
ones but also reflect the attracting, repelling, and revolving interaction of 
subject and object is now fully developed. As William H. Hildebrand has 
observed, this interaction bears quite a close resemblance to Coleridge's 'law 
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of polarity', as expounded in Biographia Literaria. Operating throughout the 
realms of nature and mind, this law manifests itself to the transcendental 
philosopher, according to Coleridge, as the counteraction and interpenetration 
of subjective and objective forces, 'the one of which tends to expand 
infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this 
infinity •••• In the existence, in the reconciling, and the recurrence of this 
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contradiction consists the process and mystery of production and life'. In 
an important respect, however, the process dramatised in Prometheus is 
different from the law of polarity as explained in the Biographia. For 
although Shelley's understanding of the interaction of contrary forces is very 
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similar to Coleridge's, he has far less confidence in the stability and 
primacy of the 'tertium aliquid 1 , the 'one power', which is both the product 
of their conjunction and their original union; and in consequence he has a 
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stronger sense of a continuing cyclic and 'self-destroying' process. This 
aspect of Shelley's thought is most clearly demonstrated by the figure of 
Demogorgon, the embodiment of self-destroying power. Born of Jupiter's rape of 
Thetis--a parody of the relationship between Prometheus and Asia--he too is 
the product of two conflicting forces, when 'Two mighty spirits, mingling, 
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made a third/ Mightier than either' (III, i, 43-4). 
Demogorgon is also in a sense the offspring of Prometheus and Asia for it 
is through their endeavours to be reunited that his power is reactivated. 
However, owing to the inevitable tendency of love to become reified as power, 
their reunion also conflicts with the revolutionary principle that Demogorgon 
represents. Therefore, although Act IV is in some ways faithful to the 
dialectical process by which Prometheus is freed, it also evinces tendencies 
that are opposed to it. Most obviously, these are revealed in certain 
expressions of dominance. For example, the Chorus of Spirits of the human 
mind, having joined the Hours in dance, sings a lyric which begins as follows: 
Our spoil is won, 
Our task is done, 
We are free to dive or soar or run ••• 
Beyond and around 
Or within the bound 
Hhich clips the world with darkness round. (IV, 135-40) 
As a celebration of the mind's freedom, these lines are nevertheless also 
expressive of a degree of dominance and transcendence of the external world 
which contradicts the reciprocal relationship between the Spirits and Hours. 
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The first two lines are couched in terms of military triumph. The remaining 
four, as Grabo and Cameron note, reflect Sir William Herschel's theory that 
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th~ universe is finite. Shelley may or may not have known that Herschel had 
abandoned the theory in 1818, but he uses it here as an expression of the 
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mind's capacity to comprehend and consequently transcend the universe. A 
different form of dominance is exercised by the 'multitudinous Orb' (IV, 253), 
which, with something of the destructive power of the 'chariot of Paternal 
Deity' in Paradise Lost (IV, 750), 1knead[s] 1 the phenomenal world outside it 
'into one aerial mass' (IV, 260), just as Jupiter threatens to 'knead' Earth's 
children 'to one void mass' (IV, 342-3). Finally, in the Earth's long speech 
in praise of love the tyranny of love is explicit: it rules 'As the Sun rules, 
even with a tyrant's gaze' (IV, 397); it gives dominion to language over 
thought, and to the human mind over the physical universe. It thus confers the 
same power as Prometheus originally gave to man, enabling him to look 'on his 
creation like a God', but ultimately leaving him the 'wreck of his own will, 
the scorn of Earth' (II, iv, 102-4). 
Hughes considers that Act IV expresses the liberation of mankind from 'the 
91 
ontological tyranny of the phenomenal'. In a similar vein, Hogle suggests 
that the transferential qualities of Panthea's vision of the Earth are 
92 
intended to critique the cold fixities of the Moon. These views are not 
difficult to justify, for clearly the Spirits of the human mind do celebrate 
the power of thought to build a 'new world of man' (IV, 157), and under the 
influence of the Earth the Moon sheds its 'shadow of white Death' (IV, 424) to 
become warm, and put forth green vegetation. Thus the act is consonant with 
the unbinding of Prometheus as an emblem of the mind's dissolution of all 
forms of static, external constraint. Yet it also tacitly gives warning of a 
potential reversion to Jovian rule through the mind's mastery of the external 
world. Such dangers, however, it cannot admit to openly without souring the 
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celebrations of Prometheus's freedom and marriage to Asia. Even Demogorgon, 
who earlier unloosed the 'snake-like Doom coiled underneath his throne' (II, 
iii, 88), now advises that 'the pit over Destruction's strength' should be 
barred and its 'serpent' (IV, 564, 567) contained. In other words, in 
recommending resistance to the cycles of change and the dialectic of subject 
and object which destroy in order to preserve, he opposes the very means by 
which Prometheus has gained his hard-won release. 
The corruption of love into power has its parallel in the figural 
operations of Act IV. Shelley sustains its lyrical symbolic mode through 
dialogue and dance, through a forward cyclic motion that repeatedly breaks up 
and eclipses the tendency of language to harden into allegory. And yet, just 
as the interrelation of subject and object itself becomes an object prior to 
both, and reciprocal love turns into unitary power, so the act of 
representation ultimately gives priority to the objectivity of allegory over 
the subjectivity of symbol. As Ulmer writes, 'whenever these figurative modes 
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occur together (and they always do) allegory necessarily prevails.' The only 
way Shelley knows of defeating this curse is through the poet's committal of 
himself through poetry to some unknown and infinite beyond, whether of 
transcendence or of death and oblivion. Prometheus at the end of Act I and 
Asia at the end of Act II both demonstrate this course, as even more clearly 
-
do the speakers of 'Ode to the West Wind' and Adonais. Such an option, 
however, is not available to Shelley in the final act of Prometheus, where 
J 
apocalypse no longer lies ahead but belongs to the present. The act, it is 
true, does illustrate a recuperative self-immolation: Panthea, for example, 
describes how the inhabitants of Earth were obliterated when 'some God/ Whose 
throne was in a Comet, past, and cried--/ "Be not!"--and like my words they 
were no more' (IV, 316-18), at which point the Earth bursts into song: 'The 
joy, the triumph, the delight, the madness' (IV, 319); and at the final 
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volcanic uprising of Demogorgon, the Earth cries, 'I hear--I am a drop of dew 
that dies!' (IV, 523). Yet Demogorgon's last words do not actually 'waken 
Oblivion' (IV, 543); they pour a little cold water on the celebrations of Act 
IV, but do not commit them to extinction. 
Ultimately the play founders on the sheer difficulty of conceiving a 
political idealism which is thoroughly revolutionary--one, that is, which 
sustains itself by perpetually destroying itself. The conflict between 
Promethean idealism and Promethean resistance to all formulations of the 
ideal--essentially the same conflict of love and defiance that remains 
unresolved in Act I--is both the foundation of the liberation the play 
proclaims, and also its frustration. Only through its own knowledge of its 
inevitable self-defeat can the play, paradoxically, escape that destiny--as 
Prometheus does in Act I--but this knowledge is not consistently applied, 
particularly in the last two acts. The myth of Prometheus's final unchaining 
runs contrary, even while it is necessary, to the notion of freedom as a 
process of continuing struggle, and through its inability openly to admit this 
positive contradiction the play falls into negative contradiction. Yet 
ultimately it is difficult to maintain the distinction between the two, and to 
argue that the play betrays its own fundamental principles. Given its 
commitment to the realization of freedom, both in its own poetry and in the 
world at large, hope must in the end outweigh hope's wreck, which can 
therefore never be total. Even Prometheus towards the close of Act I does not 
wholly despair of human love. The poem's conceptual incoherence is therefore 
inseparable from its redemptive project. Moreover, the play always retains 
some awareness of its contradictions, and to the extent that it does so it 
turns them to creative account. As we have seen, the last two acts do 
implicitly recognize the potentially tyrannous implications of the new dawn 
they dramatise, and through a subtle and sceptical self-awareness at least 
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partially succeed in reclaiming a process of becoming from an assertion of 
being. Thus, if the poem fails to fulfil its highest aspirations, it also 
rescues itself from complete self-defeat. But Shelley never again attempts to 
embody in verse the triumph of revolutionary idealism, and in future tempers 
his optimism to a severer sense of poetic and political possibilities. 
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C h a p t e r 6 
Adonais: 'The Painted Veil' 
That an attitude of sceptical idealism informs Shelley's thinking throughout 
his adult life is nowhere more evident than in the consistency of his attitude 
towards the notion of a life after death. A number of his letters to Elizabeth 
Hitchener in 1811 which touch on this issue show him to be torn between his 
reason and his feelings. In one he says, 'I have considered it in every 
possible light & reason tells me that death is the boundary of the life of 
1 
man. Yet I feel, I believe the direct contrary.' Although Shelley's 
utterances on the subject are not always so even-handed, and in his prose are 
2 
predominantly sceptical, the tension between rational doubt and imaginative 
desire concerning a future state persists through his career, remaining 
essentially unaffected by the different philosophical influences he submits 
to, whether materialist, empirical or Platonic. Thus, almost exactly ten years 
after the letter to Hitchener, he writes in a very similar vein in a note to 
Hellas: 'Until better arguments can be produced than sophisms which disgrace 
the cause, this desire [for immortality] ••• must remain the only presumption 
that eternity is the inheritance of every thinking being' (Hutchinson, pp. 
478-9). 
Adonais, the elegy Shelley wrote for Keats in the summer of 1821, and his 
most extended meditation on the subject of death, presents his opposing views 
in a particularly stark form. The poem, indeed, is structured upon them. The 
first thirty-seven stanzas, drawing on the Greek pastoral elegaic conventions 
of Bion and Hoschus (parts of whose elegies Shelley translated), express grief 
at the finality of Adonais 1s death. The remaining eighteen stanzas, 
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conversely, follow the Christian inheritors of the classical tradition, 
particularly Spenser's 1Astrophel 1 (1586) and Hilton's 1Lycidas 1 (1638), in 
3 
declaring that the departed one 1is not dead 1 • This apparent affirmation of a 
life beyond the grave makes the conclusion of the poem, in Curran's words, 1 in 
4 
some sense the exemplary crux of Shelley's poetry', for it forces the 
question of how we are to interpret his expressions of transcendentalism. 
Until quite recently it was usual to take the poem's Platonic and 
eschatological language at face value. In this tradition of criticism lloodman 
considers that Shelley commits 'psychic suicide' in his pursuit of postmortal 
5 
fulfilment in the poem. Without going so far, Wasserman also offers a dualist 
reading, arguing, despite an awareness of Shelley's deep-seated scepticism, 
that at the end of the poem the mortal principle is breached by a transcendent 
6 
One. Similarly, Leighton, borrowing terms from Derrida and A Defence of 
Poetrv, sees the poem as expressing a dualism of voice and text, composition 
7 
and inspiration. However, for those critics uho consider Shelley to be 
consistently anti-metaphysical, his dualist terminolo~v in Adonais is purely 
figurative. For example, Cameron and Dawson, Hith an emphasis on Shelley's 
social concerns, interpret the poem in moral and psychological terms, ~-1hile 
\vright, Tetreault and Hogle all in various ways find its meaning to be 
8 
constituted of a deconstructive interplay of its metaphors. In this chapter I 
shall attempt to mediate between literal and figurative approaches to 
Shelley's language in Adonais by concentrating on the notion of death in 
Adonais, and on how this in turn depends on its understanding of the relations 
between nature and mind. 
Like Epipsychidion, written earlier the same year, Adonais ends by 
launching the poet forward into an unknO\{TI future. Less obviously than that 
poem it also involves a reconsideration of his past, though a past which is as 
much literary and intellectual as it is personal and emotional. It is as if at 
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this period, when many of his private and political hopes have been 
disappointed, Shelley reassesses former achievements and failures in an 
attempt to recover and redefine a basis for future hope. In Adonais he returns 
particularly to earlier thoughts on death, a subject which has concerned him 
philosophically and poetically, but also more directly through the experience 
of bereavement. The immediate occasion for the poem is not only the death of 
Keats but, as Cameron has made clear, Shelley's bitter quarrel with Robert 
9 
Southey. It is in the context of an assessment of Keats's work and of the 
background to this quarrel, we shall find, that Shelley readdresses a subject 
that has long perplexed him and always unsettled the idealist aspirations of 
his poetry. 
i 
Adonais is first of all Keats but he is also in a sense Shelley himself, 'Who 
in another's fate now wept his own' (300), and in rekindling the dead poet's 
'fading melodies' (16) the poem recalls both Keats's and Shelley's earlier 
10 
poetry, as Abbey observes. Ultimately, the assurance that Adonais lives is 
an assurance that both through their poetry have overcome death. 'The breath 
whose might I have invoked in song' (487) in the last stanza, is the 'breath' 
of Adonais which hitherto the poet has invoked in vain (57, 101, 173, 219, 
450), but it is also a reference to the 'Ode to a Nightingale' (1820), in 
which Keats calls on death to 'Take into the air my quiet breath' (54), and 
11 
(as Bloom points out) to the breath which Shelley invokes in 'Ode to the 
West Wind'. Adonais, Shelley suggests, both draws life from and gives life to 
the two poets' earlier 'fading melodies'. His resuscitation of Keats's poems, 
however, also involves revision. There is, it is true, a sense in which 
Shelley revises all his poetic models, from Bion to Milton, but the nature of 
his response to Keats shows him to be re-engaging with this poet in a 
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particularly careful and critical way. And in doing so he also reconsiders his 
own poems in which he has previously dealt with the subject of death. 
Although in certain poems we find that Keats's view of death is similar to 
Shelley's in Adonais, in others it is almost the reverse, and Shelley's 
comment on these helps to define his own intentions. The main basis of his 
critique is that some of Keats's poems quite deliberately 'adorned and hid the 
coming bulk of death' (18) by using language and imagination to obscure rather 
than to encounter its destructive reality. Thus, in the 10de to a 
Nightingale', the poet is drawn towards another realm of death and 
imagination, but allows himself finally to be tolled back from what he calls 
the 'deceiving elf' (72) of fancy, with the result that his vision 'fades' 
(75). This drawing back to the 'sole self' (72) is the very opposite of the 
poet's self-immolation through poetry at the end of Adonais. It is therefore 
not without significance that in echoing Keats's line, 'I have been half in 
love with easeful Death' (52), Shelley's reference in the Preface to his poem 
to being 'in love with death' omits the 'half'. Keats's Isabella (1820) also 
reveals a fascinated revulsion from death on the part of its narrator, who 
prefers 'The simple plaining of a minstrel's song' to the 'wormy circumstance' 
(385-8) of Lorenzo's death. Shelley therefore uses the heroine's basil growing 
in a pot containing her lover's skull as the source of a simile describing 
Adonais, who was 'Like a pale flower by some sad maiden cherished' (48); from 
which we may infer that, like the basil, Keats adorns and hides but does not 
overcome death. Other such flowers in Adonais are 'Like incarnations of the 
stars' (174), symbols of immortality through their very transience. Likewise, 
the immortality envisaged in Shelley's pastoral elegy could hardly be more 
different from the silent stasis of the urn's 'Cold Pastoral' (45) in Keats's 
'Ode to a Grecian Urn' (1820). 
However, a number of poems by Keats accept submission to death as the means 
200 
to renewed life, and therefore come closer to Shelley's intentions in Adonais. 
They include 'To Autumn' (1820), which suggests a reciprocity between spring 
and autumn, and the 'Ode on Melancholy' (1820), in which melancholy is 
dialectically related to 'Beauty that must die;/ And Joy, whose hand is ever 
at his lips/ Bidding adieu' (21-23). But closer still is Hyperion, the poem 
12 
which Shelley singles out for praise in the Preface to Adonais. In its 
account of the fall of the Titans and the subsequent deification of the young 
Apollo the cycles of death and rebirth are one of its major themes. Oceanus 
advises his fallen fellow gods that they are 'not the beginning and the end' 
and that 'another race may drive/ Our conquerors to mourn as we do now' (II, 
190; 230-1). Of the song Clymene heard prophesying Apollo's succession she 
says 'A living death was in each gush of sounds' (II, 281), and by his 
deification he does as it were 'Die into life' (III, 130). In Adonais, which 
ends with the poet undergoing a comparable process of transformation, there is 
an equally close interrelationship between concepts of living and dying. 
In returning to his own earlier poetry, Shelley readdresses a problem which 
he defines in Alaster and has subsequently been unable to resolve 
satisfactorily. In that poem the death of the protagonist, who is recalled by 
the portrait of the 'frail Form' (271) in Adonais, holds no promise of renewed 
life. Moreover, his death is emblematic of the fruitless death which poetry 
itself suffers in failing to recall the unity of its origin. Although in 
Prometheus Unbound Shelley elaborates a dialectical process of thought by 
which the recovery of hope is predicated upon its loss, there is a limit to 
how far the poem pursues its own logic. In particular, it fails to encompass 
within that logic the ultimate loss of death. It does so firstly in the sense 
that in Act III the Promethean revolution has no answer to 'chance and death 
and mutability' (II, iv, 201) in the human sphere, thus allowing a rift to 
open between immortal mind and mortal nature. Secondly, in Act IV, as we have 
201 
seen, the drama is ultimately unwilling to contemplate its own death, and the 
abandonment of the unity, symbolized by the reunion of Prometheus and Asia, on 
which its optimism rests. The play thus also adorns and hides death. But while 
in both Alastor and Prometheus death functions as a cause or emblem of 
disunity, the two poems also suggest that death can represent a form of unity. 
In Alastor the Poet seeks nature's 'cradle, and his sepulchre' (430) in / 
pursuit of the unified origin he has lost, and, according to the Earth in 
Prometheus Unbound, death unites the 'two worlds of life and death' (I, 195). 
In Adonais Shelley corrects both the failure of hope in the earlier poem and 
the uncertain basis of hope in the later; and he does so by juxtaposing the 
contrasting conceptions of disunitive death-in-life and unitive life-in-death 
in such a way as to address the meaning of death more directly than he has 
ever done previously. 
ii 
The relation between the different conceptions of life and death in Adonais 
has a significant connection with another aspect of Shelley's retrospection in 
the poem--that which concerns his earlier relations with Southey. An early 
draft of the Preface mentions Southey by name as the critic whose harsh 
criticism caused Keats's death, though whether Shelley truly believed Southey 
13 
to be responsible may be in doubt. Cameron has argued at length that the 
poem is addressed quite specifically to Southey, first as an attack on his 
political volte-face and his religion, and second as a response to his 
accusations, made the previous year in the course of a particularly rancorous 
14 
correspondence, about Shelley's treatment of his first wife, Harriet. While 
Cameron may overstate the importance of Southey as the poem's addressee, it is 
arguable that Shelley's earlier dealings with him have an even broader 
relevance to Adonais than Cameron describes. 
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There are two periods prior to their quarrel by correspondence in 1820 when 
•, 
Shelley's career intersected with Southey's. The first of these occurred in 
the winter of 1811 and 1812, when Shelley visited Southey in Keswick and had a 
number of conversations with him. The second followed the publication in 1817 
of Shelley 1 s Proposal for Putting Reform to the Vote, vrhich Southey revievred, 
attacking its author on both political and personal grounds, and causing a 
resentment in Shelley which, as Cameron relates, became almost obsessive and 
led him to assume Southey to be the author of other anonymous hostile 
15 
reviews. These two periods happen to be associated with the inception or 
composition of Shelley's two most Southeyan poems: Queen Hab, begun in 1812, 
and The Revolt of Islam, 1vritten in 1817. The verse form of the former, the 
narrative structure of the latter, and the use of supernatural machinery in 
both clearly owe much to the writer of Thalaba the Destrover (1801) and The 
Curse of Kehama ( 1810). At the same time, however, Shelley 1 s tv10 poems are 
direct assaults on the political and religious views of which he regarded 
Southey to be one of the prime representatives. In attacking Southey more 
personally in Adonais, Shelley also looks back on the periods during which the 
earlier ti-10 poems 1-1ere 1-~ri tten to re-examine metaphysical ideas concerning 
death with which he had then been preoccupied and had in part defined in 
response to Southey. 
As Queen f.iab shows, one of the spurs to Shelley's philosophical 
speculations at the time it was written was a concern about the possibility of 
an afterlife. This is also a recurring topic in his letters to Hogg and 
Hitchener in 1811-12. Hriting to Hogg on 3 January 1811, he postulates the 
existence of a universal mind of which each individual is a part, and without 
which 'the strongest argument in support of the existence of a future state 
instantly becomes annihilated' (Jones, I, 35). Yet even in 1811 Shelley is 
conscious that such a belief tends to dualism, for in the same letter he 
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writes, 1 but can vle suppose this rev1ard will arise spontaneously ••• without a 
cause, a First Cause, a God ••• ?' (Jones, I, 35). In a letter to Hitchener of 
20 June 1811, he tries very hard to reconcile hope in an afterlife with a 
materialist philosophy: 
one of the properties of animal soul is consciousness of identity--if 
this is destroyed, in consequence the soul whose essence this is, must 
perish; but as I conceive, & as is certainly capable of demonstration 
that nothing can be annihilated, but that everything appertaining to 
nature, consisting of constituent parts infinitely divisible, is in 
continual change, then do I suppose, & I think I have a right to draw 
this inference, that neither \!ill soul perish; that in a future state it 
will lose all consciousness of having formerly lived elsewhere, will 
begin life anew, possibly under a shape of which we have no idea •••• I 
flatter myself that I have kept clear of supposition-- (Jones, I, 110) 
Here Shelley attempts to combine a natural and cyclical idea of death, which 
involves the loss of conscious identity, with the 'supposition' (which he 
clearly suspects it must be) that the individual soul survives. This view of 
life as infinite animation may obviate the need for a first cause but in doing 
so it radically alters the nature of a possible afterlife, which can only be 
considered to exist within the natural world. Such questions were the subject 
of his talks with Southey at Keswick, according to Shelley's letter to 
Hitchener on 2 January 1812: 
I tell him I believe that God is another signification for the 
Universe.--I then explain--'I think reason and analogy seem to 
countenance the opinion that life is infinite ••• that every thing is 
animation ••• and in consequence being infinite we can never arrive at its 
termination. How, on this hypothesis are we to arrive at a first cause? 
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--Southey admits and believes this.--Can he be a Christian? Can God be 
three; Southey agrees in my idea of Deity, the mass of infinite 
intelligence. I, you, & he are constituent parts of this immeasurable 
whole. (Jones, I, 215). 
Southey's account of their conversations is, needless to say, rather 
different. Of Shelley he \·Trites, 'At present he has got to the Pantheistic 
stage of philosophy, and, in the course of a week, I expect he Hill be a 
Berkeleyan, for I have put him upon a course of Berkeley' (Jones, I, 219 n.). 
This remark, though patronising, is an accurate indication of the -..my in -..rhich 
Shelley is pulled bet-..reen monistic and dualistic views of the world. He 
recognizes that the soul must perish without its 'consciousness of identity', 
but continues to hope that the human mind Hill be renewed like the rest of 
nature; and although he aclmovlledges that a future state requires a 
transcendent God, he tries to avoid such a belief through an idea of infinite 
animation. 
As if in Adonais Shelley 1vere resur:J.ing the debate he held vrith Southey ten 
years previously, he addresses the same issues concerning death and the 
relationship of mind and nature. In the poem he proposes various conceptions 
of postmortality which reflect the very same ambiguities that he shOHS in the 
early letters. First, the poet laments that, w·hile nature renews itself 
cyclically, Adonai s 1 will a vrake no more 1 ( 90) • H ext He are told that 'He is 
made one -..rith Hature 1 of Hhich he has become a 'portion' contributing to its 
'successions' of change (370-383). Finally, he is located in 'Heaven,/ ••• the 
abode Hhere the Eternal are' (493-95). These three conceptions of death also 
correspond, if in a slightly different order, to the three movements ;rhich 
Wasserman identifies in the poem, each of \oJhich proposes a hypothesis 
concerning nature and death which supersedes that of the immediately preceding 
movement. Thus, in his view, the first movement (sts. 1-17) implies a 
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'materialistic monism' in which 'everything is nature, man as well as other 
forms of organized matter, and that all nature moves in time to its own 
annihilation'; the second (sts. 18-37) distinguishes between physical nature, 
which renews itself cyclically, and the human mind, which dies once and for 
all; and the third (sts. 38-55), in which Shelley's scepticism evolves 'into a 
kind of poetics of assertion', postulates the eternal survival of spirit after 
16 
death in a realm transcending nature. Although these are useful distinctions 
which can be discerned in the poem, they are not as sharply defined as 
Wasserman suggests, and nor is there a clear linear development by Hhich the 
poem shifts from one to another. From the very beginning, for example, a 
future existence is envisaged for Adonais. In the first stanza we read that 
his 'fate and fame shall be/ An echo and a light unto eternity!' (8-9), and, 
in stanza 7, that he 'bought, with price of purest breath,/ A grave among the 
eternal' (57-8). Conversely, in the final section of the poem there are traces 
of monism in the centre and circumference metaphor (418-20), and, as we have 
seen, in the idea that Adonais 'is made one with Nature'. Horeover, 
1:lasserman 1 s argument that the recurrent images in the poem, such as those 
involving flowers and stars, are successively reinterpreted to show how their 
values are revised, can easily be reversed to demonstrate that these motifs 
17 
point up connections rather than differences. 
Although there is no clear development in the poem's philosophical 
understanding of death, there is a decisive change in the speaker's attitude 
towards it. The catalyst of this change is the curse delivered in stanza 37 
against the revie\ver, assumed to be Southey, lvho was supposedly responsible 
for Keats's death. This curse leads us to a consideration of the second 
previous period of Shelley's dealings with Southey. In 1817 his preoccupation 
with the subject of death had gained a new impetus as a result of the suicides 
of Fanny Godwin and Harriet Shelley in October and November respectively of 
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the previous year. To judge by a number of short poems and fragments written 
18 
about this time Shelley felt some responsibility for both of these deaths. 
Southey's attack on what he calls Shelley's 'act of moral suicide' in the 
review of 1817, and his more explicit accusation in the correspondence of 1820 
that Shelley had caused his first wife's death, are therefore likely to have 
19 
been particularly wounding. In Adonais, consequently, it is hardly 
coincidental that in charging Southey with the death of Keats he echoes 
Southey's charge against himself regarding the death of Harriet Shelley, and 
that the 'Remorse', 'Self-contempt' and 'Shame' (331-2) that Shelley wishes 
upon Southey are comparable to what Southey urged on him. These similarities 
are confirmed by the fact that it is not only the hostile critic, Southey, who 
is likened to Cain, but also the 'frail Form', Shelley's self-representation, 
whose 'branded and ensanguined brow,/ ••• was like Cain's or Christ's' (305-6). 
The reference to Christ is a further reference to their quarrel, for it was 
partly with their rival views of Christianity that they belaboured each other 
in their letters of 1820. The curse also links the two poets: its injunction, 
'Live:!~ fear no heavier chastisement from me' (326), recalls the curse laid on 
Ladurlad in Southey's The Curse of Kehama (1810), as well as that pronounced 
on Ahasuerus, who in other poems by Shelley has affinities with both Cain and 
20 
Christ. 
The most important precedent for the curse, however, is in Prometheus 
Unbound, where, again, it draws attention to the close relationship between 
good and evil, the cursed and the cursing. In both poems it is the occasion 
for contri~ion as well as vituperation, and the poet's admission in Adonais 
that 'we keep/ With phantoms an unprofitable strife' (345-46) is comparable to 
21 
Prometheus's retraction of his curse. Moreover, the self-knowledge which the 
two speakers gain through their curse is the means by which a backward-looking 
regret is eventually replaced by forward-looking desire, and a resistance to 
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change by a willing submission to it. Thus the poet in Adonais achieves a 
suddenly altered perception of death. Adonais 'is not dead', he realizes, 'tis 
Death is dead, not he' (342, 361). As a consequence of his recognition of the 
futility of his curse, death as a remote, inexorable otherness is in effect 
dethroned and seen instead as belonging to the realm of the living: 'We decay/ 
Like corpses in a charnel' (348-9). Yet, although this realization marks the 
point at which the poet overcomes his grief and fear of death, it represents 
no simple philosophical reversal. The same ambiguity as to whether death 
belongs inside or outside nature continues, and the poem ends with the poet 
seeking the very death whose defeat he just announced. Shelley, in fact, 
apparently remains in the same uncertainty regarding the nature of death as he 
was at the time of his acquaintance with Southey in 1811-12. 
iii 
The poem's view of death is crucial to the question of how we are to 
understand its expressions of transcendentalism. For, clearly, only if death 
is conceived as having a reality beyond nature can the notion of an eternal 
'One' which is experienced in death have anything more than a figurative 
value. A prima facie reason for rejecting a dualist interpretation of the poem 
is that it flies in the face of all we know of his sceptical resistance to 
ideas of transcendence. As Cameron bluntly says of the famous stanza 52, 
'Shelley could not have been referring to the Platonic "One" or to a 
supernatural "Heaven" or "eternity", because he had no belief in any of 
22 
them'. Shelley's own remark in a letter to Horace Smith that 'I am glad you 
like 'Adonais', and, particularly that you do not find it metaphysical, which 
I was afraid it was', would seem to confirm Cameron's opinion, while 
23 
recognizing that the poem might be open to misunderstanding. He makes the 
same point in writing to John and Maria Gisborne during the course of 
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composition: 'very few persons ••• will ••• understand it.--It is a highly wrought 
24 
piece of art'. This is an apt description of the poem, which is indeed 
remarkable for the control and complexity with which it manipulates its 
models, imagery and ideas. Moreover, Shelley appears to be emphasizing that, 
far from being an expression of the inadequacy of language to reflect 
'Heaven's light' (461), the poem represents an increased commitment to his 
art. 
Yet there are objections to an insistence on the total metaphoricity of all 
the poem's expressions of transcendence. What above all makes such a reading 
problematic is the manner in which a Platonic or Christian dualism i~ closely 
linked--to the point of being identified--with an irreducible opposition in 
the poem be~ween life and death. This distinction critics like Tetreault and 
Hogle seek to elide by arguing that there is no otherness beyond language and 
life, though they do so at the cost of a certain inconsistency. Thus, while 
arguing that the poem seeks no reality beyond the play of its own signifiers, 
Tetreault nevertheless finds it fundamentally flawed by a 'total blindness to 
the autonomy of literary language' and an assumption that the potential of 
25 
poetry depends on the presence of the poet. Hogle, who believes Shelley's 
10ne 1 is not the centred concept it seems but rather metaphorical 
transference, appears to acknowledge that the idea of death is both necessary 
to transference and an example of it when he says, 'an image is a death, the 
26 
disappearance of its referent, quite as much as death is always an image'. 
However, by privileging the transferential image in his interpretation of the 
poem he disregards this equivalence and consequently fails to recognize that 
death is more than metaphor just as transference involves more than loss. For 
the post-structuralist critic, the demise of the authorial poet may hold no 
terrors. If at the end of Adonais Shelley overcomes his own fears, the reasons 
for his reassurance are somewhat different, for death and the poet remain for 
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him realities beyond the text. This is not, however, to say that he relies on 
the notion of a self-subsisting originary presence. Rather, we find that he 
conceives of life and death, poem and poet as linked together in a dynamic and 
complex mutual dependence. 
One manifestation of this duality is that the poem is conceived as an 
intricate blend of reality and fiction. In this respect Shelley is to a 
certain extent only following a pastoral elegiac tradition of using certain 
stylized conventions not only to lament the death of an actual person but to 
mask a personal utterance of the poet. But he exploits this characteristic of 
the genre in such a way as both to emphasize and confuse the differences 
between the real and the fictive. He links the poem firmly to external time 
and place with references not only to the circumstances of Keats's death, but 
to his own griefs and disappointments, to his dispute with Southey, and to the 
living people who are portrayed in the poem as mourners, and he uses the 
Preface to elaborate further on the occasion of the poem's composition. 
Consequently, when the poem begins 'I weep for Adonais--he is dead', which is 
a close transliteration of the first line of Bion's 'Lament for Adonis', an 
immediate tension is felt between the fictive and the real identities of 
mourner and mourned. This ambiguity between the extra-textual and the textual 
is maintained throughout the poem, and relates directly to the uncertain 
metaphoricity of its transcendental language. Thus the allusion in stanza 51 
to the fresh graves of Keats and Shelley's son William in the Protestant 
Cemetery in Rome involves the poem in a complex interplay between these real 
mortalities outside the poem and the immortality of Adonais within it, and 
between the sentiments of the actual Shelley and those of his poem's speaker. 
While introducing such personal references Shelley also, as various critics 
have noted, draws attention to the artifice and conventionality of its own 
27 
metaphors. The disjunction of which Samuel Johnson complains, in writing 
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about 'Lycidas', between the standard formulas of elegy and the spontaneous 
expression of grief is used by Shelley to emphasize the failure of poetry to 
28 
bring the dead back to life or to recover a lost unity of meaning. His 
style-- 1the high, marmoreal style of a public monument', as Richard Holmes 
29 
calls it --is conspicuously poetic, and rife with echoes of others' poetry as 
well as his own. The 'Dreams' and 'Splendours', respectively recalling Keats 
and Dante, and other elaborate personifications of poetry fail to revive 
Adonais, and fade away without him, while Urania, Milton's muse, can produce 
30 
in his dead body only a fleeting illusion of life. The failure of Echo to 
reverberate 'amid the voiceless mountains' (127) recalls Prometheus Unbound 
Act I, where the elements refuse to repeat the Titan's curse, but in this 
context it is also a rather worn and self-conscious poeticism from the 
pastoral elegiac tradition, as also are nature's lament for the dead poet, and 
the contrast of its seasonal renewal with his irreversible death. 
An important aspect of all these well-used images, however, is that, as 
Hogle recognizes, they themselves have suffered a death, and thus become the 
cold memorials of a life as much as the mourning survivors of a death. In 
stanza 39 the poet's realization that this is so, that it is not Adonais but 
the living who experience death, causes him to turn from a lamentation to a 
celebration of death. Yet death is never wholly subsumed by life in the poem. 
Instead, leaving Greek pastoral conventions behind, the poem proceeds to 
explore a number of different formulations of immortality and of the 
relationship between life and death. In doing so it makes use of an intrinsic 
ambiguity in the term death, which can imply both the experience or process of 
dying and the state of being dead or the realm which the dead inhabit. These 
two quite different aspects of death, one of which is known to the living and 
belongs within nature while the other does not, are from now on in the poem 
variously conceived as converging, separating and becoming interchangeable. 
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Something of the complexity of the poem's view of death and afterlife is 
suggested by the name Adonais, which, as Wasserman and Hogle have shown, is a 
31 
formation from different Greek and possibly Hebrew words. Adonis, whose name 
is the main root of Shelley's title, is associated with a purely natural view 
of death, whether he is considered as the subject of Bien's lament, or whether 
his myth is seen (as it was by Erasmus Darwin and various contemporary 
32 
mythographers) as a symbol of nature's powers of self-regeneration. To 
explain the additional 1a 1 in the name, Wasserman suggests that Shelley is 
referring to the term 'Adonai', which is an alternative to Adonis, but 
carries, he argues, connotations of lordship and godhead appropriate to the 
immortalization of the deceased poet. Hogle believes that Shelley is also 
thinking of the 1Adonias 1 , Greek mourning ceremonies or festivals devoted to 
the slain Adonis, a reference which he thinks accords with the poem's view of 
death as a metaphorical memorialization rather than an objective reality. 
These suggested sources and their meanings for Shelley are somewhat 
speculative, but, taken together, they do indicate some important ways in 
which he conceives of death in Adonais. Death has both a natural and a 
supernatural aspect, is both a process and a state. Moreover, in each of these 
senses death can serve as a metaphor for the other, resulting in a constant 
uncertainty as to which is the image and which the reality. 
iv 
Some of the tensions between concepts of life and death are clearly revealed 
in stanza 47. Here the poet sets out to argue that, because life and death are 
one, Adonais must be considered as inhabiting the same realm as the living, 
yet his words tend to the contrary effect: 
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Who mourns fop Adonais? oh come forth 
Fond wretch'Oand know thyself and him aright. 
Clasp with thy panting soul the pendulous Earth; 
As from a centre, dart thy spirit's light 
Beyond all worlds, until its spacious might 
Satiate the void circumference: then shrink 
Even to a point within our day and night; 
And keep thy heart light lest it make thee sink 
When hope has kindled hope, and lured thee to the brink. (415-23) 
The poet tells the mourner that he can know himself and the dead Adonais in 
the same way, for both the living and the dead are included within the 
circumference of knowledge which is life. In contrast with the centre, which, 
as in the Ptolemaic scheme, is here identified with the Earth, the 
circumference is dark (needing to be lit by 'thy spirit's light'), 'beyond all 
worlds' and 1void 1 , and thus includes death in its embrace. Yet the light of 
life cannot entirely banish the darkness, for although it may fill the void, 
the darkness of death is still present within the alternation of 'day and 
night', a phrase suggestive of the cycles of life and death within time. Thus 
the centre-circumference image of unity is, as ever, riven with duality. But 
not only is it divided within, but the circle is not all-embracing either: 
once the 'void circumference' is satiated with light, death it would seem 
still lies beyond its ambit, beyond the 'brink' to which the 'kindled hope' of 
unity inevitably leads. This stanza echoes a stanza from Byron's Childe 
Harold's Pilgrimage (III, xiv), which ends with the lines, 
this clay will sink 
[The spirit's] spark immortal, envying it the light 
To which it mounts as if to break the link 
That keeps us from yon heaven which woos us to its brink. (123-6). 
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At first Shelley seems to revise Byron's dualism, and yet the final effect of 
his stanza is to confirm it. 
A further insight into stanza 47 and the relationship of life and death in 
the poem is offered by 'On Life'. Here Shelley explains that the reason he 
abandoned his early materialism i·laS that he realized it Has incompatible '<lith 
a hope in a future life: 
I was discontented with such a view of things as it afforded; man is a 
being of high aspirations 'looking both before and after,' whose 
1 thoughts that ivander through eternity, 1 disclaim alliance with 
transience and decay, incapable of imagining to himself annihilation, 
existing but in the future and in the past, being, not what he is, but 
ivha t he has been, and shall be. Hha tever may be his true and final 
destination, there is a spirit id thin him at enmity i·Ti th nothingness and 
dissolution (change and extinction). This is the character of all life 
and being.--Each is at once the centre and the circumference; the point 
to which all things are referred, and the line in which all things are 
contained.--Such contemplations as these materialism and the popular 
philosophy of mind and matter, alike forbid; they are consistent only 
with the intellectual system. (R&P, p. 476) 
Shelley's claim that the 'intellectual system' is 'consistent' with a desire 
for immortality is a startling one--and for two reasons. First, Sir Hilliam 
Drummond's Academical Questions, from which this system derives, can hardly be 
said to 'conduct inevitably' (R&P, p. 477) to such a conclusion, as Shelley 
asserts, even though it does not absolutely 'deny the existence of divine and 
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intelligible ideas'. Secondly, Shelley's suggestion that the hope of 
immortality might have a philosophical basis is quite exceptional in his 
mature prose. It is unfortunate, and perhaps detracts from the high claims he 
makes for his new philosophy, that in the rest of the essay he makes little 
attempt to explain how the 'intellectual system' satisfies the 'high 
aspirations' that he speaks of. Nevertheless, from what the essay does say it 
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is possible to make some deductions about the way Shelley envisaged his 
concept of life to embrace even death. 
Implicit in the essay are three distinct ways of conceiving 'life'. First, 
it is synonymous with nature, the world outside mind, such as Shelley imagines 
an artist creating 'in words or upon canvas'; second, it is the subjective 
unity of nature and mind, experienced in 'the state called reverie'; and 
third, it is a projection of that unity, or the 'one mind' of which individual 
minds are only 'modifications' or 'portions' (R&P, p. 474-78). The~e 
distinctions correspond closely to the different views of the relationship 
between·nature and mind and the associated conceptions of life and death to be 
found in Adonais. These, as we have seen, are, first, a mind-nature dualism in 
which nature perpetually renews itself while mind does not; second, a unity of 
nature and mind, in which life and death converge, and Adonais is 'made one 
with Nature'; and third, a transcendental projection of this immortal unity 
beyond the realm of nature. What is revealed by a comparison of these 
different metaphysical positions in Adonais with the essay's corresponding 
conceptions of life is that the latter can equally be regarded as definitions 
of death. 'On Life' does therefore implicitly include death within its 
definition of life, and so offer some security against 'nothingness and 
dissolution'. Similarly, when the Earth in Prometheus Unbound says, 'Death is 
the veil which those who live call life' (III, iii, 113), it remains wholly 
ambiguous in which of. their various senses the words life and death are used, 
but again the two are identified. 
The cardinal concept in both 'On Life' and Adonais is that of unity, which 
both represent as a circle with mind as its centre and nature as its 
circumference. The two works also imply that this circle embraces both life 
and death as well. However, they both show a recognition that this notion of 
unity is ultimately beyond knowledge and expression. 'It is well', Shelley 
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writes in 'On Life', 'that we are ••• shielded by the familiarity of what is at 
once so certain and so unfathomable from an astonishment which would otherwise 
absorb and overawe the functions of that which is [its] object' (R&P, p. 475). 
Unconsciousness, even death, he seems to be saying, would be the paradoxical 
accompaniment of a full apprehension of the unity of life. Thus the 
'intellectual philosophy' leads to 'that verge where words abandon us and ••• we 
grow dizzy to look down the dark abyss of--how little we know' (R&P, p. 478). 
Similarly, in stanza 47 of Adonais, he· speaks of the 'brink' to which one is 
lured when 'hope has kindled hope' (423)--by which we can interpret him to 
mean that any hope of conceiving an all-inclusive unity is ultimately defeated 
by the unknowable otherness of death. 
The idea of unity is therefore inherently unstable, and without ever being 
fully comprehended, serves as a transition between a dualism of subject and 
object and an ontological dualism of an eternal oneness and a temporal many. 
In Adonais the unitive awareness is not subjectively conveyed as a visionary 
experience as it is, for example, in the description of the dream of the 
'veiled maid' in Alaster, or in the poet's apprehension of 'Power' in 'Mont 
Blanc 11 s Ravine of Arve. Instead, like 'On Life', the poem describes it 
objectively, and thus emphasizes its character as incomplete and transitional 
rather than culminatory and epiphanic. Hence the description of Adonais's 
oneness with nature in stanzas 42 and 43, like the centre and circumference 
image in stanza 47, is as suggestive of duality as it is of unity: 
He is made one with Nature: there is heard 
His voice in all her music, from the moan 
Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird; 
He is a presence to be felt and known 
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone, 
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move 
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Which has withdrawn his being to its own; 
Which wields the world with never wearied love, 
Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above. 
He is a portion of the loveliness 
Which once he made more lovely: he doth bear 
His part, while the one Spirit's plastic stress 
Sweeps through the dull dense world, compelling there, 
All new successions to the forms they wear; 
Torturing th'unwilling dross that checks its flight 
To its own likeness, as each mass may bear; 
And bursting in its beauty and its might 
From trees and beasts and men into the Heaven's light. (370-387) 
As in Queen Mab, 'Power' and 'Spirit' hover between personified abstraction 
and pantheistic identity with nature, though 'Power' is located primarily 
'beneath' and 'above' the natural world, recalling the remote power of 'Mont 
Blanc', whereas the 'Spirit', like the immanent 'Spirit of Beauty' in 'Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty', operates dynamically 'through' nature. The two stanzas 
are primarily an expression of the interaction between these notions of the 
here and the beyond, and between various other contraries with which they 
correspond--above all between the rival conceptions of death as metaphor and 
as reality, as a living process and as a hidden but destructive power. The 
'one Spirit's plastic stress' is therefore a revision of Coleridge's 'Plastic 
and vast, one intellectual breeze' in 'The Eolian Harp' (written in 1795): 
while Shelley does not wholly dispense with the transcendental oneness that 
this phrase represents, he sets it in dialectical opposition to the 'organic 
harps ••• of animated nature' (44-45) in Coleridge's poem and to the 'trees and 
beasts and men' (387) in his own. The 'Spirit' may torture 1th 1unwilling 
dross ••• /To its own likeness', but only through this likeness does it acquire 
'its beauty and its might' (381-86). And between the dead poet and the living 
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world there is a similar interdependence, for Adonais 'is a portion of the 
loveliness/ ~fuich once he made more lovely'. We are reminded here of Keats's 
10de 1 (1820), which begins and ends with the refrain, 
Bards of Passion and of ~firth, 
Ye have left your souls on earth! 
Have ye souls in heaven too, 
Double lived in regions new? 
Like Adonais, 'the souls ye left behind you/ Teach us here the way to find 
you' (25-26) through nature's 'voices thund'rous' (8) and the nightingale's 
song. Shelley, however, more anxious than Keats to close the gap between life 
and death, past reality and present image, finds a more intricate connection 
' between the departed poet and his 'fading melodies'. 
It is in the light of this interaction between the poem's various 
conceptualizations of life-in-death and death-in-life that we should see the 
poet's desire for death in the final stanzas. In stanza 47 the focus of 
attention shifts away from Adonais to the mourner, assumed at first to be the 
reader, but turning out in stanza 51 to be mainly the poet himself. It is a 
shift, in other words, from objectivity to subjectivity, a shrinking 'to a 
point within our day and night', which leads to Rome, to the Protestant 
Cemetery, and finally to the graves of Keats and William Shelley. In each of 
these locations new life springs out of death--in the vegetation clothing the 
wrecks of Rome, the flowers in the graveyard, and the 'grey walls' mouldering 
like 'slow fire upon a hoary brand' (442-43); and in contemplating the graves 
the poet begins to wish for his own death and resurrection: 'What Adonais is, 
why fear we to become?' (459). It might seem inconsistent that he should want 
to join Adonais in death, having just declared that 'Death is dead' and argued 
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so forcibly that the exemplary dead survive among the living. But from a 
subjective point of view the logic of his argument does require that he, like 
nature, poetry and Adonais, should die in order to live, and die by submitting 
to the oneness that lies always beyond the circles and cycles of 
consciousness. Stanza 52, which some have found incongruous on account of its 
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Platonic and Christian terminology, is in fact perfectly accordant with this 
developing train of thought: 
The One remains, the many change and pass; 
Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly; 
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, 
Stains the white radiance of Eternity, 
Until Death tramples it to fragments.--Die, 
If thou wouldst be with that which thou dost seek! 
Follow where all has fled!--Rome's azure sky, 
Flowers, ruins, statues, music, words, are weak 
The glory they transfuse with fitting truth to speak. (460-8) 
There are two manifestations of death in this stanza, one operating within 
life~- 1 the many change and pass', 'Earth's shadows fly', the other destroying 
life, trampling it to fragments; and the same two are found in the line 'No 
more let Life divide what Death can join together' (477), where what 'Death' 
unites is life and death, in the same way that it unites the 'two worlds of 
life and death' in Prometheus Unbound Act 1. One thread of the poem's logic 
therefore demands that it now dismiss its own weak metaphors, along with all 
nature and art, as inadequate expressions of that oneness beyond the grave and 
beyond the text whose loss has been the subject of mourning from the poem's 
beginning. The poet accordingly urges himself on to share the fate of those 
whose graves he has mentioned: 'vfuy linger, why turn back, why shrink, my 
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Heart?' (469). This line recalls but also reverses the import of Keats's 'Why 
1 linger at the yawning tomb so long?' in Isabella, and thus rejects the 
narrator's preference in this poem for the anodyne 'simple plaining of a 
minstrel's song' to the 'wormy circumstance' of death (385-88)--for, in other 
words, the metaphors of poetry to the reality beyond it. 
Yet Spelley's dying into life at the end of Adonais is a more complex 
process than this apparent rejection of the world of appearances implies. For 
while in one sense the death and rebirth he invokes await him beyond language 
and life, beaconing from afar like the soul of Adonais, in another they are 
experienced metaphorically within the text. 'Love', he says, 'now beams on 
me,/ Consuming the last clouds of cold mortality'·, resulting in his 
inspiration by the 'breath whose might I have invoked in song' (481-87). In 
the last four stanzas these alternative ideas of life-in-death and death-in-
life are held in dialectical equipoise. Stanza 52 in various ways disrupts its 
overt dualism and its identification of death with oneness and of life with 
the many. The 'dome' of life, though 'many-coloured', is also a kind of unity, 
which death fragments, and it 'Stains' the otherwise invisibls 'white radiance 
I 
of Eternity', just as 'Rome's azure sky,/ Flowers, ruins, statues, music, 
words ••• transfuse' a glory even though they cannot fittingly speak it. The 
stanza thus implicitly questions the idea of death as a unified origin and 
end. At the same time, the poet repeatedly addresses himself, in this stanza 
and the next, in the second person, as if he himself were divided between 
selves which pull in different directions. Indeed, the tension between the 
subject-self seeking unity and the object-self resisting it is directly 
related to the parallel polarities of the many and the one, and of life and 
death. The outer world 'Attracts to crush, repels to make thee wither' (472-
4), tending at once towards unity and separation, towards annihilation and 
alienation of the self. In stanza 54 the 'Light' 'Beauty', 'Benediction' and 
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'Love' which shine on the world are, like the 'Power' and 'Spirit' earlier, 
both within and without, lighting and lit by, the physical universe. The 
'shore' the poet leaves behind in the final stanza may, as Leighton suggests, 
represent 'both his life and his poem, both of which must be ended if he is to 
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reach "Eternity" 1 , but he also relies on the 1 breath 1 , the 1 bark 1 , and the 
'tempest' (487-90)--all emblems of poetry and life--to take him there. Thus, 
if there is a strain of morbid self-destructiveness at the end of Adonais, it 
is turned to creative hope, and the poem successfully marries 'exultation and 
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horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change'. 
Shortly after its completion Shelley writes of Adonais that it is 'perhaps 
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the least imperfect of my compositions'. One might speculate about which 
specific imperfections of his earlier poems he has in mind, but it is possible 
that he refers to a failure of integrity and coherence, particularly in the 
longer poems of idealist optimism such as The Revolt of Islam and Prometheus 
Unbound. Despite the contradictory twists and turns of its thought, and its 
sudden departure from its pastoral elegiac models after the utterance of the 
curse, Adonais achieves an uncharacteristic compositional unity. Yet this 
unity is not the expression of closure, of a claim to unity of meaning. On the 
contrary, unlike the Revolt and Prometheus, which do attempt to embody as well 
as to predict the achievement of perfection in the reunion of their 
protagonists, Shelley's elegy expressly defers the experience of oneness to a 
point beyond the end of the poem and the end of life. On the other hand, its 
poetic synthesis is not founded on a Platonic otherworldliness either, as 
38 
Edwin B. Silverman has thought. Rather, like Asia in the final scene of 
Prometheus Unbound Act 2, Shelley in Adonais achieves a perfect balance 
between future hope and present realization, and between power, which is 
remote, and spirit, which is its manifestation as continual process in the 
present. Through the mutual denial and affirmation of these contraries the 
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poem bursts beyond the closure that each i~plies. Its final abandonment of all 
assertions about death make it the supreme expression of Shelley's sceptical 
idealism, and also his most effective poetic defence of the 'poetry of 
39 
life 1 • 
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C h a p t e r 7 
The Triumph of Life: 'Actors or Spectators' 
Adonais and The Triumph of Life have often been thought to express almost 
opposite metaphysical attitudes. More than any other of his poems, Adonais has 
been adduced to support a view of Shelley as a transcendental dualist, seeking 
an eternal oneness beyond the world of fleeting appearances. The Triumph of 
Life, on the other hand, is usually regarded as the severest expression of his 
scepticism regarding the existence of any reality beyond the world's 'false 
and fragile glass' (247). Thus we find that while the dualist readings of 
Shelley by Wilson and Wasserman have little to say about the Triumph, it is 
this poem in particular that has attracted the attentions of 
1 
deconstructionists such as Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller. ~~ny other 
critics to a greater or lesser degree fall in with both these approaches by 
2 
regarding the Triumph as a sceptical repudiation of the idealism of Adonais. 
It is my intention to show that this view exaggerates the philosophical 
divergence between the two poems, and that, even though markedly different in 
mood, they share a common substructure of thought. Consequently it will be 
found that, just as the elegy's apparent dualism has been often misread, 
Shelley's final unfinished poem is less unreservedly pessimistic than has 
sometimes been thought. I begin by looking at the two poems in the light of 
remarks about the latter made by De Man, the chief exponent of the view of the 
poem as a palinode, for within his analysis he identifies the particular issue 
I mean to address. 
226 
i 
The idealist and sceptical interpretations of Shelley that Adonais and The 
Triumph of Life have respectively called forth have a certain similarity in 
that both find in his poetry a degree of pessimism--admittedly of a very 
different kind in each case--about the possible attainment in life or through 
language of any desired good. De }an's argument that the Triumph allegorizes 
the way in which language posits meaning only to erase it is in its end result 
not unlike the view that finds a Platonist disparagement of poetic fictions in 
Adonais. The philosophical underpinnings of the two views are to all 
appearances directly contrary, one denying the possibility of hermeneutical 
completion, the other depending on it. Even here, however, the difference may 
not be all it seems. De Man has characterized the need for such completion in 
terms of a tendency to dispose of writers' dead bodies by burying them 'in 
3 
their own texts made into epitaphs and monumental graves.' This almost 
literally describes the way Adonais has been turned into an elegy for Shelley 
himself--for example, by Mary Shelley in her Notes to her 1839 edition of the 
4 
poems--and has been used as his epitaph on monumental statuary. The poem 
particularly lends itself to such treatment, not only because its last stanza 
is st~angely prophetic of Shelley's own death, but because it has proved 
itself susceptible of the kind of closed reading that is more obviously 
resisted by his other work. But de Man refers specifically to the way in which 
The Triumph of Life, which is incomplete even in a formal sense, has as it 
were been rendered whole by the interpretations of its readers. For him the 
death of Shelley, in cutting the poem short, acquires significance as an 
ultimate disfiguring event which supersedes yet confirms the succession of 
symbolic disfigurations within the poem. Yet it might be questioned whether 
his treatment of Shelley's death really differs from Mary Shelley's in her 
view of Adonais. He admits that every reading is a 'monumentalization', but 
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claims it is not necessarily 'naive or evasive', or a 'repression of self-
5 
threatening knowledge'. His own is saved, he believes, by a knowledge--which 
he argues is also Shelley's in the Triumph--of the endless process of erasure 
and repetition that reading involves. He writes: 
No degree of knowledge can ever stop this madness, for it is the madness 
of words. \~at would be naive is to believe that this strategy, which is 
not ~ strategy as subjects, since we are its product rather than its 
agent, can be a source of value and has to be celebrated or denounced 
d . 6 accor 1ngly. 
Here de ~~n sounds like the narrator in the Triumph, standing aloof from the 
procession of life, finding all 'amiss' (179), and declining to 'worship' 
(246) or find value in any of the figures that pass before him. But there is a 
contradiction in this attitude, for both assume an artificially detached 
position from which to observe that humankind is blindly involved in a 
meaningless process over which it has no power of control or judgement. This 
is de Man's 'self-threatening knowledge', which Shelley's Rousseau seems to 
share, when he tells us that the sages chained to the car of life had not 
learned 'to know themselves' (212) •. Yet if the subject-self rather than the 
object-self is considered, then it can also be argued that such knowledge, far 
from threatening the self, actually preserves it intact from the disfiguration 
that assails everything the self perceives. Ultimately, for all the subtlety 
of his analysis, de Man buries Shelley in the Triumph as surely as Mary 
Shelley buries him in Adonais; and both thereby, in the manner of 
Frankenstein, restore to life and wholeness the poet and his work. But while 
the contradiction of de Man is shared by Shelley's narrator and Rousseau, in 
the poem, I shall argue, it is consciously confronted and becomes an essential 
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element within its structure and meaning. 
Unlike de Han, most readers are prepared to speculate on hO\v the truncated 
poem might have continued. The fragment certainly ends tantalizingly. The 
narrator asks, '"Then, what is Life?"' (544), and Rousseau begins to reply as 
the car of life rolls away from them. It appears that the poem at this point 
is about to turn in a new direction. The narrator's question, however, occurs 
somewhat unexpectedly, for while watching the triumphal procession earlier he 
has asked, '"And \vhat is this?/ liJhose shape is that within the car? & \vhy?"' 
(177-8), and has received from Rousseau the ansVTer (apparently to all three 
questions), "'Life"' (180). It is by no means obvious what further information 
or what alternative view of life he could now be given. Some critics have 
7 
conjectured that the poem would have ended optimistically. For example, 
Abrams considers that the completed Triumph would probably have finally won 
hope from despair in the manner of some of Shelley's earlier long poems and 
8 
Dante's Divina Commedia. In this case the fluid term 1Life 1 Hould presumably 
have been redefined, in accordance with 'On Life', as the unity of subject and 
object, mind and nature. But this notion of unity, always implicitly 
questioned by Shelley even when out\-:ardly proclaimed, is Hhat the Triumph 
unflinchingly reveals as a delusion. Horeover, although the poem offers a 
tribute to Dante, it also quite consciously revises his account of a 
heavem-:ard ascent towards the source of love. 
However, as I shall argue, we are not forced to make a choice between a 
transcendental oneness and a decentring, disfiguring process, between the 
'native noon' of the 'sacred few' (131, 128) and the car of life. In this 
respect the Triumph shows a continuity with Shelley's earlier poems which is 
at least as important as its correction of them. Indeed, the aspect of the 
poem which I propose to consider in the remainder of this chapter finds a 
brief but striking anticipation in Adonais, the poem of which the Triumph is 
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so often thought to represent a reversal. Here the elegist, in despair at the 
fact of mortality, asks, 'Whence are we, and why are we? of what scene/ The 
actors or spectators?' (184-5). Questions of whence and why remain as 
unanswered in this poem as in the later one, but the reference to actors and 
spectators hints at the means to a resolution of the poet's grief, for, as 
suggested in the previous chapter, it is the complex interplay of subjective 
and objective experience that eventually forms the basis of the poem's 
concluding optimism. In the Triumph, when the dreamer asks similar questions 
Rousseau urges him that to gain answers he should 'from spectator turn/ Actor 
or victim' (305-6). Here Shelley's Rousseau is echoing the real Rousseau, in 
whose Julie, ou la nouvelle Heloise St Preux writes, 'I find it is a folly to 
think to study mankind in the quality of a simple spectator •••• We can have the 
opportunity of seeing others act, in proportion as we act with them', and· 
Wolmar similarly says, 'I made myself an actor, to qualify myself for a 
9 
spectator'. In his discussion of the Triumph, Miller has described how the 
reader too is a spectator who must turn actor, since 'to understand the work 
at all it is necessary to enter into it, to abandon oneself to the itinerary 
10 
traced out by the text'. It is possible that if the poem had been finished 
the dreamer would have followed the advice he is given by becoming an actor in 
his own dream, thus learning, as Rousseau says, 'what thou wouldst be taught' 
(307). But as l1iller adds, the reader who becomes an actor also becomes a 
victim of the poem, which 'means experiencing the impossibility of ever 
11 
unravelling all its threads.' Similarly, what the dreamer who had turned 
actor in the completed poem might possibly have gained is not any objective 
knowledge but rather a kind of unknowing, or a venturing upon the unknown, as 
the voyage into death is for the poet of Adonais. vlhether this is the way the 
poem would actually have developed, however, is less important than the fact 
that the potentiality for it is there in the fragment that we have, not only 
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in the words of Rousseau to the narrator, but in a latent dialectical tension 
throughout between acting and spectating--a tension in which the spectator's 
view apparently prevails but only by a repeated renewal of the actor's 
involvement. 
De Nan insists that we are the 'product' not the 'agent' of language, and 
he believes that The Triumph of Life bears him out. However, there is an 
important sense in which by making this point he contradicts it, and so saves 
himself from the powerlessness he claims. He seems almost to acknowledge this 
problem, on Shelley's account if not on his own, when he says that 'The poem 
is sheltered from the performance of disfiguration by the power of its 
12 
negative knowledge'. But in thus enforcing a strict separation between the 
concepts of 'product' and 'agent', de Man's reading of the poem becomes as 
closed and as self-protective as those it is intended to correct. For Shelley 
there is in fact a constant interplay between products and agents, actors and 
spectators, and upon this interrelation poem and self are perpetually and 
hazardously 'Borne onward' (460). The death of the poet and the truncation of 
his poem are hardly necessary to bring home their vulnerability to the process 
they describe. 
ii 
Like the prefaces and opening sections of a number of Shelley's poems, the 
forty-line proem to The Triumph of Life provides an important elucidatory 
comment on the ensuing narrative. Moreover, like other poetic introductions 
(for example, the invocation in Alastor, and the Dedication and first canto of 
The Revolt of Islam), it does so by placing the poet or narrator both inside 
and outside his own poem, thus spanning the divide between reality and 
fiction. In the Triumph this ambiguous vantage-point of the narrator is 
clearly a reflection of the concern within the poem with the interrelation 
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between objective and subjective ways of seeing. One of the ways in which the 
intricacies of this interrelationship are most clearly revealed is in the 
expression of attitudes towards the natural world. In the proem the narrator 
introduces the theme entirely in these terms. 
The scene which he depicts itself hovers between the real and the imagined. 
As Melian Stawell has observed, it resembles the coastline near Spezia where 
the poem was written, and it might be conjectured that the narrator's sense of 
alienation from the natural harmony he describes reflects Shelley's own 
feelings in Lerici, from where he writes to Byron on the 3rd May 1822: 'Nature 
13 
here is as vivid and joyous as we are dismal'. But the landscape of the poem 
has a rich literary origin as well as an actual one. It recalls first of all 
Petrarch 1 s Trionfi, the work on which Shelley's Triumph is most obviously 
modelled, and which begins with a description of a spring scene in a valley 
where the poet lies down to dream. The 'old chestnut' (25) sounds like an 
Italian version of the 'dark sycamore' under which Wordsworth reclines in 
Tintern Abbey (10), and of the 'lofty elms' whose cool the narrator seeks at 
the beginning of The Excursion (I, 29), and of countless other trees lending 
14 
shade to bucolic poets. The narrator's description (26-8) of his situation 
on a westward facing slope overlooking the sea is an adaptation of two lines 
from Goethe's Faust: 'The day ahead of me, night left behind,/ The waves 
15 
below, and overhead the sky' (1087-8). We are also reminded of Rousseau's 
accounts of his enjoyment of the dawn in his Confessions, particularly of one 
where he describes his custom at Les Charmettes of rising early in order to 
16 
offer praise to the Creator of nature. What links all these literary 
references together is that they have, or in Shelley's hands they acquire, a 
connection with memory and forgetting, whose intertwinings form one of the 
poem's major themes. Petrarch 1 s grief and dream are caused by the season 
'stirring the memory of that day/ \{hereon my love and suffering began' ('The 
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Triumph of Love', 2-3); 'Tintern Abbey' and the first book of The Excursion 
are both about memories of a lost past; the lines from Faust, as Robinson has 
noted, are adapted to make the narrator look west towards the retreating night 
with its 'thoughts which must remain untold' (21), not east towards the coming 
day; and memory and its failings are a recurrent concern of Rousseau as he 
17 
casts his mind back in writing The Confessions. For both \vordsworth and 
Shelley memory involves detachment and hence a kind of oblivion: as a form of 
the objectifying self-consciousness, it not only stands in the way of an 
immediate enjoyment of the present scene but is unable to resurrect such 
enjoyment from the past. Consequently, in much the same way that Wordsworth in 
1Tintern Abbey' and the 'Immortality' ode admits he cannot recover his boyhood 
delight in nature, Shelley's night thoughts 'must remain untold'. 
The narrator's feelings of remoteness from his surroundings are due not 
only to his lack of sympathy for nature's worship of the sun but to the 
'strange trance' which drops a transparent shade like 'a veil of light' (29, 
32) over the scene. This veil causes him a sensation of 'deja vu', an 
experience which itself can perhaps be explained as an interaction of short-
term remembering and forgetting. An explanation of this kind is to be found in 
Shelley's fragment entitled 'Difficulty of Analyzing the Human Hind', where he 
speaks of the stream of thought as a 'passage from sensation to reflection'. 
Here 'reflection' is in effect the memory of a forgotten 'sensation', but as I 
have suggested previously, what makes the passage 'so dizzying and so 
tumultuous' is that it is really more like an· oscillation. He can thus begin 
to see a resemblance bet-v1een the narrator 1 s 1 strange trance 1 in the Triumph 
and the 'trance sublime and strange' of the poet in 'Hont Blanc', where, 
musing on his 'own separate fantasy', he holds an 'unremitting interchange' 
with 'the clear universe of things' (35-40). An effect of this 'interchange' 
is that, as it 'renders' 'reflection' and 'receives' 'sensation', the feelings 
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of both immediacy and separateness are intensified. Such would also appear to 
be the effect of the narrator's trance in the Triumph, 
for the shade it spread 
Was so transparent that the scene came through 
As clear as when a veil of light is drawn 
O'er evening hills they glimmer. (30-3) 
The 'veil' thus distances and clarifies, reminding us of the concealing and 
revealing effect of the veil of poetry as described in the Defence (R&P, p. 
505). 
The rapid interchange of sensation and reflection during intense thought, 
however, is always in danger of being brought to a halt by one particular 
reflection--a consciousness, such as occurs in both 'Mont Blanc' and the 
Defence, that the source of thought and the 'original conception' of poetry 
are forever inaccessible. Reflection always in the end as it were lies 
uppermost once it recognizes its inability to recover original sensation. It 
is a reflection of this nature that occupies Wordsworth in the 'Immortality' 
ode and Coleridge in the 'Dejection' ode (1802), and it is the dominant 
perspective in The Triumph of Life. Shelley's poem, moreover, follows 
Wordsworth and Coleridge in expressing the sense of what has been lost as a 
former responsiveness to nature. Just as Coleridge can only 'see, not feel' 
the beauty of the external world ('Dejection', 38), so in the Triumph nature 
is remembered as having been felt by all the senses, not only sight. Hence the 
narrator says: 
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I knew 
That I had felt the freshness of that dawn, 
Bathed in the same cold dew my brow and hair 
And sate as thus upon that slope of lawn 
Under the self same bough, and heard as there 
The birds, the fountains and the Ocean hold 
Sweet talk in music through the enamoured air. (33-9) 
The recollection of nature's music is a particular feature of such nostalgia, 
whereas light, as in the 'veil of light', becomes a pervasive symbol of the 
objective vision which always falls between the viewer and his memory. 
Two other poems to which the proem of the Triumph refers, unlike those so 
far considered, are unreservedly joyous celebrations of landscape--though the 
landscape in each case is far removed from the Mediterranean coast. One is 
Coleridge's 'Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni', a poem which seems 
to have left a lasting impression on Shelley since he wrote 'Mont Blanc'. Its 
Alpine peaks and final apostrophe to Mont Blanc--'and tell yon rising sun/ 
Earth, with her thousand voices, praises God' (84-5)--are recalled by the 
'mountain snows' and nature's adoration of the sun in the Triumph. Another 
Romantic aubade to which we find a number of verbal references in Shelley's 
poem is Wordsworth's sonnet 'Composed upon Westminster Bridge, September 3, 
1802 1 (1807). Wordsworth's 'smokeless air' (8) becomes Shelley's 'smokeless 
altars' (5) and 'smiling air' (14); the City is said to 'wear/ The beauty of 
the morning' (4-5) just as in the Triumph things 'wear/ The form and character 
of mortal mould' (16-17); and both poets proclaim the 'splendour' of the 
rising sun ('Westminster Bridge', 10; Triumph, 3). Shelley's narrator, 
however, for reasons that become clearer in the course of his vision but are 
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partly indicated here, dissociates himself from the attitude of worship which 
nature shares with Coleridge and Hords\·lOrth. He does so partly because his 
sudden entrance into the poem with 'But I, whom thoughts which must remain 
untold' (21) introduces a self-awareness that conflicts with an inclination to 
worship. But he does not merely find hims~lf unable to respond with the same 
transports as Hordsworth and Coleridge; he also actively rejects the object of 
that worship, the sun, and turns away from the approaching day to lie down and 
rest. Thus, although he shares their nostalgia, he remains deeply sceptical of 
any formulation of what that nostalgia might be for, preferring his 
unspecified 'thoughts which must remain untold'. 
At the very beginning of the poem the sun's uprise is represented as an 
event of great fulfilment: 
Swift as a spirit hastening to his task 
Of glory and of good, the Sun sprang forth 
Rejoicing in his splendour, and the mask 
Of darkness fell from the awakened Earth. (1-4) 
Explicitly emblematic 10f glory and of good', the sun is also 'Swift as a 
spirit', a phrase which recalls not only 'A pardlike Spirit beautiful and 
swift' in Adonais (280) but more significantly the language of Prometheus 
Unbound Act II, \·lhere the Spirit of the Hour, 1 On the brink of the night and 
the morning 1 , flies 1 S\olifter than fire 1 to inaugurate the new age of 
Prometheus, the 'sun' who 'is yet unrisen' (II, v, 1,5,9). In describing the 
sunrise as he does at the beginning of the Triumph it is as if Shelley returns 
to the narrative of Prometheus at the end of Act II in order to correct the 
anomalies of Act III. For he goes on to show how the beneficent power of the 
rising sun becomes an object of worship and a tyrannizing father, as all 
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things 'Rise as the Sun their father rose, to bear/ Their portion of the toil 
which he of old/ Took as his own and then imposed on them' (18-20). To free 
Prometheus, in other words, is to install another Jupiter. Punning on the word 
1Sun 1 , as he does in Prometheus, Shelley at the same time expresses his view 
of Christianity as an oppressive perversion of the doctrines of Christ, whose 
redemptive toil takes on a resemblance to God's creative toil in Genesis in 
becoming an imposition on mankind. The 1Sun 1/Son thus becomes or engenders the 
18 
father, just as Wordsworth's 'Child is father of the Man'. As spirit, son 
and father Shelley's sun can be seen to represent a kind of heterodox trinity, 
whose three elements are analogous to the main components of that process of 
thought which Shelley develops and describes in Prometheus Unbound. Here they 
roughly correspond to the three main characters, Asia representing dynamic and 
relational spirit, Prometheus its putative realization in unity, and Jupiter 
the projection of unity as oppressive power. What the Triumph acknowledges, as 
the play does not (or does so only implicitly), is the objectifying and 
disfiguring effect of its own representation. Tilottama Rajan writes that 
Prometheus 
affirms that it can enact a work identical lvith itself. For in making 
his text into a play, Shelley allegorizes reading as performance rather 
than interpretation, a discourse that legitimizes itself by doing what 
it says rather than by conveying an anterior arid provable truth. 19 
Whereas Prometheus, as a play, assumes meaning to be created through 
'performance' (or acting), the Triumph, Rajan argues, following de ~~n, 
accepts that it is dependent on 'interpretation' (or spectating), which finds 
language always 'unable either to state or to perform anything that is not 
20 
already different from itself'. The proem bears out this view. The sun's 
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rapid transformation from beneficent spirit to tyrannical projection is echoed 
by the effect of the narrator's 'strange trance' which projects the scene 
around him beyond the immediate present. Although he thus recognizes himself 
as the 'actor or victim' of the process he describes, a further result of this 
process is to turn the actor into a spectator who is perpetually removed from 
the objects he contemplates. This indeed is the state of Prometheus in the 
first act of the play, where he appeals in vain for a response from the 
elements of nature. The difference in the Triumph is that the narrator accepts 
the role of spectator both as a necessity and by choice: he neither worships 
nor abhors the sun, but instead stretches his 'faint limbs' in weariness, and 
so escapes Prometheus's bitter sense of alienation. To this extent his stance 
is in line with de Man's: the onward career of language is irresistible, and 
all one can do is acknowledge one is within its power. 
This position, however, is modified by the narrator's wakefulness at night, 
which, as he explains, is the cause of his present weariness: 
But I, whom thoughts which must remain untold 
Had kept as wakeful as the stars that gem 
The cone of night, now they were laid asleep, 
Stretched my faint limbs. (21-4) 
The narrator's detachment from the day is thus weighed against a converse 
attachment to night, to the thoughts of night which in remaining 'untold' 
avoid the disfiguring objectifications of day, and to the stars, perennially 
for Shelley symbols of desire. There is a further reminiscence here of the 
'Dejection' ode, in which Coleridge, keeping midnight vigil, regains an inward 
imaginative strength that the external things of day deny him. The link 
between the night/day and thought/language oppositions may also have been 
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suggested by Psalm 19, which is mentioned by Reiman as a possible analogue of 
the proem, and whose second verse runs, 'Day unto day uttereth speech, and 
21 
night unto night sheweth knowledge'. Certainly we are reminded of Shelley's 
own 1To Night' (1821), the opening of which is verbally similar to the 
Triumph's, though in one sense opposite in intent: 'Swiftly walk o'er the 
western wave,/ Spirit of Night!'. In that night here weaves 'dreams of joy and 
fear' (5) and also wields an 'opiate wand' (13) blotting out the concerns of 
day it is again the repository of 'thoughts which must remain untold' in 
daytime. The poem's emphatic preference for the potentialities of night over 
the realizations of day is muted but unmistakably present in the Triumph's 
proem, where it implicitly contradicts the initial joyful announcement that 
with the sunrise 'the mask/ Of darkness fell from the awakened Earth'. The 
narrator's untold thoughts of night in the Triumph also recall the regrets and 
desires of Prometheus and Asia in Prometheus Unbound before the sun's rising 
at the end of Act II, even though his weariness of the day is quite unlike 
their view of the new dawn. In fact Rajan's above-quoted remarks about the 
play are much more accurately applied to its final two acts, where it does 
attempt to perform the dawning of the Promethean era, than they are to the 
first two, where this is still an unrealized dream. In speaking therefore of 
the Triumph as a correction of Prometheus it is necessary to bear in mind that 
the play's main point of weakness--the enactment of Prometheus's freedom--is 
in some ways less the fulfilment than the negation or disfigurement of the 
achievement of Act 2, just as the risen sun in the Triumph negates and blots 
out the stars of desire that heralded its approach. 
iii 
The despotism of objective vision is as much a theme of the narrator's dream 
as it is of the proem. Even critics who have differed widely in their 
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interpretations of the poem have often concurred in viewing the captivity of 
the followers of the triumphal procession as. emblematic of their submission to 
some kind of externalizing tendency in themselves. For example, in Reiman's 
dualist, moral and tentatively optimistic reading the tyrannizing power of 
'Life' is 'mere reason' or 'the distorted vision of the outward eye', while 
for the deconstructive, determinist de ~fun it is the arbitrary and 'endless 
22 
prosopopoeia' of language. The poem, however, contains crucial ambivalences 
which undermine both of these positions, and while it affirms life's triumphal 
progress to be nothing less than all-subsuming and irresistible, it also 
allows room for a view of life as less remotely and inhumanly external. 
The chariot's function as a symbol of objectification is indicated by its 
'cold glare' (77), which obscures 'The Sun as he the stars' (79), a succession 
of three forms of light corresponding to the three manifestations of the sun 
in the proem as father, son and spirit. The 'owl-winged faculty of 
calculation' of the Defence (R&P, p. 503) may indeed be suggested by this 
eclipsing cold light, which in forbidding 'Shadow to fall from leaf or stone' 
(445) seems to oppose the imaginative transformation of the natural world. But 
the chariot's significance cannot be so narrowly or univocally defined; for it 
allegorizes less the static power of reason than a continuing process in which 
reason and imagination are closely intertwined. Indeed, its motion relies on 
those very transformations which it apparently resists, and which appear in 
the poem as the various shadow-chasing and phantom-forming pursuits of its 
followers and captives. Among these is Rousseau's own vision of the 'shape all 
light' (352), who, borne of reflected sunlight on water, is manifestly an 
imaginative recreation of external nature. But the projection of such phantoms 
entails their inevitable deformation: they are 'distorted' and 'wrought' by 
the 'car's creative ray' (531-4) in a process which exhausts and disfigures 
those whose self-expressive masks they are. All creative thought, the poem 
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suggests, involves a form of externalization in which the subject is defeated 
by the object. 
This deconstructive aspect of the triumphal procession is very clearly 
demonstrated in two parallel passages occurring respectively in the narratives 
of the narrator and Rousseau. The narrator describes how 'Maidens and 
youths ••• /Like moths by light attracted and repelled' (149, 153) are caught in 
a whirling dance, an image of the 'unremitting interchange' and the mutual 
push and pull of subject and object, sensation and reflection, sign and 
referent. Finally the dancers are drawn together but at the moment of union 
fall senseless: 
Yet ere I can say where the chariot hath 
Past over them; nor other trace I find 
But as of foam after the Ocean's wrath 
Is spent upon the desert shore. (161-4) 
Thus the desired unity is aborted, leaving only a lifeless externalized trace 
like the 'wrinkled sand' in the Defence (R&P, p. 504). The same images of 
sexual desire and of traces left on the shore occur in the passage where 
Rousseau asks the 'shape all light' to 'Shew whence.I came, and where I am, 
and why' (398). Such questions can only be answered by that unitive experience 
sought by the dancers. In asking them Rousseau is suspended 'between desire 
and shame' (394), as if aware that what he seeks is prohibited. His feelings 
are similar to Dante's on his first meeting with Beatrice in the Purgatorio, 
and to Faust's in the episodes with Margaret, and are also reminiscent of the 
mingled fear and desire which Saint-Preux experiences at the thought of 
Julie's kisses, and which in the Confessions Rousseau describes as his own 
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before his sexual initiation with Mme de Warens. Moreover, both Saint-Preux 
and Rousseau relate how the anticipated pleasure finally eludes them; and 
likewise, when the 'shape all light', in answer to Rousseau in the Triumph, 
offers him the cup of nepenthe he 
Touched with faint lips the cup she raised, 
And suddenly my brain became as sand 
Where the first wave had more than half erased 
The track of deer on desert Labrador, 
Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled amazed 
Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore 
Until the second bursts. (404-410) 
Critics have differed about whether Rousseau actually drinks the nepenthe, but 
the point is that to dririk is already to have passed beyond the moment of an 
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impossible unity. Significantly, we are told that the 'first wave had more 
than half erased/ The track of deer'. The deer and the wolf, as Clark 
suggests, represent the self-conflict of the mind, which flees and pursues 
itself simultaneously, and the wave that comes between them therefore divides 
25 
the mind from its own knowledge of itself. With the bursting of the second 
wave and the appearance in a 'new Vision' (410 and 434) of the triumphal car, 
Rousseau's wolfish desire is in turn objectified and superseded, and he is 
'delayed not long' (461) even by the memory of the 'shape' from entering the 
procession. Here he joins those who, projecting 'Shadows of shadows' (488), 
are involved in the creative-destructive cycle of the car's progress, until 
falling 'by the wayside' (541) he becomes the spectator who can act as the 
narrator's guide. 
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The narrator, maintaining the same detach~ent he displays in the proem, is 
also a spectator, like his literary forbears, the dreamer in Petrarch's 
Trionfi and the fictional Dante who is led by Virgil through Hell and 
Purgatory. His objective standpoint has a significance beyond theirs, however, 
in being thematically related to the content of his narrative, which is so 
much concerned with the inevitability of objective vision. Both the narrator 
and Rousseau, commenting on the pageant of life from the outside, do so with 
great scepticism and consequently thus play no small part in representing the 
chariot as a deconstructive symbol. Unlike those within the procession they 
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show no straining after absolutes; the narrator has no 'desire to worship 
those'who drew/ New figures on ••• [the world's] false and fragile glass' (246-
7); and Rousseau draws no moral distinctions between 'The Wise,/ The great, 
the unforgotten' (208-9) who are chained to the car, even though Plato and 
Napoleon are among their number. 
But since there is so clear a correspondence between the objectifying 
vision that the car represents and the objective view that they take of it, 
the narrator and Rousseau are only artificially relieved of an active 
participation in the triumphal procession. A similar anomaly occurs in the 
speech from Calderon's La Vida es Sueno which is found translated in one of 
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Shelley's notebooks in Edward '\iilliams's hand. The theme of the passage, 
which is very close to that of The Triumph of Life, is summed up in the last 
two lines of the translation thus: 'All life and being are but dreams and 
dreams/ Themselves are but the memory of other dreams.' The problem with such 
a statement is that if it is true the speaker cannot know it to be true. 
Similarly, in the Triumph the narrator's position is undermined by his own 
narrative, for if the car of life represents the inevitable disfigurement of 
all representation, then neither his dream nor the poem escapes its influence. 
De Man, as we have seen, elides this difficulty by suggesting that the poem is 
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sheltered by its own 'negative knowledge'. On the contrary, the Triumph, 
unlike the short passage from Calderon, actually draws attention to its own 
~ 
self- reference. The narrator's vision is, after all, the product of a 
'strange trance', and is a 'waking dream' (42), as Rousseau's vision is like a 
'day appearing dream' (427). In occupying a middle ground between waking and 
sleeping, both characters hover between consciousness and oblivion of their 
present involvement in their own narratives. Shelley thus complicates 
Wordsworth's description in his 'Immortality' ode of life as 'but a sleep and 
a forgetting' (58). An index of his deliberate ambiguity is that Rousseau's 
phrase, 'I found myself asleep' (311), is substituted in the manuscript for 
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the initial Wordsworthian 'I was laid asleep'. The change is significant in 
suggesting some degree of self-consciousness on Rousseau's part, and in 
creating an uncertainty whether his new awareness constitutes waking or 
sleeping. This confusion generates a number of further contradictions relating 
to an interplay of the spectating and acting roles of the two narrative 
voices. 
Although the narrator and Rousseau speak with the sceptical knowingness of 
those who stand outside the dance, neither is completely detached from the 
spectacle he sees. The narrator repeatedly expresses his deep dismay: he is 
'aghast' (107), is 'Struck to the heart' (177), feels his 'cheek/ Alter' (224-
5), 'grieved' (228), experiences 'despair' (231), and his~'eyes' and 'heart' 
'are sick' (298-9). Moreover, despite a certain disdain for the multitude who 
follow the car, he also shares some of their assumptions. For example, while 
he tells how some vainly pursued 'birds within the noonday ether lost' (64), 
which seems to describe eagles (or possibly skylarks) soaring beyond visible 
range, he also speaks of the 'sacred few' (128) who 'Fled back like eagles to 
their native noon' (131). His belief that it is possible to escape the 
procession is again revealed when he relates how those on the 'path where 
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flowers never grew' (65) 
Heard not the fountains whose melodious dew 
Out of their mossy cells forever burst 
Nor felt the breeze which from the forest told 
Of grassy paths, and wood lawns interspersed 
With overarching elms and caverns cold, 
And violet banks where sweet dreams brood. (67-72) 
This natural description has the flavour of a Keatsian landscape such as we 
find in Endymion, and (in the last line particularly) of the woodland setting 
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of A Midsummer Night's Dream. The escapist quality in these reminiscences 
tends to subvert the narrator's Rousseauian belief that the solitudes of 
nature provide a genuine alternative to the dusty path of life in society. At 
the same time, the description's appeal to other senses than the visual 
reminds us of the proem where the landscape as objectively seen evokes the 
memory of it as immediately felt. It thus expresses the narrator's nostalgia 
for the lost origins of poetic creativity, as do the familiar symbols of 
'fountains' and 'caverns'. His emotional involvement in the scene before him 
and his search for origins are most clearly revealed, however, in the urgent 
questions of why, whence and whither that he puts first about the car (177-8) 
and then about Rousseau (296-7)--questions which immediately ally him with 
those who are in the procession, none of whom 'seemed to know/ vfuither he 
went, or whence he came, or why' (47-8). His despair is summed up in his 
complaint that 'God made irreconcilable/ Good and the means of good' (230-1), 
which is a succinct formulation of a problem which has preoccupied Shelley 
throughout his career. 'God', 'Good' and 'the means of good' make another of 
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those triads on the Jupiter-Prometheus-Asia model, 'God' as the projection and 
perversion of a unity which now presides over the disunity of various 
dualities, such as the ideal and the real, subject and object, sign and 
referent. That the narrator should regret, instead of simply accepting, the 
continuance of this disunity is further evidence that he is actually an actor 
in life's pageant despite his special status in the poem as spectator. 
Rousseau, too, is not as deadened to the procession as his resemblance to 
an 'old root' (182) suggests. As Rajan and others have argued, his repudiation 
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of his former career is far from clear-cut. Also, there is a contradiction 
in his comments on the sages chained to the car: he speaks with scepticism of 
the 'morn of truth they feigned' because 'their lore/ Taught them not this--to 
know themselves' (211-4), yet his own encounter with the 'shape all light' 
teaches that the goal of self-knowledge is itself an illusion, relying as it 
does on the unattainable unity of mind as subject and mind as object. Shelley 
would appear to be again subverting the actual Rousseau, who in the Reveries 
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of the Solitary Walker makes the Delphic dictum, 'Know thyself', his own. 
His assumption that self-knowledge is possible is akin to his belief that 
if the spark with which Heaven lit my spirit 
Earth had with purer nutriment supplied 
Corruption would not now thus much inherit 
Of what was once Rousseau. (201-4) 
Like the narrator, he has not come to terms with the irreconcilability of 
'Good and the means of good', and his regret that he has not lived up to the 
heavenly 'spark' within himself offers further demonstration that he too has 
not truly opted out of 'Life'. His suggestion that the narrator will gain the 
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knowledge he seeks by turning 'Actor or victim in this wretchedness' (306)--
knowledge which he admits eluded hi~-is one more inconsistency in his 
attitude to the triumphal procession. In one sense these contradictions 
indicate that Rousseau and the narrator are deluding themselves in imagining 
that they have not succumbed to life, but in another sense, paradoxically, 
they suggest quite the opposite, for in revealing that these figures are 
already actors as well as spectators in life's triumph, the poem raises a 
doubt about the dominance of the subject by the object. In subtle and 
necessarily unremarked ways a form of life as immediate experience survives 
even while it furthers the advance of the juggernaut of life as objective 
thought. 
iv 
The same contradictions are to be found in Rousseau's account of the events 
that have led him to his present position, though here again the disfiguring 
power of thought and language appears to prevail. In describing the spring 
landscape in which he initially finds himself, the feminine 'shape' he meets 
there, and his ensuing vision of the triumphal car, Shelley draws heavily on 
Dante's. description of his encounter with the 'bella donna' in Eden and the 
appearance of the pageant of divine revelation in Cantos 28-31 of the 
32 . 
Purgatorio. These scenes from Dante, however, are wrested to an almost 
contrary purpose, and lead Rousseau not towards divine illumination but 
progressively further away from what he doubtfully calls 'The Heaven which I 
imagine' (333). Various elements in the 'oblivious valley' (539) have their 
33 
analogues in Canto 28, which Shelley translated. For example, the hill of 
Purgatory, from which Dante and Beatrice ascend to the heavens, becomes 1a 
mountain, which from unknown time/ Had yawned into a cavern high and deep' 
(313). Bearing testimony to former seismic activity, such caverns for Shelley 
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represent the traces of a forgotten act of creation. From it, therefore, 
with the musical sound of poetry, flows the 'gentle rivulet' (314), Hhich in 
its description resembles the Lethe of the Purgatorio, but in its power to 
cause forgetfulness is closer to the Lethe of Virgil's Aeneid than to Dante's 
river of absolution. 
There are two kinds of forgetfulness that Rousseau describes in his account 
of his experiences in the 'oblivious valley', though at times these become 
almost indistinguishable. On the one hand, there is the self-forgetfulness 
which is the accompaniment of a heightened aHareness, and \vhich is marked here 
and elsewhere in the poem by synaesthetic imagery, and 'melody, confusing 
sense' (340). On the other hand, forgetting has a directly opposite origin in 
the tendency of self-conscious thought to externalize and hence always to lose 
an immediate knowledge of its objects. The close relation between the two 
kinds of oblivion is evident in the following passage in which Rousseau 
describes the obliterating effect of the 'shape all light': 
And still her feet, no less than the sweet tune 
To which they moved, seemed as they moved, to blot 
The thoughts of him who gazed on them, and soon 
All that was seemed as if it had been not, 
As if the gazer 1 s mind \·ras stre\-m beneath 
Her feet like embers, and she, thought by thought, 
Trampled its fires into the dust of death, 
As Day upon the threshold of the east 
Treads out the lamps of night, until the breath 
Of darkness reillumines even the least 
Of heaven's living eyes--like day she came, 
!·faking the night a dream. (382-93) 
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Initially the blotting of disfiguring 'thoughts' is apparently the effect of 
an all-consuming rapture on the part of the 'gazer', a term implying rapt 
contemplation. The words, 'and soon/ All that was seemed as if it had been 
not', at first seem to confirm the impression of the preceding stanza, but the 
tenses used introduce a temporal and progressive element (reinforced by 'and 
soon') that runs counter to an ecstatic disregard of time. The 'shape''s 
metrical feet, which emphasize the temporal element in poetry, then become as 
destructive as they have just been creative, extinguishing the mind 'thought 
by thought'--these thoughts being·both the instruments and the objects of her 
trampling progress. Subtly one kind of oblivion has superseded the other, as 
if indeed the original blotting 'seemed as if it had been not'. The same 
process can be observed in those passages, already considered, likening the 
mind's erasure to the action of waves on the shore, where again the experience 
of unity implies its simultaneous dissipation. It is also to be found in the 
succession of different forms of light, as when the car's 'cold glare, 
intenser than the noon/ But icy cold, obscured with ] light/ The Sun as 
he the stars' (77-79). Intermediate between the light of the stars and the 
light of the car, the sun, as in the proem and as in the passage quoted above, 
has an ambiguous significance, and in suggesting both forms of blotting, 
demonstrates that the apprehension of oneness is never secure from the 
perpetual self-division of thought. 
This repeated movement from subjective to objective experience suggests a 
certain correlation between the 'shape all light' and the 'Shape' (87) in the 
car of life. Some critics, however, in arguing that the former represents an 
imaginative principle which counteracts the dead hand of the latter, assume 
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that there is no inevitable connection between them. Duffy, for example, 
believes that in the 'shape all light' the poem vindicates the ecstatic and 
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self-effacing strain in the thought of the real Rousseau, and distinguishes it 
36 
from his Enlightenment rationalism which is symbolised by the car of life. 
He suggests that the state in which Shelley's Rousseau experiences his vision 
is equivalent to the 'reverie' described in the Reveries of the Solitary 
37 
Walker. Here Rousseau speaks of a sense of being 'fused as it were with the 
great system of beings and identifying myself with the whole of nature', and 
of transcending every 'other feeling of deprivation or enjoyment, pleasure or 
38 
pain, desire or fear than the simple feeling of existence'. This certainly 
resembles the 'sweet and deep ••• oblivious spell' (331) in the Triumph, in 
which one forgets 'All pleasure and all pain, all hate and love' (319). The 
experience of oneness with nature mentioned by Rousseau also brings to mind 
Shelley's description of reverie in 'On Life', which, as Duffy again remarks, 
39 
may also be indebted to Rousseau's Reveries. In this essay, however, a 
distinction needs to be made between the kind of reverie which it suggests is 
within the reach of human experience, and the complete but unattainable 
knowledge of unity from which 'It is well that we are ••• shielded' (R&P, p. 
475). The former is closer to the 'rapture' described in 'On Love', which 
involves the projection of the self as 'a soul within our soul' or as an 
1antitype', which 'is the invisible and unattainable point to which Love 
tends' (R&P, p. 474). Rousseau's reverie in the Triumph, in which he pursues 
his antitype in the 'shape all light', is clearly more like this state, while 
the images of the cavern and the stream suggest an originary unity lost in 
'unknown time' (312). The 'shape', whose light is the dawn sun reflected on 
water, transcendental and temporal symbols respectively, is an image of that 
40 
unity projected on nature; hence she moves to 'the ceaseless song/ Of leaves 
and winds and waves and birds and bees' (375-6). This again reminds us of 'On 
Love', where Shelley speaks of finding in nature a suitable mirror of the mind 
when human sympathy is wanting: 'Hence in solitude ••• we love the flowers, the 
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grass and the waters and the sky. In the motion of the very leaves of spring 
in the blue air there is then found a secret correspondence with our heart' 
(R&P, p. 474). Rousseau's experience of the 'shape all light' in the Triumph, 
however, reveals the instability of this 'secret correspondence', showing how 
it fluctuates between subjectivity and objectivity, and is ulti~ately 
destroyed by the latter: neither 'flowers' nor 'solitude' nor the 'phantom' of 
his vision (461-64) can long delay him from joining the procession. In her own 
way, therefore, the 'shape' heralds the approach of the triumphal car as 
Matilda does in the Purgatorio, and her evanition, no less than that of the 
r---
'veiled maid' in Alaster, signals the inevitable defeat of solitary idealism. 
Thus the poem makes no final distinction between the poet and the thinker in 
Rousseau, as Duffy argues, but rather shows his ideals of reverie and retreat 
into nature to be symptoms of, not antidotes to, the 'contagion' (277) of 
life. 
Hogle's view that the poem offers the reader a choice between 'repressed 
and accepted transference', respectively represented by the visions of the 
narrator and Rousseau, opens itself to a similar objection: in a word, there 
is no transference that does not involve the projection of disfiguring 
41 
phantoms. As Miller says, in the end there is no difference between those 
who succumb to life and those who do not, just as in Alaster it is hinted that 
a similar fate awaits the 'luminaries of the world' and the 'meaner 
42 
spirits'. Nevertheless, Hogle rightly argues that the deconstructive chariot 
in the Triumph is itself shown to be susceptible to deconstruction, even if 
43 
not in quite the way he suggests. Although there is no escape from life's 
triumphal march, or from the concepts of unity and power upon which its 
progress depends (of which, arguably, transference is one), Rousseau's advice 
to the narrator to join the dance suggests that we can at least choose how 
willingly we participate. Moreover, by recommending that he freely submit to 
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the gyrations of subject and object, and plunge into the 'living storm' (465) 
as he did, Rousseau indicates how the mind's objectifying tendency might be, 
not defeated exactly, but subsumed within a continuing process of renewal and 
liberation. To act is to spectate, and vice versa, and the interaction between 
the two activities is what may constitute an emancipatory rather than a 
repressive view of life. Rousseau cannot state such a conclusion without 
negating it, but the poem does leave it open to be understood. 
The car oniy half erases the thoughts it rides over, and similarly, 
although the 'shape' tramples out the mind's 'embers', Shelley's poem confirms 
the suggestion of the 'Immortality' ode 'that in our embers/ Is something that 
doth live' (133-4). 'Day ••• /Treads out the lamps of night', but night remains 
as a 'dream' and will return. Memory, in crossing time, may be a form of 
forgetting, since it cannot recover immediate experience, but forgetfulness, 
where erasure is not total, also proves to be a way of remembering. This is 
the same paradox of Prometheus Unbound Act 2, Scene 1, where a readiness to 
forget enables Asia and Panthea to fill 'forgotten sleep/ With shapes' (142-
3), which lead them forward on their quest. In the Triumph the paradox 
repeatedly finds expression in the ambiguities associated with the images of 
day and night, sun and stars, waking, sleeping and dreaming. Whatever the 
poem's pessimism, it never loses hope to the extent of ceasing to weigh the 
forgotten against the remembered, the potential against the realized, and 
night, stars, sleep and dreams against day, the sun and wakefulness. Unlike 
Wordsworth in the 'Immortality' ode, however, Shelley does not find in 
'shadowy recollections' ('Immortality' ode, 153) consolation for the 
irretrievable loss of a transcendent origin. In the Triumph, memory and 
forgetfulness, like sleep and waking, alternate by creating and destroying 
each other. As Abbey has observed, natural images such as the sun which 
threaten to break free of their cycles and become symbols of transcendence are 
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repeatedly 'pulled back from static centre to turning circumference'. At the 
same time, what makes the circumference turn, and what gives the car of life 
45 
its motion, is the projection of those very symbols it dismantles. 
However accidental it may be, it is highly appropriate that the fragment 
should end with the unanswered question, 'Then, what is Life?' To ask this 
perfectly expresses what it is to.remember and to forget, and to be both actor 
and spectator in life 1s1 procession. Coming as it does at the end of Rousseau's 
account of his life and at the end too, it would seem, of the chariot's 
involvement in the narrator's dream, his question also serves as a reminder 
that he remains in ignorance, despite all he has learned. Thus scepticism 
ultimately mitigates the pessimism which it causes. Finally, and perhaps most 
appropriately of all, the question leaves us in doubt as to whether Shelley 
would have offered a different kind of answer from that already given. Such an 
answer may be difficult to conceive, but the question suggests the possibility 
is there. 
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C h a p t e r 8 
Conclusion 
In the forgoing chapters I have argued that a dialectical structure of thought 
informs the content and style of Shelley's poetry at a fundamental level. 
Reduced to its simplest elements, this dialectic consists of a competitive but 
interdependent relationship of subject and object. Oscillating between 
convergence and separation, and constantly making and remaking each other, 
subject and object vie for dominance, without either ever achieving a total 
ascendancy. This basic pattern of thought underlies the relation between 
numerous other polarities in his poetry, such as the concepts of necessity and 
freedom, tyranny and love, creation and destruction, permanence and change, 
the one and the many; it governs various aspects of his poetic mode--the 
relationship between sign and referent, fiction and reality, language and 
thought; and it informs his understanding of the relationship between the poet 
and his age, the poet and his poems, and the poems and the reader. Moreover, 
it accounts for Shelley's habitual philosophical attitude of sceptical 
idealism, in \·rhich contrary strains of thought only find their full scope 
through their interaction with each other. To see his work as thus constituted 
of a dynamic and creative interplay of contraries is in effect to view Shelley 
as the practitioner of a form of Romantic irony similar to that defined by 
Friedrich Schlegel. It is also a way of 'harmonizing the contending creeds' 
that belong to Shelley criticism, for it shows that the opposing emphases on 
his scepticism and his idealism, and on the political and private aspirations 
of his poetry, need not be considered as mutually exclusive. 
Shelley never expounds with any complexity in his prose the dialectic which 
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underpins his poetry, yet nor should we expect him to, for it is in his poetry 
that we look for his most original and profound philosophy. In practice, if 
not always in theory, he confirms the Coleridgean view of the subservience of 
philosophy to poetry, and illustrates Hartman's remark that 'the art of the 
2 
Romantics ••• is often in advance of even their best thoughts'. Yet the 
dialectical pattern of his thought revealed in his poetry clearly grows out of 
his interest in philosophical and scientific subjects, and is fully explicable 7 
-
in terms that he and other authors use in writing about them. His poetic 
preoccupation with the relationship of mind and nature, the question of which 
is prior, and its implications regarding a metaphysical origin, is heavily 
dependent on the investigations into these topics by both French and British 
philosophy of the eighteenth century. The natural sciences, too, provided him 
with many of the ideas which became essential components of his philosophical 
outlook: contemporary theories of the constitution and circulation of matter, 
of electricity, meteorology, geology and astronomy all involved the notion of 
cycles of growth and decay arising from the conflict of opposing forces. 
Although Shelley abandoned his materialism early in his career, the idea that 
mental and political processes are extensions of natural ones remained with 
him, and became entwined with idealist conceptions of the mind-nature 
relationship belonging to the 'intellectual philosophy' and also encountered 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century poetry and fiction. In view of the 
intellectual context in which Shelley was writing, it is not surprising that 
he should evolve a dialectical mental framework independently of his 
3 
contemporaries, Blake, Hegel and Harx, who did so more explicitly. 
Although the interrelationship of subject and object is present in all the 
major aspects of his thought, it is most obviously expressed and explored in 
his poetry through his treatment of external nature. Indeed, Shelley only 
finds his voice as a poet once he sheds his early rationalist disdain for the 
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'sickly sensibility' which takes delight in nature, and begins to view nature 
as an object worthy of emotional regard himself. Moreover, the most formative 
period of his poetic development, from 1815 to 1819, is one in which, owing to 
his extensive travels in Britain and on the Continent, he was exposed to a 
wide variety of natural scenery. The three works of this period which I have 
examined clearly reflect his responses to landscapes he has recently seen: 
Alastor makes particular use of river journeys he made on the Continent in 
1814 and up the Thames in 1815; 1Hymn to Intellectual Beauty' and 1Mont Blanc' 
are a record of his encounter with the scenery of Switzerland in 1816; and 
Prometheus Unbound draws heavily on his experience of the landscape of Italy 
through which he travelled in 1818 and 1819. The importance of these 
experiences to his poetic development is difficult to quantify with any 
precision, but there is little doubt that it was considerable. rmry Shelley 
does not exaggerate excessively in saying that 1every page of his poetry is 
4 
associated ••• with the loveliest scenes of the countries which he visited'. 
Shelley, likewise, needs to be taken seriously when, in the Preface to The 
Revolt of Islam, he puts nature alongside literature as the two principal 
components of his education as a poet. 
From 1815 onwards Shelley displays a remarkable consistency in his view of 
the relationship between mind and the external world. Although there are 
variations in the relative weighting he gives to subjective and objective 
points of view, and hence in his idealism and scepticism, his optimism and 
pessimism, these are predicated upon a constant idea of their dialectical 
interdependence. The development of his career therefore consists mainly in 
exploring the possibilities and implications of a structure of thought which 
remains essentially unchanged. Even in Queen ~~b it is possible to detect 
beneath the poem 1 s somewhat fissile monism the emergence of a mind-nature 
relationship of.attraction and repulsion. Shelley at this time was already 
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being influenced by various forms of idealism, encountered, for example, in 
the empirical philosophers, the poetry of Wordsworth, and the fictions of 
Goethe, Godwin and Owenson. Halbach's rationalist and impersonal conception of 
nature accordingly shows signs of giving way to one in which the senses and 
feelings are involved. vlhile Queen Hab confidently proclaims the unity of mind 
and matter, Alaster finally despairs at the way in which an idealist desire to 
recover a unity of subject and object is persistently thwarted. The Poet's 
journey by boat does, however, anticipate later such Shelleyan voyages which 
show how the same process of thought which constantly separates the mind from 
its objects can reverse this effect to bring them back into relation. In the 
two odes of 1816 he substantially achieves this reversal for the first time. 
In these poems it is discovered that the river-like motion of thought which 
seems always to flow away from its source in an 'unseen Power' can 
nevertheless gain an apprehension of power as a process of 'unremitting 
interchange' between mind and nature; and between the two conceptions of 
power, one representing permanence and the other change, there is also a 
mutual dependence and interaction. 'Mont Blanc' is Shelley's most 
dispassionate poetic analysis of the relationship of mind and nature, 
according them an almost equal influence, though it ends with a tentative 
affirmation of the power of the 'human mind's imaginings' to internalise and 
humanise the remote otherness of the external world. In 'Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty' the 'Spirit of BEAUTY', like power in 'Mont Blanc', is both a 
principle of relationship and flux, and a supramundane essence, but the poem 
finally privileges the latter and consequently falls into contradiction. In 
Prometheus Unbound Shelley considerably broadens the application of the 
·dialectic elaborated in the 1816 odes, above all by emphasizing its political 
and moral implications. Thus the emancipation of Prometheus can be seen as a 
corollary of the self-abandoning relationship with the external world which he 
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initiates and Asia continues. Act II is Shelley's completest demonstration of 
the creative and liberating potential of the interrelationship between subject 
and object (enacted by Asia) and between originary power and revolutionary 
process (both embodied in Demogorgon). However, the equality between these 
contraries is not indefinitely sustainable, and Prometheus eventually belies 
its egalitarian logic when, in Acts III and IV, the process which dethrones 
Jupiter itself threatens to become a form of dominance, in the same way that 
the 'Spirit' does in 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty'. Yet the play cannot do 
otherwise, given its commitment to political perfectibility, which, however 
much it may rely on an interplay of subjective idealism and objective 
scepticism, must finally give priority to the former. After Prometheus, 
Shelley is always more conscious of the self-defeating tendencies of the 
dialectical process which the drama celebrates. Adonais manages to reiterate 
the recovery of hope from despair, but it does so by going beyond Prometheus 
to address the nature of death, a question which is the cause of some 
awkwardness in the play. Death is the ultimate, indefeasible form of otherness 
in the poem, and in attempting to bring it within the poem's imaginative 
circle by relating it dialectically with life, Shelley presses his poetry to 
the very limits of its power to redeem life and meaning from decay. He can 
pursue his idealist quest no further than this, and although a few months 
later, in one of his 'few moments of enthusiasm', he returns to the theme of 
political progress in Hellas, his expectations of what can be achieved in 
5 
either politics or poetry have evidently passed their high-water mark. In its 
disillusioned recognition of the unavoidable division between subject and 
object, it is possible to see The Triumph of Life as the logical outcome of 
his career. The car of 'Life' is related to the chariot that bore Asia into 
the Promethean age, and is an emblem of the same inevitable process of 
history, but it is seen, not from the subjective vantage point of one who is 
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carried, but with the objectivity of a spectator. The possibility of renewed 
hope is not utterly excluded--and not only because the poem remains 
incomplete--but that Shelley should re-enact the redemption of Prometheus, 
whose myth of liberation he consciously revises, is scarcely conceivable. 
There is therefore some justification for Bloom's view that Shelley's final 
poem completes a cycle of rise and fall in his career, which takes him from 
the impasse of Alaster, through the celebratory high point of Prometheus 
Unbound, to the increasing despondency of his last years, and final admission 
6 
of poetic defeat. Viewed thus, his career fulfils a cycle resembling the 
cycles which are so recurrent a feature of his poems. Yet, as Tetreault points 
out, there is no evidence that the composition of The Triumph of Life and the 
storm in which Shelley was drowned were anything other than coincidental, and 
we should be wary of interpreting the poem as the terminus of his life's 
7 
work. Shelley's career consequently presents us with the same dilemma that 
his poems so often do. It engages us in the process of recreating meaning, of 
seeking a pattern in its continually evolving form, but by ending with 
uncertainty and irresolution, it also prevents us from ever completing this 
process. Resembling Hhat he calls in.the Defence 'the chaos of a cyclic poem' 
(R&P, p. 482), it thus draws us, his readers, into continuing the revolving 
activity of decreating and recreating which has constantly been his own. 
Some of Shelley's early statements about the laws of nature remain of 
continuing relevance to his poetic technique. 'Do we not see that the laws of 
nature perpetually act by disorganization and reproduction, each alternately 
becoming cause and effect'?, he writes in 1812, and in 1814 he supplements 
this by saying: 'The laws of attraction and repulsion, desire and aversion, 
8 
suffice to account for every phenomenon of the moral and physical world.' To 
study his poetic treatment of nature throughout his career is to be constantly 
reminded of these principles, and also to find them applicable to almost every 
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aspect of his thought. Any just appraisal of his work therefore requires that 
we acknowledge the full importance of its contrary impulses, their creative-
destructive interdependency, and their equality. 
It is in meeting this demand that Shelley criticism, throughout its 
history, has largely been wanting. For almost a century and a half after his 
death the main emphasis was upon his visionary idealism, his emotionalism, his 
love of nature and solitude. The revolution in Shelley studies which finally 
corrected this view has resulted in an immeasurably deeper understanding and 
appreciation of his writing, yet it has not been without its own imbalances. 
In giving a central place to his political concerns, a number of critics have 
found ways of reinterpreting those aspects of his poetry which earlier gave 
9 
substance to the myth of his unworldliness. Yet the dilemma of involvement or 
retreat is a real one for Shelley, and in so far as he solves it, he does so 
by linking the opposing tendencies in a creative dialectic rather than by 
subordinating one to the other. The current emphasis on his philosophical 
scepticism has also led to one-sidedness through a depreciation of his 
idealism. Shelley does·not merely admit an element of idealism through certain 
10 
loopholes in his prevailing scepticism, as some have suggested. Nor does his 
scepticism persistently undermine his idealism--as post-structuralist critics 
tend to argue--without a corresponding countermining from the other direction. 
Both de Man and Hogle can be charged with exempting themselves from the 
scepticism which they so rigorously apply. Shelley, with greater self-
awareness, recognizes that the attitude of scepticism can itself be 
deconstructed, and that language is inseparable from a degree of logocentrism. 
Hence, although his ideal imaginings are constantly put into question, they 
are as essential to the revolutionary process of his poetry as his rational 
doubt. In short, Shelley is equally a maker and an unmaker of myths, and we in 
turn should recognize that in dismantling earlier myths about him we cloak him 
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in myth once again. As spectators of the Shelleyan pageant we are inevitably 
actors as well. 
Notes 
1. I borrow the phrase from Shelley's letter to Peacock, 23-24 January 1819 
(Jones, II, 71). 
2. Hartman, 'Romanticism and Anti-Self-Consciousness' (1962), in Romanticism, 
Longman Critical Reader, ed. Cynthia Chase (London: Longman, 1993), pp·. 
43-54 (p. 47). 
3. Bloom draws a comparison between Blake's and Shelley's dialectic, 
particularly in relation to Prometheus Unbound, Shelley's Mythmaking, pp. 
46-140. Shelley's understanding of a dialectical relationship between 
creative intellect and social movement is thought to prefigure ~~rx by 
Cameron, Shelley: The Golden Years, pp. 131-34, and Everest, 'Shelley's 
Doub],es: An Approach to "Julian and Maddalo"', in Shelley Revalued: Essays 
From the Gregynog Conference, ed. Everest, pp. 69-71. Hoagwood thinks 
Shelley shows a relationship with the sceptical tradition of dialectical 
thought that lies behind Hegel, ~~rx and Engels, Skepticism and Ideology, 
p. xx. 
4. Preface to Posthumous Poems of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1824), in Hutchinson, 
p. xxvi. 
5. Letter to John Gisborne, 10 April 1822, Jones, II, 406. 
6. The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic Poetry (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1961), p. 353. See also Bloom, Shelley's r·1ythmaking, pp. 117, 
220. 
7. The Poetry of Life, p. 248. 
8. Murray, pp. 53, 115. See also above, pp. 51-52. 
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9. See above, pp. 20-21, 30 n. 39. 
10. See, for example, Pulos, passim; Reiman, Shelley's "The Triumph of Life", 
pp. 3-18; Wasserman, pp. 131-53. 
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